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Abstract 
 
The prevalence of anxiety disorders in the general population makes clarification of variables 
that contribute to the onset or maintenance of these disorders essential. Two such contributory 
variables are anxiety-induced selective processing bias and theorized subsequent explicit 
memory avoidance. The purpose of the present study was to examine the impact of one-session 
in vivo exposure treatment on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance 
immediately following successful treatment of stimulus-specific anxiety as well as at one-week 
and one-month follow-up. Participants (N = 60) were assigned to one of three groups: (1) the 
treatment group, composed of individuals who were fearful of either a snake or a spider and who 
received one-session in vivo exposure treatment for that fear; (2) the no-treatment group, 
composed of snake- or spider-fearful individuals who did not receive treatment for this specific 
fear; or (3) the control group, composed of individuals who were not fearful of either a snake or 
spider. Comparisons of these three participant groups occurred prior to treatment (i.e. pre-test 
assessment), following treatment (i.e. post-test assessment), and at one-week and one-month 
follow-up on tests of selective processing bias and on tests of explicit memory for a previously 
learned word list. It was hypothesized that treatment would cause immediate elimination of 
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance, but that the effects of treatment would 
reduce at one-week and one-month follow-up as no treatment maintenance procedures were used 
in this study. Mostly null results were obtained on all dependent variable measures used in this 
study at all assessment periods. This sample displayed no evidence of selective processing bias 
and/or explicit memory avoidance at any of the four assessment points, halting the investigation 
of the impact of treatment on these processes. Additionally, results pertaining to the impact of 
state and trait anxiety were largely null. Thus, all questions the study was to address could not be 
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adequately answered given the lack of evidence for the presence of the constructs in the sample. 
Focus of the discussion is on the reasons for the null results, including methodological issues as 
well as theoretical issues with the constructs of interest.
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Problem Statement 
 
 The estimated lifetime prevalence of anxiety disorders makes them among the most 
pervasive of mental disorders; for example, recent lifetime prevalence estimates for social phobia 
range from 3% to 13%, and lifetime prevalence estimates of specific phobia range from 7.2% to 
12.5%. This is in contrast to the prevalence of other disorders such as bipolar I, which ranges 
from 0.4% to 1.6%, and schizophrenia, which ranges from 0.5% to 1.5% (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994; Kessler, 1994; Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, 
Merikangas, & Walters, 2005). In light of their prevalence, understanding covert mechanisms 
that maintain anxiety disorders and the impact of treatment, particularly empirically supported 
behavioral treatments that directly address overt behavioral manifestations of anxiety, on these 
mechanisms is essential. Two such cognitive mechanisms, selective processing and explicit 
memory avoidance, have been studied extensively (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Coles & Heimberg, 2002; and Mitte, 2008 for meta-
analytic reviews) in an effort to determine the nuanced causes of some individuals perceiving the 
world as threatening while other individuals exposed to the same stimuli perceiving the world as 
innocuous. While these cognitive mechanisms have been examined across anxiety disorders, the 
focus of this study was the examination of selective processing bias and explicit memory 
avoidance in individuals who approximate fear characteristic of specific phobia compared to 
non-fearful individuals. 
Selective processing bias, also referred to as attentional bias or selective attention, refers 
to preferential encoding of threat-related information by anxious individuals compared to the 
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encoding of neutral information and to the encoding of the same threat versus neutral 
information by non-anxious individuals. The occurrence of this bias, which is likely the product 
of numerous factors, has been empirically demonstrated in anxious individuals exposed to 
anxiety-inducing stimuli (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997) as well as in non-
anxious individuals exposed to universally threatening material (Li, Wang, Poliakoff, & Luo, 
2007), and an evolutionary element to such bias has been suggested (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008). 
Selective processing bias theoretically occurs automatically and involuntarily, and there is 
evidence that spider phobic individuals consciously recognize their responses to spiders as more 
automatic in nature than non-fearful control subjects, although endorsement of high levels of 
self-reported automaticity were not related to therapy outcome (Mayer, Merckelbach, & Muris, 
2000). The occurrence of this reflexive and rapid attentional bias has been studied across a 
variety of anxiety disorders, and specific neural correlates, particularly the amygdala, associated 
with attentional bias have been proposed (Schienle, Schäfer, & Naumann, 2008; Straube, 
Mentzel, & Miltner, 2006). 
While a logical assumption may be that preferential recall for threat-relevant information 
is an inherent result of selective encoding of that information, evidence of congruent explicit 
memory bias is mixed (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). This lack of substantive evidence for explicit 
memory bias and the possible presence of explicit memory avoidance, or inability to consciously 
recall threat-relevant stimuli, may indicate distinctive adaptive reactions at various stages of 
cognitive processing. In a comprehensive literature review on the topic, Williams et al. (1997) 
reiterated their earlier proposal that initial automatic stages of processing favor bias for threat-
related information while later strategic stages favor avoidance of such information, thus 
producing such discrepancy (see also Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987). However, the 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  3 
authors note that empirical findings incongruent with this theory suggest that the interplay 
between selective processing bias and subsequent explicit recall is complex and that a singular 
theory is an inadequate representation of all cases. Further research is required to determine the 
relationship between selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance and the variables 
that may affect the occurrence of these two phenomena. Additionally, further research is needed 
on the impact of treatment on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance (Mobini 
& Grant, 2007), including research that investigates the long-term impact of treatment on these 
biases; the present study represented an effort to address this void in the literature. 
 The purpose of the present study was to investigate the presence of selective processing 
bias through the administration of an emotional Stroop task and an exogenous cueing task. In 
addition, explicit memory avoidance was evaluated to determine whether there were significant 
elaborative recall differences between snake- and spider-fearful individuals and non-fearful 
controls. Finally, the immediate and long-term effects of one-session in vivo exposure therapy on 
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance were examined. This study sought to 
improve upon existing studies and marry the literature on selective processing bias and explicit 
memory avoidance to produce data on differential cognitive processing in high- and low-anxious 
individuals and the factors that may produce or enhance such bias, such as state and trait anxiety. 
In addition, the assessment of treatment outcome will be used to determine whether an 
empirically supported anxiety treatment can modify a necessary component of anxiety 
maintenance—hypervigilance to and persistent rumination on anxiety-provoking information—
without overtly attempting to do so. 
The following literature review will address all crucial elements and constructs included 
in this study, beginning with selective processing bias. The theoretical foundation of selective 
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processing as well as the empirical examination of the phenomenon will be discussed. Uses and 
limitations of the emotional Stroop task, a primary methodological technique for detecting 
selective processing, will be elucidated, and the exogenous cueing task as a progression from the 
emotional Stroop task will be described. This will be followed by a discussion of the impact of 
selective processing on explicit memory and the important moderating variables that may 
produce discrepant results. The utility and hypothesized methods of change of exposure 
treatment for specific phobia as well as the impact of treatment on selective processing and 
explicit memory avoidance will complete the review.  
Literature Review 
Theories of Selective Processing Bias 
 
Many anxiety disorders appear to be characterized by disruption in memory that allows 
for the disproportionate recall of the feared situation or stimulus (DSM-IV-TR; American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994; Coles & Heimberg, 2002; MacLeod, 1991); post-traumatic 
stress disorder, for example, is characterized by both enhancement of memory for the traumatic 
experience and concurrent paradoxical memory impairment of varied aspects of the event such 
that recurrent, intrusive, and fragmented recollections disrupt the normal functioning of the 
trauma victim (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994). An agoraphobic’s 
fear may be exacerbated by recall of a single instance of an embarrassing or threatening situation 
that prohibited immediate escape in the same manner in which a person with generalized anxiety 
disorder may recall anxiety-provoking experiences more readily than positive experiences that 
should balance or even negate that information. Memory bias in anxiety disorders is often 
begotten from theories of selective processing, which broadly suggest that information that is 
deemed threatening is preferentially and more thoroughly encoded than neutral or pleasant 
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information and/or better encoded than a non-anxious individual’s encoding of that same 
threatening information. Understanding selective processing and theoretically resulting explicit 
memory bias has important clinical and scientific applications in that the maintenance of anxiety 
disorders may be at least partially contingent on sustained selective processing, and successful 
treatment should involve elimination or reduction of selective processing. 
Because of the possible centrality of the issue, selective processing bias has received 
extensive empirical attention and theoretical explanations, such as those posited by Aaron Beck 
(Beck, 1976) and Gordon Bower (Bower, 1981, 1992). Beck’s schema theory of cognition and 
emotion suggests that the development of maladaptive schema associated with depression and/or 
anxiety occurs early in life, though those schemas lie dormant in the cognitive system until an 
elevation in depression/anxiety occurs and activates specific schema. Once schemas are 
activated, they produce processing biases for schema-consistent information, thereby limiting 
cognitive processing availability for information that does not fit into the encompassing schema 
(MacLeod, 1990; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). The activated schemas distort all information 
processing and prime an individual to experience thoughts related to each schema, make negative 
predictions, and interpret ambiguous information in a manner such that it is schema-consistent 
(Coles & Heimberg, 2002). 
According to Bower’s network model, information in long term memory is stored in 
figurative nodes, all of which are located within a network and have associative connections with 
numerous related nodes. The activation of a single emotional node, produced by one’s current 
corresponding emotional state, spreads throughout that node’s associative connections and 
primes, or partially activates, those connections that contain mood congruent information. As a 
result of primed associative nodes, mood congruent information is disproportionately available to 
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the cognitive system, thereby inducing a processing bias favoring the encoding of emotionally 
congruent stimuli (Bower, 1981, 1992). Bower’s network model has been applied to numerous 
anxiety disorders; Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson, and Twentyman (1988), for example, 
described potentiation and inhibition of nodes, particularly the consistent potentiation of threat 
arousal nodes despite the absence of threat, in the maintenance of post-traumatic stress disorder 
in combat veterans. Both theories suggest that selective processing automatically occurs without 
conscious intent or acknowledgement; the theories differ in that Beck’s model seems to suggest 
that biases are result of an developmentally attained trait while Bower’s theory suggests that 
one’s state is the cause of bias (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). It is important to note, however, 
that neither model predicted different manifestations and varieties of memory bias for different 
emotional disorders (Coles & Heimberg, 2002), as is suggested in current research.  
Typical Experimental Paradigms that Assess Selective Processing Bias 
 
Two main categories of experimental paradigms, identification tasks and interference 
tasks, have been used to detect theoretical selective processing bias in anxious participants 
(MacLeod, 1991). Identification tasks, in which emotionally threatening and neutral words are 
presented to participants in a manner incompatible with conscious recollection, have been used 
to determine if anxious individuals are more adept at identifying threat words in spite of 
ambiguity. Included in this category is the dichotomous listening procedure (Foa & McNally, 
1986), in which two valenced word types, typically threat and neutral, are simultaneously 
presented into the right and left ears using headphones, and selective attention is revealed in the 
participant’s ability to better identify threat-related words. Noteworthy, however, is a 
methodological criticism for this particular procedure that was described by MacLeod (1991): 
apparent attention biases found using this procedure may be due to an anxiety-linked guessing 
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strategy rather than to encoding selectivity. The white noise paradigm, in which participants 
encode threat-relevant and neutral sentences and attempt to accurately repeat the sentences when 
they are presented with varying levels of background noise, has received limited use in phobia 
research (Olatunji, Sawchuk, Lee, Lohr, & Tolin, 2008). Backward-masking techniques (Öhman 
& Soares, 1993) have also been used to demonstrate possible preferential attention to threat by 
making a threat stimulus ambiguous to determine if threat is still accurately detected. 
Interference tasks, in which bias is indicated by a participant’s inability to ignore the 
meaning of emotionally threatening stimuli in order to perform some other simple task, are used 
extensively to determine if a participant allocates preferential attention to threatening stimuli 
compared to neutral stimuli. Included in this category is the dot probe paradigm, in which threat 
and neutral words or images are presented simultaneously in two different locations of a screen. 
The presentation of these stimuli is then followed by a dot or a similar target stimulus in the 
location of either the threat or neutral stimulus; this target stimulus serves to prompt participant 
response. Shorter response latencies when the target stimulus is presented in the same area as the 
threat stimulus is hypothesized to indicate more attentional resources devoted to that stimulus 
rather than to the neutral stimulus, thus resulting in the rapid detection of the target stimulus that 
replaces the preferentially attended to stimulus. The discriminative ability of the dot probe 
paradigm has been questioned, however, as typical use of the measure lacks the refinement to 
differentiate between vigilance and difficulty disengaging attention in anxious individuals (see, 
for example, Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). Also included in this category 
is the popular emotional Stroop color-naming task, including the Spider Stroop (Watts, 
McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986) that includes spider-related words. Emotional Stroop tasks 
most often involve the presentation of threat and neutral linguistic stimuli in various colors; the 
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participant is instructed to ignore the word’s meaning and simply name the color in which the 
word is printed. Longer color-naming response latencies are believed to indicate more attention 
devoted to the meaning of the word, which results in reduced speed in performing the required 
color-naming task due to that increased attention. Because this task represents a dominant 
experimental paradigm in this particular body of literature, the emotional Stroop task warrants 
closer examination. 
Uses and Limitations of the Emotional Stroop Task in Identifying Selective Processing Bias 
 
J. Ridley Stroop introduced the original Stroop task in an experiment published in the 
December 1935 edition of the Journal of Experimental Psychology; since its first appearance in 
the literature, the Stroop task has been used extensively to test hypotheses regarding cognitive 
processes such as interference, although it has undergone frequent modifications from its initial 
form to better accommodate the goals of attentional bias research. The original Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935) involved color words, such as red and blue, printed in a matrix on a card. These 
words were printed in a color different than the color named in the word; for example, the word 
“red” appeared in blue ink. The same matrix of color words was also printed in black ink to 
allow for a comparison in response latencies, which were measured with the use of a stopwatch 
that was started when the participant began reading the words on the card and was stopped when 
all words on the card had been read. Participants were to read the actual word while ignoring the 
ink color in which the word was printed, correcting all errors in reading the words that might 
have occurred as they proceeded. The significant finding of this task was that incongruent color 
word-ink color matches produced a significantly greater response latency than color words 
printed in black ink, intimating the presence of cognitive inhibition for incongruent color-ink 
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words; that is, one must inhibit the readily available response of naming the color in which the 
word is printed to name the actual word that suggests a different color. 
The advent and propagation of computer and software technologies that allowed for 
single word presentation, voice recognition, and millisecond response recordings for individual 
words permitted the Stroop task to reveal interference effects in greater detail. As the 
methodology of the original Stroop task evolved from a card format to a single trial 
computerized format, uses of the Stroop expanded to include identification of interference 
resulting from highly emotional words, and a modified form of the Stroop task was applied to 
depressive and anxious individuals to ascertain processing of emotional stimuli. This emotional 
Stroop task, which became a regularly implemented research methodology in the 1980s 
(Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), is a derivation of the original Stroop task that involves 
the presentation of emotionally-laden words (i.e. “spider” for spider phobic participants) that are 
thought to cause cognitive interference and subsequent slower response times, as is congruent 
with Beck’s schema theory and Bower’s network model. In a comprehensive review of the 
literature on the use of the emotional Stroop in the attentional bias literature, Williams et al. 
(1996) noted the success of the task in identifying selective processing in a wide range of anxiety 
and depressive clinical disorders. By using a unique methodology, Kelly and Forsyth (2007) 
demonstrated the utility of the Stroop task and, by extension, the emotional Stroop task in 
identifying selective processing bias. The authors used an observational fear classical 
conditioning procedure to condition healthy participants to fear previously neutral words that 
were then presented in a Stroop task; results indicated that the fear conditioning procedures led 
to the development of selective processing bias for the threatening words and that extinction 
procedures attenuated Stroop interference, thus lending support not only to the ability of the 
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Stroop task to detect attentional bias but also to the effectiveness of successful treatment in 
reducing such bias. 
Because of its dominance in the selective processing literature, research on the processes 
underlying or mitigating the interference effects typically found in the emotional Stroop task is 
fairly extensive, and there is an emphasis on understanding variables that may confound the 
typical interference for threat words produced in an emotional Stroop task. Larsen, Mercer, 
Balota, and Strube (2008) stated that many empirical studies on attentional bias that use the 
emotional Stroop task fail to control for lexical features such as word length and word frequency, 
two features that were controlled in the present study. The authors demonstrated that these 
lexical features account for a significant amount of the variance in Stroop response times, 
making due diligence to such potential confounds necessary for future emotional Stroop 
implementation. Waters, Sayette, and Wertz (2003) commented on potential carry-over effects of 
the Stroop task; that is, Stroop interference effects produced by repeating trials of negatively 
valenced words may be inaccurately inflated due to a participant’s rumination on previous 
words. Conversely, words presented in an unblocked format may decrease the emotional Stroop 
effect because rumination on previously viewed negative words may cause longer response 
latencies on subsequent neutral words. Several recommendations presented were to increase 
inter-item intervals, which was done in the present study, or to add filler items between threat 
and neutral words. Finally, the utility of the Stroop task has been questioned in several studies by 
Thorpe and Salkovskis (1997a, 1997b). The authors suggest lack of reliability intrinsic in this 
task given that an experiment they conducted revealed decreases in Stroop interference 
regardless of word valence in both treated and untreated spider phobic participants (Thorpe & 
Salkovskis, 1997a). They also suggest that Stroop interference may merely reflect preoccupation, 
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which is not necessarily indicative of anxiety. Despite procedural issues with the emotional 
Stroop, much empirical literature has been published using the emotional Stroop to establish the 
presence of selective processing (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  
Empirical Examination of Selective Processing Bias Using Typical Paradigms 
 
As is compatible with contemporary theories on cognitive bias, a great deal of empirical 
support for enhanced processing of threat-related information in anxious participants has 
emerged using such traditional paradigms as those previously mentioned, but many do not 
evaluate subsequent explicit memory (Elsesser, Heuschen, Pundt, & Sartory, 2006; Foa, Feske, 
Murdock, & Kozak, 1991; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 
1985; McNally, Riemann, & Kim, 1990; Öhman & Soares, 1993; Purkis & Lipp, 2007; Vrijsen, 
Fleurkens, Nieuwboer, & Rinck, 2009). Using a dichotomous listening procedure, Burgess et al. 
(1981), for example, tested the ability of individuals with agoraphobia, social phobia, and non-
phobic controls to identify threatening and neutral words. Both phobic groups exhibited a 
disproportionate ability to detect threatening words compared to neutral words, thereby 
suggesting a selective processing bias for threatening words. MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata 
(1986) found that anxious subjects demonstrated bias toward threat cues regardless of personal 
relevance of those cues, indicating the potential for enhanced processing of all threat-related 
information in anxious individuals. In a noteworthy study that evaluated both selective 
processing bias and explicit memory, Kindt and Brosschat (1998) used a negative priming and 
free recall task to investigate the hypothesis that selective processing bias operated in response to 
threatening stimulus-related words and cognitive avoidance replaced that bias in the presence of 
anxiety response-related words, such as “startled” or “terrified.” While individuals with spider 
phobia did show a selective processing and recall bias for threatening stimulus-related words, 
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there was no diminished recall for anxiety response-related words, thereby opposing the theory 
of cognitive avoidance for such stimuli. Cognitive bias for threat-related information has also 
been documented in the replicable phenomenon of “weapon focus,” which occurs when a 
threatening stimulus (e.g., the weapon of an attacker) is selectively encoded and recalled at the 
expense of other details, such as the appearance of the attacker (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; 
Steblay, 1992).  
Although identification and interference tasks remain the mainstay of anxiety-induced 
attentional bias research, other methodologies have recently been implemented in an attempt to 
more effectively detect reflexive and subtle selective processing bias. These methodologies have 
revealed evidence for such bias. In a novel paradigm employed by Cisler, Ries, and Widner 
(2007), for example, spider-fearful and non-fearful participants were tested not on the latency of 
their responses, as is the dependent variable in Stroop and dot probe paradigms, but on the 
accuracy of probe detection following identification of a valenced target word. The study 
employed a rapid serial visual presentation procedure (RSVP), which involved a computerized 
stream of words that included one fear-relevant target word and one neutral probe word. 
Participants in the control group were instructed to ignore the fear-relevant target word when it 
appeared but report the presence of the neutral probe word, which appeared various milliseconds 
later than the target word, while those in the experimental group were instructed to report both 
the target word and the probe word. The authors hypothesized that those experimental group 
participants who had elevations in anxiety would respond with earlier detection of the probe than 
non-fearful participants following the presentation of the fear-relevant target word; this would be 
primarily due to increased vigilance following presentation of the fear-relevant target word. 
Indeed, results indicated that spider-fearful participants demonstrated faster processing of the 
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target word and that these participants were better able to quickly identify the following probe, 
which suggested increased vigilance as a result of anxiety arousal. There was, however, some 
difficulty identifying the probe word if it immediately followed the target, which suggested 
difficulty disengaging attention from a threat-relevant stimulus, although this result was also 
demonstrated in the low spider-fearful group.  
Despite relative support for selective processing bias, studies reporting confounds that 
may operate to produce bias not attributable to preferential attention (Mathews & Klug, 1993) 
and avoidance of threat-related information in anxious individuals (Foa, McNally, & Murdock, 
1989; Pflugshaupt et al., 2007) or life-threatened individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2010) also exist. 
One study reported visual avoidance of fear-relevant stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, but no 
measure of automatic or strategic processing was administered (Tolin, Lohr, Lee, & Sawchuk, 
1999). A study that implemented the white noise paradigm with spider-phobic and non-phobic 
participants (Olatunji, Sawchuk, Lee, Lohr, & Tolin, 2008) found no evidence of preferential 
processing of spider-related sentences in individuals with spider phobia, and null results such as 
this have been reported elsewhere using other paradigms (i.e. Wenzel & Holt, 1999). A meta-
analytic review of 165 studies that used, among other measures, word-stem completion and 
lexical decision or stimulus identification implicit memory tasks found no relationship between 
anxiety and implicit memory for threat-relevant information across anxiety disorders, although it 
should be noted that these results may not generalize to other tasks of implicit memory (Mitte, 
2008). A study that used visual tracking technology (Rinck & Becker, 2006) found initial visual 
fixation on pictures of spiders by spider-fearful participants compared to non-fearful controls 
when those images were presented with pictures of butterflies, dogs, and cats, a finding that the 
authors hypothesized was attributable to automatic, involuntary processing of threat by spider-
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fearful individuals. However, this initial attentional bias was quickly followed by notable visual 
avoidance of the spider picture by the spider-fearful participants in favor of a picture that was 
subsequently rated as more pleasant: the picture of a cat. This result supports theoretical 
reflexive bias toward threat followed by avoidance of further elaboration of threat, which is 
deemed the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis that will later be discussed (Mogg et al., 1987; see 
Pflugshaupt, Mosimann, von Wartburg, Schmitt, Nyffeler, & Müri, 2005, for further support of 
this hypothesis), but the authors found no significant recognition differences between spider 
phobic participants and non-anxious controls on a test of recognition despite the attentional bias 
for threat-relevant information. Taken together, these results cast doubt on the existence of 
consistently operating anxiety-induced selective processing and call for an examination of 
possible moderator effects, such as anxiety-provoked rumination characteristic of trait anxiety, to 
explain such findings, which will be further examined in this review. 
Exogenous Cueing Task 
 
 The exogenous cueing task (Posner, 1980; Posner, 1988; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 
1980) has been used to examine the allocation of attention, specifically orientation to and 
detection of visual signals, in control participants as well as in participants with a variety of 
disorders (i.e. schizophrenia and affective disorders, Sereno & Holzman, 1996; or major 
depressive disorder, Leyman, DeRaedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2006). Typically, an individual is 
instructed to indicate the location of a target stimulus either to the left or right of a fixation cross 
after a peripheral cue has appeared in the same spatial location as the target (i.e. valid trials) or in 
the opposite spatial location of the target (i.e. invalid trials). Generally there exists facilitated 
responding, or decreased millisecond response times, to the target on valid trials due to increased 
attention devoted to that spatial location and increased response time on invalid trials, which is 
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known as the cue validity effect (Leyman et al., 2006). In his description of the exogenous 
cueing task, Posner (1988) described facilitation of responding to cued locations as measured in 
participant reaction times, the most typical measure, as well as other possible forms of 
measurement. He further stated that three components of attention are involved to produce the 
response facilitation observed during validly cued trials: (1) increased alertness to the target at 
the sight of the cue, (2) cue-initiated spatially selective movement of visual attention to the cued 
area, and (3) two unique forms of response inhibition. Those two forms of inhibition were 
described as cost, which refers to inefficiency in handling information presented at any uncued 
location due to orientation of attention to the cued location and difficulty disengaging that 
attention, and inhibition of return, which refers to reduced efficiency in attending to a previously 
cued location. 
As in the emotional Stroop task, an emotional modification of this task has been 
developed to evaluate the impact of emotional cues on attentional capture, which refers to an 
individual’s immediate attention devoted to a stimulus, and attentional holding, which refers to 
the impaired ability of an individual to disengage attention from a stimulus. A study that used 
conditioned aversive stimuli as peripheral cues, for example, demonstrated attentional capture as 
well as attentional holding by the aversive conditioned stimulus (i.e. CS+), thereby implying the 
ubiquitous nature of attentional bias to threat (Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De 
Houwer, 2004). That is, on valid trials, participants demonstrated a decreased reaction time to the 
target under CS+ cue conditions compared to reaction time to the target under nonconditioned 
stimulus (i.e. CS-) cue conditions, thereby demonstrating attentional capture. On invalid trials, 
participants demonstrated an increased reaction time to the target under CS+ cue conditions 
compared to their reaction time to the target under CS- cue conditions, thereby demonstrating 
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attentional holding. These findings suggest preferential attention devoted to anxiety-provoking 
stimuli followed by immediate inhibited disengagement of attention from such stimuli, although 
it should be noted that both these phenomena occur fairly instantaneously (i.e. milliseconds 
following the presentation of an anxiety-provoking stimulus) and may be followed by avoidance 
of further processing of the stimulus. 
This paradigm has infrequently been used to identify attentional bias in individuals with 
anxiety disorders. In an attempt to distinguish between facilitated attentional capture and 
impaired attentional disengagement of individuals with high and low trait anxiety, Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, and Wiersema (2006) used a modified exogenous cueing 
task and demonstrated both attentional capture and impaired disengagement in high trait anxious 
individuals at 100ms presentation of threat cues in Experiment 1. At 500ms cue presentation, 
however, these participants demonstrated attentional avoidance to threat-relevant pictures. 
Notably, those participants who were low in trait anxiety exhibited no threat-biased attentional 
capture. Waters, Wharton, Zimmer-Gembeck, and Craske (2008) used a visual probe task that 
was similar to the exogenous cueing task to assess attentional bias in children with a variety of 
anxiety disorders as well as the impact of treatment on bias. They found evidence for attentional 
bias toward threat cues in anxious children using this task, and they also reported that successful 
treatment of anxiety with cognitive behavioral group therapy did not alleviate such attentional 
biases. Despite its somewhat limited use in the literature on threat-induced attentional bias 
compared to the emotional Stroop, the exogenous cueing task overcomes some of the limitations 
of the emotional Stroop, which includes the inability to distinguish increased response latencies 
from attentional capture or attentional avoidance, by allowing for the assessment of possible 
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attentional avoidance, which would be indicated by response patterns clearly distinct from those 
indicative of attentional capture.  
Explicit Memory Avoidance: Effect of Selective Processing Bias on Subsequent Recall 
 
 While the phenomenon of selective processing bias has received relatively substantial 
empirical support, research on subsequent conscious recollection of threat stimuli has yielded 
diverse results. One may logically expect that information that receives preferential attention 
during encoding would enjoy subsequent enhanced recall; indeed, some studies seem to have 
assumed this to be true (e.g., Wessel & Merckelbach, 1997), and there is evidence that supports 
this assumption (Kindt & Brosschat, 1998; Smith-Janik & Teachman, 2008; Watts & Coyle, 
1992). Friedman, Thayer, and Borkovec (2000), for example, found a significant explicit recall 
bias for threat-related words compared to non-threat words in subjects with generalized anxiety 
disorder. A study examining memory bias in high and low anxious adolescents used the Stroop 
paradigm with the addition of a word-stem completion task and a recognition task to assess 
explicit recall; although the high anxious group did not show memory bias relative to the low 
anxious group on the word-stem completion task, there were significant between-group 
differences in the recognition task (Potter, 1999). The high anxious group recognized more 
threat-related words than the low anxious group, thus exhibiting explicit memory bias for threat-
related words on the recognition task. A meta-analysis by Mitte (2008) reported evidence of 
congruent explicit memory bias exhibited by high anxious subjects in recall tasks but no 
selective recognition of threat-relevant material in explicit recognition tasks, although between-
group reported effect sizes were typically small (see Mitte, 2008, particularly Table 9). 
Although these studies do suggest explicit memory bias for threat-relevant stimuli that is 
congruent with the bias found in selective processing, there are a number of contrasting 
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empirical studies that report explicit memory avoidance (Watts, 1986) or no significant recall 
differences between threat and neutral stimuli. Mogg et al. (1987) reported no support for threat-
related memory bias in anxious study participants, who in fact demonstrated poorer recall of 
threatening material than non-threatening material on recall and recognition tasks. Avoidance of 
threat-related stimuli (Watts & Dalgleish, 1991) and nonsignificant results for threat stimulus-
related words have been reported elsewhere (Watts & Coyle, 1993), including in a study that 
used video clips of spiders as the threatening stimuli and assessed explicit memory through recall 
and recognition tasks of the clips and their details (Thorpe & Salkovskis, 2000). Reconciliation 
for such divergent findings in explicit recall may be found in a theory hypothesized by Williams 
et al. (1997), which posits that elevated anxiety results in emotionally-congruent integrative 
processing characteristic of selective processing bias followed by emotionally-incongruent 
elaborative processing characteristic of explicit memory avoidance; thus, selective processing 
operates in anxious individuals such that they favor attention to threat but further elaboration 
required to consciously recall threatening information is hindered, resulting in explicit memory 
avoidance for threat-relevant stimuli.  
This theory has been tested using a combination of implicit tasks to uncover selective 
processing bias and explicit tasks to test for conscious avoidance of that information. As 
described above, implicit memory tasks, such as the masked Stroop test, measure passive 
acquisition of previously exposed material (MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995) while explicit 
memory tasks, such as free recall tests, measure strategic recollection of previously viewed 
material.  A study by MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995) examined whether participants with 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) would show a recall advantage for threat-related words on 
an implicit memory task (tachistoscopic identification) and on an explicit memory task 
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(recognition test) compared to non-phobic controls. Results indicated that the GAD group did 
show significantly higher levels of implicit memory for threat-related words than the control 
group; however, there were no significant differences in explicit memory between participant 
group or word valence. Other studies reported similar results in that implicit memory tasks 
suggested selective processing while explicit memory tasks suggested no recall differences 
between threat-relevant and neutral stimuli (e.g. Mathews, Mogg, May, & Eysenck, 1989). A 
literature review by Coles and Heimberg (2002) on memory bias in panic disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder 
reported that, while explicit memory bias for threat-relevant information enjoyed little support, 
there was modest support for implicit memory bias specific to these disorders.  
Thus, it appears that Williams’ theory is not fully supported by the literature, but partial 
support arises from studies in which explicit memory avoidance was found (e.g. Wenzel & Holt, 
2002). There is great difficulty in determining the impact of selective processing on subsequent 
recall in light of the inconsistency of results. MacLeod and Mathews (2004) stated that, because 
of the diversity of results in most anxiety disorders with the exception of panic disorder, 
“memory bias does not represent a robust characteristic of anxiety” (p. 180). They note, 
however, that possible inhibition of elaboration of selectively processed material or perceptual 
representations of threat-relevant information rather than conceptual representations may be 
possible explanations for the lack of consistent memory bias. Indeed, measures of implicit 
memory or tasks that imposed restricted awareness of threat material tend to more reliably 
produce biased recall rather than purely conceptual explicit measures. 
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The Impact of Potential Moderator Variables on Selective Processing and Explicit Recall 
 
Although there appears to be evidence supporting selective processing bias in anxious 
subjects, contradictory results or failures to replicate have led to the exploration of variables that 
may affect selective processing bias. The nature of the stimuli used in various paradigms 
designed to test selective processing has been examined in an effort to determine the ecological 
validity of the two most commonly used stimuli: valenced words and pictures. The presentation 
and subsequent priming tests for valenced words have produced results suggestive of the 
adequacy of such stimuli in detecting selective processing bias (Chen, Lewin, & Craske, 1996; 
Kindt & Brosschot, 1998; Lavy, Van den Hout, & Arntz, 1993; MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995; 
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Richards & Millwood, 1989). This has led to the use of valenced 
words in most studies examining this topic, although other stimuli have been used infrequently. 
In several studies, pictorial stimuli were presented to determine their efficacy in 
producing bias. Lipp and Derakshan (2005) used the dot probe paradigm with pictures of snakes, 
spiders, mushrooms, and flowers to detect possible attentional bias in snake- and spider-fearful 
participants and found preliminary evidence for bias toward threat-relevant pictures in fearful 
participants. Kindt and Brosschot (1999) used pictorial stimuli in an emotional Stroop test 
modification that was administered to spider phobic and non-phobic children; more specifically, 
they used pictures of spiders and chairs superimposed on a colored circle and labeled these 
images as nonintegrated pictorial stimuli. They then compared recall for nonintegrated pictorial 
stimuli to nonintegrated linguistic stimuli, which involved threat and neutral words superimposed 
in a colored circle, and integrated linguistic stimuli, which were the traditional Stroop stimuli of 
colored threat and neutral words. While bias was found for integrated and nonintegrated words, 
pictures elicited no selective processing bias in individuals with spider phobia, despite the spider 
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phobic participants’ judgment that pictures of spiders were the most aversive stimuli in terms of 
valence and arousal. An earlier study, however, by Kindt and Brosschot (1997) examined the 
same issue by exposing adult spider phobics and non-phobics to the same paradigm and found 
bias for threat-related words and pictures, although pictures elicited no greater bias as predicted. 
Similar results were presented by Lavy and Van den Hout (1993), but they reported that pictures 
elicited slightly less selective processing bias than linguistic stimuli.  
In addition to the nature of the stimuli, another frequently investigated variable that may 
affect selective processing bias is the relative contributions of state and trait anxiety, but the 
effects of each are often difficult to dissociate due to their high correlation (MacLeod, 1990). 
MacLeod and Matthews (1991) and Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, and Painter (1997) suggested that 
increased levels of state anxiety produce the most consistent results favoring selective processing 
of threatening information: indeed, a study by Foa and McNally (1986) found that clinically 
anxious participants’ memory bias for threat-related words was completely eliminated by 
reduction in state anxiety through imaginal exposure and exposure and response prevention 
treatments. Chen, Lewin, and Craske (1996) used the linguistic emotional Stroop paradigm to 
test the effects of increased state anxiety in spider phobic participants by presenting the feared 
stimulus before the Stroop test and eliciting continued state anxiety by informing participants 
that they would be physically contacting the spider after the computerized test. Spider phobic 
participants demonstrated selective processing bias toward threat-related information that was 
enhanced by elevated state anxiety. The authors concluded that elevations in state anxiety 
magnify bias that may have already been introduced by elevated trait anxiety, which other 
studies that will be reviewed momentarily have also regarded as a necessary condition for 
selective processing (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Richards & Millwood, 1989; but see 
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Wikström, Lundh, & Westerlund, & Högman 2004, for disparate results). A study exploring the 
effects of trait anxiety on autobiographical memory (Richards & Whittaker, 1990) suggested that 
high trait anxious individuals showed autobiographical memory bias for anxiety-related 
memories in that they were able to produce memories associated with anxiety-related cue words 
faster than happiness-related cue words; this result was not, however, replicated in a later similar 
study (Levy & Mineka, 1998). There was no evidence that high trait-anxious individuals 
detected fear-relevant stimuli faster than low-trait anxious individuals in a study that used a 
change detection paradigm, which involved subtle fear-relevant or fear-irrelevant changes to a 
computerized picture of a social scene (Mayer, Muris, Vogel, Nojoredjo, & Merckelbach, 2006). 
MacLeod and Mathews’ (1988) study involving college students with either high or low 
trait anxiety suggested an interaction between trait and state anxiety. Testing occurred once when 
state anxiety was low, which was early in the semester, and again when state anxiety was high, 
which was before a course examination. Word pairs consisting of threat and neutral stimuli were 
used in a probe detection task to determine amounts of visual attention to each stimulus. Results 
indicated that selective processing was not present when state anxiety was low for either high or 
low trait anxious participants but, with increases in state anxiety, high trait anxious individuals 
showed selective processing for threat-related stimuli while low-trait anxious individuals showed 
avoidance of threat-related stimuli. These results were tested in a similar study (MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 1992) that sought to determine the contribution of state and trait anxiety as well as 
automaticity of bias using a masked and unmasked Stroop procedure. On masked trials used to 
evaluate selective processing bias, elevations in state anxiety increased bias for threat-related 
information in high trait-anxious subjects but increased avoidance for such information in low-
trait subjects. In the unmasked exposure condition designed to test for explicit memory bias, high 
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state anxiety led to conscious avoidance of threat-related stimuli for both high- and low-trait 
subjects. Egloff and Hock (2001) used an emotional Stroop task containing general physical and 
ego threat words on a large nonclinical sample to clarify the effects of state and trait anxiety on 
Stroop interference and found results somewhat similar to MacLeod and Rutherford (1992); 
these authors found that only for individuals with elevated trait anxiety did concurrent elevated 
state anxiety produce Stroop interference. Participants who were low in trait anxiety and high in 
state anxiety showed reduction of Stroop interference. These studies suggest a difference in the 
nature of selective processing bias as a function of both state and trait anxiety variables as well 
as conscious versus unconscious awareness. 
One-Session In vivo Exposure Treatment for Specific Phobia 
 
 The prevalence of specific phobia, as mentioned above, has prompted the development of 
a robust literature on efficacious treatments with a considerable focus on the treatment developed 
by Lars-Göran Öst, which is deemed one-session in vivo exposure treatment; exposure treatment 
is, of course, a hallmark treatment for anxiety disorders, but the rapidity of one-session in vivo 
exposure treatment distinguishes it from other exposure methods. Behaviorally-based treatments 
for specific phobia have received much empirical support, with one-session in vivo exposure 
treatment in particular producing moderate to large effect sizes and positive treatment response 
rates of 76% or better (Wolitzky-Taylor, Horowitz, Powers, & Telch, 2008; see Zlomke & 
Davis, 2008, for a relevant review of the literature). The positive treatment outcomes produced 
by such brief treatments appear to be long-standing, with significant treatment gains remaining at 
follow-up of up to one year (Buchanan & Houlihan, 2008; Choy, Fyer, & Lipsitz, 2007; Gilroy, 
Kirby, Daniels, Menzies, & Montgomery, 2003; Koch, Spates, & Himle, 2004; Öst, Ferebee, & 
Furmark, 1997), although it should be noted that specific conditions (i.e. context changes, see 
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Mystkowski, Craske, & Echiverri, 2002; or trait anxiety, see Muris, Mayer, & Merckelbach, 
1998) have been implicated to cause eventual reemergence of fear responses or hindrance of 
treatment effectiveness. In a review of specific phobia and its treatment, Antony and Swinson 
(2000) reported that several variables predicted relapse of fear following successful treatment, 
including rate of fear decrease during treatment, alteration of anxiety-related cognitions as a 
result of treatment, and heart rate elevation at the beginning of treatment. Nevertheless, rapid 
behavioral treatment of specific phobias has proven effective in both single-session and multiple-
session formats. It appears that multiple-session formats add no significant treatment gains 
compared to single-session formats, however, thus making single-session formats practically 
preferred over multiple sessions (Hellström, Fellenius, & Öst, 1996; Öst, Alm, Brandberg, & 
Breitholtz, 2001; Öst, Brandberg, & Alm, 1997; Öst, Hellström, & Kåver, 1992; but see 
Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2008). Additionally, small group exposure therapy also appears 
efficacious (Öst, 1996; Öst, Ferebee, & Furmark, 1997), thereby increasing the feasibility of such 
treatment for some providers or individuals for which individualized treatment poses challenges 
or hardships. Technological advances have permitted creative new methods for administering 
one-session in vivo exposure treatment, such as those that implement virtual reality, and 
controlled clinical studies have shown promise of these methods (Garcia-Palacios, Hoffman, 
Carlin, Furness, & Bortella, 2002; Gilroy et al., 2003). The significant empirical support, the 
ease of implementation, and the cost-effectiveness of one-session in vivo exposure treatment 
have made it a primary treatment for the alleviation of anxiety produced by specific phobia.  
Öst (1997) described the rationale and foundational treatment procedures of one-session 
in vivo exposure treatment for a number of specific phobias, including arachnophobia (fear of 
spiders), ophidiophobia (fear of snakes), dental phobia, and claustrophobia (fear of enclosed 
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spaces), among others. Öst notes that the purpose of such treatment is to allow the participant to 
gain exposure to a feared stimulus in a controlled manner in order to demonstrate that the 
catastrophic events the participant fears will happen do not actually occur. As outlined by Öst 
(1997) and exhibited in several studies examining similar issues (Koch, Spates, & Himle, 2004; 
Lavy & Van den Hout, 1993; Lavy, Van den Hout, & Arntz, 1993; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997a), 
exposure treatment typically begins with pre-treatment instructions that explain procedures of 
treatment and introduce the Subjective Units of Distress scale (SUDs) that will be used to 
ascertain level of anxiety during treatment steps. The experimenter then verbally introduces 
treatment steps, which are arranged in a hierarchical fashion according to difficulty, individually 
to the participant and instructs on completion of the first step. Following verbal description and 
instruction, the experimenter then models the necessary components of the treatment step, 
permitting the participant to carefully observe as he/she demonstrates the treatment step. The 
importance of such modeling has been suggested by findings that participant observation seems 
to reduce anxiety cognitions while exposure activities reduce avoidant behaviors (Götestam & 
Götestam, 1998). Following modeling, the participant is asked to complete each successive 
component of the treatment step either independently or with the initial assistance of the 
experimenter, which is gradually faded such that the participant eventually completes the step 
independently. SUDs levels are taken at each treatment step and treatment continues until all 
treatment steps are completed with satisfactorily low SUDs levels. Thus, treatment steps may be 
sequentially repeated in cycles until all treatment steps are completed at satisfactorily low SUDs 
levels. The exposure that occurs in treatment is gradual and controlled, although such treatment 
represents only a portion of the therapeutic work that must be done; the participant is expected to 
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maintain therapeutic gains outside of treatment by initiating regular exposure to the previously 
feared stimulus. 
Effects of Treatment on Selective Processing Bias and Explicit Memory Avoidance 
 
 Foa and Kozak (1986) proposed that behavioral treatments such as in vivo exposure 
therapy reduce anxiety by evoking fear and allowing for habituation of anxiety and 
disconfirmation of threat associated with the feared-stimulus. Thus, if stimuli are no longer 
threatening, one may expect that they will not induce preferential encoding and cause no 
retrieval disruption. Again, few studies have been conducted to determine the effects of 
empirically supported treatment on anxiety, particularly specific phobia, and cognitive bias, 
although those that have been conducted have generally found that treatment reduces cognitive 
bias toward threat information (Teachman & Woody, 2003; Van den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, & 
De Jong, 1997; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986). Lavy, Van den Hout, and Arntz 
(1993) tested spider phobic participants and non-phobic controls using a Stroop task followed by 
one-session elaboration or non-elaboration exposure for phobic participants. The elaboration 
treatment condition encouraged participants to elaborate as much information about the spider 
stimulus as possible, thus preventing avoidance of threat stimuli, while the non-elaboration 
condition discouraged such elaboration. Selective processing bias for threat-related stimuli, as 
measured by the dependent variable of response latencies on the Stroop task, was reduced but not 
eliminated by treatment, and elaboration did not aid selective processing bias reduction. Lavy 
and Van den Hout (1993) used a linguistic and pictorial Stroop task to test one-session in vivo 
exposure treatment outcome in spider phobic participants and found reduction in bias for 
linguistic stimuli and elimination of bias for pictorial stimuli. Stanley-Kime (2008) reported that, 
following successful one-session in vivo exposure treatment, individuals who were previously 
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fearful of a snake or spider did not exhibit explicit memory deficits for environmental peripheral 
details that were exhibited by individuals who did not receive treatment and remained fearful 
throughout the experiment. In vivo exposure treatment therefore appears to impact cognitive 
processing based on the limited available data.   
 The examination of treatment outcome studies involving other anxiety disorders is 
warranted due to the potential generalizability of the results produced by variations of exposure 
treatment. Many studies focusing on a variety of anxiety disorders have reported reduction of 
selective processing bias, but most do not evaluate explicit memory (e.g. Mathews, Mogg, 
Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995). A study by Masia, McNeil, Cohn, and Hope (1999), for example, 
provided treatment of social phobic individuals by (1) exposing participants to social anxiety 
words; (2) asking participants to imagine an anxiety-provoking image related to the content of 
the word, a pivotal component of imaginal exposure; and (3) performing an emotional Stroop 
task with social anxiety words to assess changes in color-naming response time. The authors 
reported a significant reduction in Stroop interference following treatment, but limitations of this 
study, including the small sample size (N =7) and the uncertainty of whether the same social 
threat words that were presented during treatment were also presented in the emotional Stroop, 
preclude tenable conclusions. Lundh and Öst (2001) reported reduced emotional Stroop 
interference exhibited by social phobic participants for social threat words following individual 
as well as group CBT, but it should be noted that similar reduced interference was found for all 
participants for physical threat words and a floor effect may have existed for treatment non-
responders. Interestingly, latency between pre-test and post-test measurement varied widely 
among participants in this study, with some participants receiving post-test measurement up to 
two years after treatment; this variable latency was not accounted for in any reported statistical 
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analysis. McKay (2005) used a directed forgetting task, a Stroop task, and a dot-probe task to 
establish whether selective processing and memory biases were evident after “worrier” and “non-
worrier” participants actively engaged in positive imagery, a component of many treatment 
programs for anxiety. Compared to participants who were in the worry-induction group, the 
“worrier” participants who were instructed to engage in positive imagery showed a reduction in 
selective processing and memory biases for threat-related information. Finally, several studies 
examining the impact of medication on attentional and interpretive bias (i.e. the tendency for 
anxious individuals to interpret ambiguous information as threatening in nature) in individuals 
with generalized anxiety disorder and other anxiety disorders have found reduction in these 
biases with anxiety medication use (Mogg, Baldwin, Brodrick, & Bradley, 2004). However, lack 
of medication effect on bias (Golombok, Stavrou, Bonn, Mogg, Critchlow, & Rust, 1991) and 
potential increases in bias as a result of medication (Stewart, Westra, Thompson, & Conrad, 
2000) have also been reported.  
Despite the small literature that supports the efficacy of treatment in reducing cognitive 
bias, some studies have produced incompatible results (see, for example, Waters, Wharton, 
Zimmer-Gembeck, & Craske, 2008, although note that this study’s sample consists only of 
children). Thorpe and Salkovskis (1997a) administered a Stroop task of spider, disgust, 
emotional, and neutral words to spider phobic participants to test the effect of one-session 
cognitive behavioral treatment for phobia. Although the treatment was effective in reducing fear 
and negative beliefs toward the feared stimulus, participants who both did and did not receive 
treatment showed a decrease in Stroop interference for all word types, including spider stimuli. 
The authors suggested that the Stroop may be an inadequate measure of selective processing 
given that phobic participants may not respond to semantic stimuli in the same manner in which 
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they would respond to an actual spider stimulus. An experiment that assessed implicit and 
explicit attitudinal change (Huijding & de Jong, 2009) in spider-fearful individuals immediately 
post-treatment and at two-month follow-up found explicit but not implicit attitude change 
following one-session in vivo exposure treatment. The resistance of implicit attitudinal change to 
treatment (e.g. Hermans et al., 2005) and the eventual spontaneous return of fear following 
treatment (e.g. Mineka et al., 1999; Vansteenwegen, Vervliet, Hermans, Thewissen, & Eelen, 
2007) have been suggested elsewhere; the possible inadequacy of brief treatment in addressing 
core implicit attitudes toward the feared stimulus and reemergence of clinically significant fear 
symptoms creates uncertainty as to the ability of such treatment to address similarly functioning 
attentional bias. The effect of in vivo exposure therapy was also tested on general memory, recall 
for anxiety level, and recall for the phobic stimulus in spider-fearful subjects (Zoellner, 
Echiverri, & Craske, 2000). Improved recall for anxious responses was noted post-treatment, but 
there was no improved recall for stimulus details. This may indicate possible interference or 
avoidance caused by anxiety, even following one session of exposure treatment. As is evident, 
theoretical reduction in recall avoidance of threatening words as a result of empirically supported 
treatment has received limited attention, and there have been requests for greater examination of 
the effects of treatment on cognitive bias as well (Mobini & Grant, 2007). 
Empirical Limitations and the Present Study in Relation to the Literature 
 
While the literature on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance is 
extensive, there are several significant limitations that were addressed in the current study. 
Although the impact of state and trait anxiety has been studied, the empirical literature lacks 
methodologies that use the feared stimulus to produce the highest levels of state anxiety. Many 
studies use linguistic stimuli or, more infrequently, pictures to assesses the occurrence of these 
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cognitive phenomenon; the assumption adopted by researchers who employ these methods is that 
linguistic and pictorial stimuli alone are adequate representations of the feared stimulus such that 
they induce anxiety without the aid of any additional anxiety-arousing stimulus. This assumption 
appears accurate upon review of the literature, but there is opportunity for improvement given 
typically small effect sizes (Cohen’s d = .45; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). While the current study 
used both linguistic and pictorial stimuli to assess for selective processing bias and explicit 
memory avoidance, participants anticipated that contact would be made with the feared stimulus 
after completion of the assessment measures per the instructions of the experimenter prior to 
assessment. Additionally, the question of whether behavioral treatments address cognitive 
mechanisms, particularly automatic and unconscious preferential attention to threat, that may be 
experienced by anxious individuals warrants further investigation (see Huijding & de Jong, 
2009) and the long term impact of treatment on these mechanisms in the absence of maintenance 
procedures is uncertain. The introduction of treatment into the typical experimental paradigm in 
this literature also allows for a more complete assessment of the role of state and trait anxiety as 
one would expect within-group reduction of state anxiety in participants who receive treatment. 
Hence, the protocol of this study permitted examination of selective processing bias and explicit 
memory avoidance in individuals who theoretically experienced decreases in state anxiety 
compared to individuals who remained highly state anxious. 
The methodology of the current study enabled it to contribute significantly to the 
empirical literature. The current study sought to examine the impact of one-session in vivo 
exposure treatment on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance immediately 
following successful treatment and at one-week and one-month follow-up. Pre-treatment 
measures of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance were incorporated to 
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support the assertion that potential changes in cognitive processing were indeed a result of 
treatment. Selective processing bias was initially measured through an emotional Stroop task and 
further analyzed through the exogenous cueing task, which was fairly unique to the literature and 
used to further delineate results found in the emotional Stroop. Explicit memory avoidance was 
assessed through free recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition tests of previously presented 
threat-relevant and neutral words. One-week and one-month follow-up assessment points were 
chosen based on the protocol of a treatment outcome study by Koch, Spates, and Himle (2004) 
that demonstrated maintenance of treatment effects at these assessment periods. In light of the 
limited literature on the enduring impact of treatment on the cognitive phenomena targeted in 
this study, more limited follow-up periods have been selected and could be extended in 
subsequent research if treatment showed continued mitigation effects on maladaptive cognitive 
processing at these assessment points.  
The performance of three participant groups, specifically a group of fearful individuals 
who received one-session in vivo exposure treatment, a group of fearful individuals who did not 
receive any anxiety treatment, and a non-fearful control group, on measures of implicit and 
explicit memory was compared to assess the presence of selective processing bias and explicit 
memory avoidance. Every participant who fully completed the protocol received four 
assessments of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance: a pre-test assessment, a 
post-test assessment, a one-week follow-up assessment, and a one-month follow-up assessment. 
One important contribution that this study offered is the evaluation of both attention and memory 
during anxiety-induction; most studies in this literature examined only one of these cognitive 
processes, and, as mentioned previously, many did not include contact with the live feared 
stimulus to maximize the likelihood of increased state anxiety. Additionally, the impact of state 
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and trait anxiety was assessed with a focus on the fluctuation of state anxiety over time as result 
of treatment. The most significant contribution of the current study was the exploration of the 
enduring impact of one-session in vivo exposure therapy (Öst, 1997) on both selective processing 
and explicit memory avoidance. As mentioned previously, limited studies have examined 
treatment outcome in selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance in participants 
with specific phobia, and no studies to the knowledge of the author had addressed the issue of 
durability of behavioral treatment effects on these phenomena. While the prolonged treatment 
effects of one-session in vivo exposure treatment have been suggested (i.e. Koch et al., 2004; 
Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2008), there is little research examining the sustainability of the indirect 
cognitive effects of such a treatment when maintenance and generalization procedures are 
excluded. Zlomke and Davis (2008) indeed asserted that no studies to the date of their article 
examined the impact of maintenance procedures in the preservation of treatment gains in 
exposure treatment, making their necessity ambiguous.  
By addressing relevant points in the literature and attempting to integrate methods used in 
various studies, this study represented a potential contribution to both the scientific and applied 
aspects of anxiety disorders in that further knowledge was anticipated to be gained about a 
crucial component of anxiety—heightened cognitive sensitivity to threat-relevant stimuli—and 
how that component differentially operates to maintain anxiety. The ultimate goal of the study 
was to provide information that would inform treatment of specific phobia, specifically through 
the establishment of whether a strictly behavioral treatment with no cognitive component could 
alleviate cognitive biases by allowing for the assimilation of non-threatening information 
regarding the feared stimulus and whether this treatment could maintain its effects over time in 
the absence of maintenance procedures. If theorized vigilance toward threatening stimuli and 
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subsequent avoidance of that stimuli can be reduced, innocuous and positive stimuli might be 
integrated, perhaps eliminating the cyclic cognitive patterns involved in anxiety.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
The current study used a quasi-experimental longitudinal design with three participant 
groups. Each participant group received four periods of assessment: a pre-test assessment that 
occurred before treatment, a post-test assessment that occurred immediately following treatment, 
one-week follow-up assessment, and one-month follow-up assessment. There are several primary 
research questions that were addressed in the current study, and these questions have been 
divided into thematic groups for ease of reporting and enhancement of understanding.  
Question Group 1: Presence of Selective Processing Bias and Explicit Memory Avoidance 
 
The first question group addressed the existence of selective processing and explicit 
memory avoidance in light of the lack of definitive evidence for either in the literature. To 
examine this, the results obtained from pre-test assessments of the treatment and no-treatment 
groups were compared to the pre-test assessment results of control group. There were also 
within-group comparisons; that is, responses to threat stimuli versus neutral stimuli were 
compared in the pre-test assessments of the no-treatment and treatment groups. Thus, the 
following research questions and hypotheses within this question group refer to results obtained 
from the pre-test assessment of the treatment group and the no-treatment group.  
It should also be noted that, in regard to the exogenous cuing task, hypotheses included 
reference to facilitated responding and attentional capture. Facilitated responding refers to 
decreased response times of participants to targets presented in valid trials; the mechanism 
underlying this occurrence is thought to be preferential attention paid to the cue that precedes the 
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target such that the target that replaces that cue is able to be detected more rapidly. Attentional 
capture, also known as attentional holding, refers to an increase in response times of participants 
to targets presented in invalid trials; the mechanism underlying this occurrence is thought to be 
an inability to disengage attention from the cue that precedes the target such that the target that 
appears in the rectangle opposite the cue is detected more slowly. 
The first group of research questions and hypotheses are (1) will there be selective 
processing bias found in the emotional Stroop task?  It was hypothesized that selective 
processing bias would be found in these groups at the above mentioned assessment period, as 
would be evidenced by longer response times on the emotional Stroop task for threat words 
compared to neutral words. (2) Will there be selective processing bias on the exogenous cueing 
task?  It was hypothesized that selective processing bias would be found in the exogenous cueing 
task in these groups. This would be evidenced by greater levels of facilitated responding to 
targets presented with valid threat cues compared to targets presented with valid neutral cues. (3) 
Will there be attentional capture on the exogenous cuing task?  It was hypothesized that these 
groups would exhibit attentional capture on the exogenous cuing task when threat invalid cues 
were compared to neutral invalid cues and uncued trials. Finally, (4) will there be explicit 
memory avoidance on the tests of free recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition? It was 
hypothesized that there would be explicit memory avoidance in these groups, which would be 
evidenced by decreased explicit recall of threat-relevant words. Although the results of empirical 
examinations of anxiety-induced cognitive bias are mixed, there seems to be substantial evidence 
suggesting the presence of selective processing bias for threat-relevant stimuli and some 
empirical support for later explicit memory avoidance of those threatening stimuli.  
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Question Group 2: Impact of Treatment on Anxiety-Induced Cognitive Processes 
 
The second group of research questions concerned the impact of treatment on 
hypothetically indicated selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. Questions in 
this group were answered by a within-group comparison involving the treatment group; that is, 
pre-test assessment results were compared to post-test assessment results in treatment group 
participants. Additionally, the post-test results of the treatment group were compared to the 
results of the no-treatment and control groups at post-test. The research questions and hypotheses 
in this group were (1) will one-session in vivo exposure treatment, an empirically supported and 
highly effective rapid behavioral treatment for specific phobia, immediately eliminate selective 
processing bias and reduce potential inhibitory processes operating to suppress explicit recall of 
threat-relevant information? It was hypothesized that one-session in vivo exposure treatment 
would immediately eliminate selective processing bias and reduce inhibition of threat-relevant 
information characteristic of explicit memory avoidance. If this pattern of results indeed 
occurred, one would expect the results of the treatment group to be roughly equivalent with the 
results of the control group on all dependent measures. One would also expect to find equivalent 
response latencies for threat-relevant and neutral stimuli on the emotional Stroop task in the 
treatment group at post-test; that is, the results obtained from treatment group on the emotional 
Stroop task should closely match those obtained by the control group, while the no-treatment 
group should have demonstrated selective processing bias for threat words. On the exogenous 
cueing task, one would expect to find equivalent reaction time to targets presented after threat 
and neutral cues on valid trials in the treatment group at post-test. One would also expect that 
reaction time would be equivalent on invalid trials when neutral and threat cues were compared 
in the post-test measurement of the treatment group. Additionally, if treatment was immediately 
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effective, one would expect equivalent recall for both threat-relevant and neutral words on 
explicit tests of memory in the treatment group at post-test, which should have resembled the 
results obtained by the control group; the no-treatment group should have demonstrated explicit 
memory avoidance.  
In addition to immediate effects, prolonged effects of treatment were assessed at one-
week and one-month follow-up. To examine the prolonged impact of treatment, results from the 
treatment group obtained at one-week and one-month follow-up were compared to the results of 
both the no-treatment and control groups at the same assessment time periods. Also, there was 
within-group comparison that occurred in the treatment group; that is, post-test results obtained 
in the treatment group were compared to one-week and one-month follow-up results within that 
group. The research question was (2) will hypothesized treatment gains exhibited in the 
treatment group remain stable at one-week and one-month follow-up?  It was hypothesized that 
the immediate treatment gains exhibited by the treatment group, as described above, would 
gradually decrease over time in the absence of treatment maintenance procedures. That is, the 
treatment group should have shown gradually increasing response times for threat-relevant 
words on the emotional Stroop and gradually enhanced facilitated responding (i.e. decreased 
response times) on valid trials and increased response times (i.e. attentional capture) for threat 
stimuli on invalid trials on the exogenous cueing task. One would also expect progressively 
decreased recall of threat words on tests of explicit memory. This return of selective processing 
bias and explicit memory avoidance was hypothesized to be due to increased state anxiety in the 
treatment group. All treatment gains, however, were not anticipated to be lost, and results of the 
treatment group were not anticipated to equate with those of the no-treatment group. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  37 
Question Group 3: Impact of State and Trait Anxiety on Selective Processing Bias and 
Explicit Memory Avoidance 
The final group of research questions addressed the impact of state and trait anxiety on 
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. To examine these questions, 
participants were recategorized according to levels of state and trait anxiety such that four 
mutually exclusive categories were created: high in both state and trait anxiety, high in state 
anxiety but low in trait anxiety, low in state anxiety but high in trait anxiety, and low in both 
state and trait anxiety. The grouping of participants into one of the four anxiety groups was based 
on pre-test assessment of anxiety levels, although the study author initially planned to group 
participants by anxiety level at each assessment point. These anxiety groups were compared on 
the dependent variable measures at each assessment period with the main assessment point of 
interest being pre-test assessment. The research questions were (1) will selective processing bias 
and explicit recall differences arise as a result of high or low state or trait anxiety in participants?  
For example, will those participants with high levels of both state and trait anxiety demonstrate 
greater selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance than those who had high levels 
of either state or trait anxiety or low levels of both state and trait anxiety? It was hypothesized 
that state and trait variables would interact. Those participants who demonstrated high levels of 
both state and trait anxiety would exhibit the greatest selective processing bias and produce more 
explicit recall avoidance of threat-relevant stimuli. Also, (2) will possible increases in state 
anxiety, as may be seen in the one-week and one-month assessments, in the treatment group 
result in greater selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance?  It was hypothesized 
that, if state anxiety increased in the treatment group at one-week and one-month follow-up 
assessments, greater selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance would be found. 
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Method 
Participants 
 
Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses at Eastern Michigan 
University and, at the discretion of their professors, offered extra credit for their voluntary 
participation. In addition to the possibility of extra credit, all Experimental Phase fearful 
participants were offered one-session in vivo exposure treatment if they did not receive such 
treatment during the course of their participation in the experiment; no no-treatment group 
participant accepted this offer for free treatment. Participants were first asked to complete several 
online questionnaires and a background survey during the Screening Phase of the study. A 
portion of those individuals who completed the Screening Phase and indicated interest in the 
Experimental Phase of the study were recruited for the Experimental Phase via email or phone 
contact made by the primary investigator. Given the demographic features of the students of 
Eastern Michigan University (Eastern Michigan University website, n.d.) as well as similar past 
recruitment efforts, the samples for the Screening and Experimental Phases included more 
women than men and the sample was mostly Caucasian; African Americans and individuals of 
other ethnicities composed a small portion of the sample. Due to narrowly focused recruitment 
efforts, the individuals included in the Experimental Phase of the study were quite young with a 
mean age of 22.38 (range = 18-56). This participant sample was chosen based on evidence that 
anxiety-related cognitive bias can be induced in individuals whose anxiety is perhaps not 
clinically diagnosable (e.g. Kelly & Forsyth, 2007; Li, Wang, Poliakoff, & Luo, 2007), thereby 
making distinction between individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for specific phobia and 
those whose fear is diagnostically subthreshold unnecessary. Thus, no participant was formally 
screened for any clinically diagnosable disorder. 
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The online Screening Phase of the study was made available to any individual recruited 
from undergraduate psychology courses, and there was no limit placed on the number of 
participants for this phase. An affiliate of the study, with the prior permission of the instructor of 
the class, entered a classroom and provided a very brief and scripted description of both the 
Screening Phase and the Experimental Phase of the study. Following this description, the 
affiliate answered any questions and circulated a sign-up sheet around the class that asked for 
each interested individual’s email address. An email that included general information about the 
Screening Phase of the study and the unique web link to the study was sent to all individuals who 
provided a valid email address. By clicking on the study’s link or copying that link from the 
email into the internet address bar, participants accessed the Screening Phase assessments. 
Potential Screening Phase participants were initially presented with a Screening Phase Informed 
Consent Agreement (see Appendix A) that outlined, among other relevant topics, the purpose, 
procedures, risks, and benefits of participation in the Screening Phase of the study. In order to 
complete the online assessments, an individual had to select that he/she agreed to the terms 
presented in the informed consent agreement. A phone number and email address of the primary 
investigator and the faculty advisor was provided to ensure that questions regarding the informed 
consent agreement could be addressed prior to the potential participant giving consent. 
There was to be an anticipated total of 60 participants, or 20 per participant group, for the 
Experimental Phase of the study; this number, which achieved a power of .80 at a 95% 
confidence interval, was based on a power analysis conducted using the primary investigator’s 
thesis data (Stanley-Kime, 2008). Participants for the Experimental Phase were recruited from 
the sample that completed the Screening Phase online assessments and indicated on the 
background questionnaire that they were interested in being contacted for further participation 
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opportunities. Participants were contacted via their preferred method of contact, and those who 
accepted the primary investigator’s invitation were those who are included in the Experimental 
Phase. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the Experimental Phase were assessed using each 
participant’s response to the Screening Phase assessments. Individuals were fearful of either a 
snake or a spider to be considered for either the treatment group or the no-treatment group. To be 
considered fearful, participants need not have met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders Fourth Edition Revised (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
1994) criteria for specific phobia; rather, they must have obtained a score in the significantly 
fearful range (70-126) on the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) or on the Fear of Snakes 
Questionnaire (FSnQ). For individuals assigned to the treatment and no-treatment groups, the 
animal/arachnid that he/she reported to most fear was used in the case that the participant met 
criteria for both. Individuals were required to be non-fearful of either a snake or a spider to be 
considered for the control group, meaning that they obtained a score in the non-fearful range (10 
or below) on the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) or on the Fear of Snakes Questionnaire 
(FSnQ). For individuals assigned to the control group, the animal/arachnid corresponding to the 
lowest score on either measure of fear (i.e. FSQ or FSnQ) was used in the case that the 
participant was not fearful of both. If an individual feared one stimulus, thus meeting criteria for 
inclusion in the treatment or no-treatment group, but did not fear the other stimulus, thus meeting 
criteria for the control group, that individual was selected for either the treatment or no-treatment 
group.  
Exclusionary criteria for the Experimental Phase of the study were assessed during the 
Screening Phase of the study, specifically using the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 
item version (DASS-21) and the background questionnaire. All participants had nominal levels 
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of depression, as indicated by a score of six or below on the Depression subscale of the DASS-
21. On the background survey, those individuals who endorsed a condition that may affect 
normal brain functioning, a learning disability, allergies to a snake or a spider, a compromised 
immune system, or color blindness were excluded from the study. In accordance with ethical 
considerations, those individuals who reported medical conditions, including pregnancy and 
heart conditions that could be negatively impacted or exacerbated by anxiety induction, were 
excluded from the study. Prior to participation in the Experimental Phase, participants were 
placed into one of three groups (i.e. treatment group, no-treatment group, or control group; see 
Procedures: Initial Experimental Phase Procedures for All Participants section for details on 
group assignment). Upon meeting with the primary investigator/research assistant for 
Experimental Phase participation, all individuals were presented with an Experimental Phase 
Informed Consent Agreement (see Appendix B) that detailed, among other topics, the purpose, 
procedures, risks, and benefits of participation in the Experimental Phase of the study, including 
follow-up procedures. 
Measures 
Screening Phase Online Assessments 
            Fear evaluation.  
 
Two brief questionnaires were used to assess fear level toward the snake and arachnid 
used in the experiment; these questionnaires were administered online and psychometric 
properties of such an administration were assessed using data collected from the author’s thesis 
(Stanley-Kime, 2008) and are reported below. The recently developed Fear of Spiders 
Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995; see Appendix C) is an 18-item self-report 
instrument that evaluates current fear of spiders with statements that are rated on an 8-point 
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Likert scale where 0 indicates totally disagree and 7 indicates totally agree. Items are scored by 
summing the participant responses to form a composite score and no items are reversed scored. 
Scores range from 0 to 126 with higher scores indicating greater amounts of fear elicited by a 
spider stimulus. The mean score for spider phobic individuals on the FSQ in a study by Muris 
and Merckelbach (1996) was 89.1 (SD = 19.6), and this was used to establish the cutoff score of 
70 on either of these questionnaires for individuals to be considered fearful in the current study. 
In addition to the FSQ, the Fear of Snakes Questionnaire (FSnQ; see Appendix D) was 
developed from the FSQ for this study; again, psychometric properties of this questionnaire were 
obtained from previously collected thesis data and are reported below. The FSnQ was created by 
substituting the word “snake” for the word “spider” in the questionnaire and rewording several 
questions, specifically question numbers 5, 10, 11, and 12, to enhance the logic of the question 
given that slight change of topic.                                                                                                                                
 According to Szymanski and O’Donohue (1995), the FSQ is designed to evaluate five 
domains of spider fear, including (1) cognitive, (2) behavioral, (3) physiological, (4) negative 
attitudes, and (5) fear of harm by spiders. This instrument was chosen over the widely 
implemented Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Watts & Sharrock, 1984) due to evidence that 
the FSQ provides greater specificity between phobics and non-phobics, is a more accurate 
measure of fear in the non-phobic range, and is capable of detecting reduction in phobic 
responses after treatment (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995). The 
FSnQ was chosen over the Snake Questionnaire (SNAQ; Klorman, Hastings, Weerts, Melamed, 
& Lang, 1974) due to evidence that scores on the SNAQ did not correspond with behavioral 
avoidance tests, which may indicate the tendency of the SNAQ to yield greater rates of false 
positives (Klieger, 1987).  
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Szymanski and O’Donohue (1995) reported internal consistency of the FSQ to be at an 
alpha of .92 in a sample of undergraduate phobic and non-phobic participants. Muris and 
Merckelbach (1996) also reported high levels of internal consistency based on an initial 
administration (α = .95) and on a subsequent administration 3-weeks later (α = .97) for both 
spider phobic participants and non-phobic controls on the FSQ; the SPQ fell below acceptable 
limits (α = .43) for non-phobic controls during a second study by the same authors in which 
treatment was administered to phobic individuals. Based on 608 responses collected during the 
author’s online administration of the FSQ for a thesis project (Stanley-Kime, 2008), internal 
consistency for online administration of the FSQ to a sample of undergraduates was very high (α 
= .98). Internal consistency for the online administration of the FSnQ based on the same sample 
of undergraduates was equivalently high (α = .98). Additionally, test-retest correlations reported 
by Muris and Merckelbach (1996) from the initial administration to the 3-week administration 
was high (r = .91). Szymanski and O’Donohue (1995) reported a split half reliability coefficient 
of .89 and convergent validity with both the SPQ (r =.65) and with a behavioral avoidance test (r 
= .19). In addition, all authors reported the ability of the FSQ to differentiate between spider 
phobic participants and non-phobic control participants (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996; 
Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995). Finally, the FSQ detected changes in fear as a result of both 
behavior therapy (Muris & Merckelbach’s, 1996) and cognitive restructuring (Szymanski & 
O’Donohue, 1995). Thus, the instrument demonstrated good test-retest reliability, internal 
consistency, and validity and is briefer than the 31-item SPQ, thereby increasing efficiency.  
 Assessment of comorbid depression, anxiety, and stress.  
 
To ensure that a comorbid condition of depression did not introduce a significant 
confound, the brief version of the 42-item Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS; 
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Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), the DASS-21 (see Appendix E), was administered online in 
addition to the FSQ and FSnQ. Again, the psychometric properties of the online administration 
were assessed using data collected from the author’s thesis study (Stanley-Kime, 2008) and are 
reported below. The DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report instrument containing three subscales that 
assess the occurrence and severity of the emotional symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress 
on a 4-point scale (0 = did not apply to me at all, 3 = applied to me very much, or most of the 
time). Items are scored by summing the participant responses to form a composite score for each 
subscale and no items are reversed scored. There are seven items on each of the three subscales 
(i.e. Depression subscale, Anxiety subscale, and Stress subscale) and subscale scores range from 
0 to 21 with higher scores indicating greater levels of the construct the subscale purports to 
measure. A total score can also be derived by summing the subscale scores, though this was not 
done in the current study. Given the mean and standard deviation of a normal population (M = 
2.83, SD = 3.87; Henry & Crawford, 2005) on the depression scale, a cutoff score of 6 or below 
(i.e. the approximate mean and one standard deviation, rounded down for prudence) on the 
depression subscale was used as inclusion criteria. The scores on the Anxiety and Stress 
subscales were not used as inclusion or exclusion criteria. 
Henry and Crawford (2005) evaluated the psychometric properties of the DASS-21 on a 
non-clinical adult sample and found satisfactory internal consistency of the three subscales (α = 
.88 for Depression, α = 82 for Anxiety, and α = .90 for Stress) as well as the total scale (α = .93). 
Additionally, the 21-item version of the scale yields scores similar to those derived from the full 
42-item scale. A study by Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, and Swinson (1998) supported the 
reliability and validity of the DASS-21 in assessing features of depression, anxiety, and stress in 
both clinical and non-clinical adult populations. They reported good internal consistency; indeed, 
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their data yielded Cronbach’s alphas for the DASS-21 Depression, Anxiety, and Stress subscales 
of .94, .87, and .91, respectively, and they found comparable scores on the DASS and the DASS-
21 among several diagnostic groups and controls. Based on the sample of 608 undergraduate 
responses to online administration of the DASS-21 (Stanley-Kime, 2008), internal consistency 
for the total scale (α = .94) as well as the Depression (α = .91), Anxiety (α = .83), and Stress (α = 
.88) subscales were good. Antony et al. (1998) also found high convergent validity when scores 
on the DASS-21 Depression Subscale and scores on the Beck Depression Inventory were 
compared (r = .79) and discriminant validity when scores on the DASS-21 Depression Subscale 
were compared with scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory (r = .51). Finally, both Henry and 
Crawford (2005) and Antony et al. (1998) found a three-factor solution that reflected the three 
subscales in the DASS-21, thus increasing the similarity of the brief version of the scale to the 
42-item version. Henry and Crawford (2005), however, also noted that combining the three 
subscales to form a measure of general psychological distress may also be a valid interpretation 
of the scale, although the three subscales can be used separately. 
             Assessment of participant characteristics and exclusionary factors.  
 
A primary investigator-created background questionnaire (see Appendix F) was used to 
assess relevant characteristics of participants as well as to screen participants for exclusionary 
factors. Basic demographic information was collected, including age, sex, ethnicity, occupation, 
and current college standing. Although all participants were required to disclose their first name, 
full disclosure of first and last name, university identification number, and contact information 
was voluntary and could be omitted at will; the purpose of collecting such identifying 
information was to allow students to receive course extra credit for their participation in the 
online screening portion of the study and allow the primary investigator to contact persons 
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interested in the treatment phase of the study. Exclusionary criteria queried in the questionnaire 
included the self-reported presence of health conditions (i.e. asthma, heart conditions, 
hypertension, lung disease, migraines, neurological problems, pregnancy, recurring chest pain, 
seizer, stroke, and ulcers), traumatic brain injury, epilepsy, dementia, learning disabilities, 
allergies to snakes or spiders, a compromised immune system, and color blindness. Other 
information was included to provide ancillary information to the primary investigator, such as 
how the participant heard of the study and if the participant had any intensely fearful experiences 
with either a snake or spider. 
Experimental Phase Assessments 
            Level of state and trait anxiety.  
 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), 
specifically Form Y (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), is a 40-item self-
report instrument that was used to assess each participant’s current and general levels of anxiety 
during the Experimental Phase of the study, although no assignment to any of the three 
participant groups was made based on the obtained data. Participants received the full STAI at 
pre-test assessment. At post-test assessment and one-week and one-month follow-up 
assessments, only the State subscale was administered as part of the Cognitive Assessment 
Sequence. The STAI consists of items designed to assess two dimensions of anxiety: state 
anxiety, which is temporary anxiety that may be elicited by a feared stimulus or situation, and 
trait, which is stable and enduring characterological anxiety. The State Anxiety subscale contains 
20 statements regarding current anxious feelings that are self-rated on a 4-point Likert scale 
where 1 indicates not at all and 4 indicates very much so. The Trait Anxiety subscale contains 20 
statements regarding general feelings of anxiety that are also self-rated on a 4-point Likert scale 
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(1 = almost never, 4 = almost always). Scores on each subscale range from 20 to 80 with higher 
scores on either scale indicating higher levels of state or trait anxiety; items are scored by 
summing the participant responses and several items on each scale are reverse scored as they 
indicate an absence of anxiety. On the State Anxiety subscale, there are 10 reverse scored 
(numbers 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, and 20) and there are 9 reverse score items on the Trait 
Anxiety subscale (numbers 21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36, and 39). 
The STAI was chosen for its psychometric soundness, brevity, and ease of administration 
and scoring (Spielberger, 1985); its use also permitted comparison with other studies that 
included this measure. Test-retest reliability over a period of several weeks has been reported to 
be between .86 and .71 for the Trait Anxiety subscale and .54 and .27 for the State Anxiety 
subscale (Hedberg, 1972). In addition, good internal consistency has been reported (above α = 
.86 for the Trait Anxiety subscale and above α = .83 for the State Anxiety subscale), and 
construct validity is demonstrated by fluctuations in State Anxiety scores resulting from variable 
states of stress and overall stability of Trait Anxiety scores (Hedberg, 1972). The discriminative 
ability of the State Anxiety subscale in a sample of undergraduates in high- and low-stress 
conditions has been established (Metzger, 1976), thereby making it particularly useful in the 
current study in which fluctuations in state anxiety may occur.  
Cognitive Assessment Sequence 
            Identification of selective processing bias: Emotional Stroop task.  
 
A computerized version of the single-item emotional Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was used 
to assess for selective processing of threat-relevant words compared to neutral words as well as 
to discern the effects of treatment over time; mean reaction time in milliseconds to name the 
color of threat-relevant words was compared to the mean reaction time in milliseconds to name 
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the color of neutral words to determine the presence of selective processing in the three 
participant groups. Stroop protocol was conducted in accordance with the procedures described 
in MacLeod (2005a). All participants were given instructions to respond as quickly as possible 
with the color in which each word is printed while avoiding errors. All participants were 
instructed to ignore the meaning of each word. Eight practice blocks of 12 words each were 
completed to ensure accurate comprehension of the task. This was followed by the experimental 
trials, in which 12 words were pre-selected from the threat and neutral word categories to form a 
block of 24 words. This block of 24 words was presented three times, yielding 72 trials total. 
During each block, the word order and word color was semi-randomized; that is, the same word 
color was not permitted to occur in two consecutive trials. A single trial began with a visual 
fixation (e.g. ++++) of 1000 ms followed by a blank screen for 1000 ms. A threat-relevant or 
neutral word was individually presented in the center of the screen in the same location as the 
visual fixation; the word, which was displayed in one of four colors (i.e., red, yellow, blue, or 
green), was printed in 72-point Times New Roman font in lower case and appeared against a 
white background. Participants were seated directly in front of the computer screen and were 
instructed to use the keyboard keys of “z”, “x”, “.” and “/”, each of which corresponded to one of 
the four colors used in the experiment, to indicate the color of each word as it is presented on the 
screen. These four keys were covered in a transparent adhesive sticker that was colored one of 
the four colors. Computer timing began at the appearance of the word and ceased when the 
participant selected a response. The item disappeared from the screen when the participant 
selected a response or a 1,500 ms time limit interval was reached. The visual fixation then 
reappeared, and the procedure began again until all words in a block were completed. Data was 
collected by the computer software (i.e. SuperLab) that was used to create the emotional Stroop 
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procedure. Participant errors, which constituted incorrectly naming the color of a word, were 
tracked, although errors were not included as a dependent variable in any primary analysis. Both 
error proportions and mean correct response times were calculated, and individual response 
times for each condition (threat-relevant vs. neutral words) were collapsed so that a mean 
response time for each condition was obtained. Outliers of less than 300 ms were removed from 
the data before calculating the mean response time for each condition. 
Selection of the threat-relevant and neutral words was dependent on the individual 
participant’s fear and separate emotional Stroop tasks were created for snake- and spider-fearful 
participants. Control participants received the emotional Stroop task that corresponded with their 
least feared stimulus (i.e. the snake or the spider). Threat-relevant words included relevant 
animals and their commonly associated characteristics (i.e. spider, web, snake), animal features 
(i.e. hairy, scaly, venom), and animal actions (i.e. crawl, strike, bite). Neutral words were 
matched for length and word frequency (Carroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971; Francis & Kučera, 
1982); these words were unrelated to the feared animal and included nouns (i.e. chair), adjectives 
(i.e. lazy), and verbs (i.e. bounce). Snake and spider word lists for the emotional Stroop task are 
available in Appendix G. 
The emotional Stroop paradigm is frequently used in the literature on selective 
processing, although it should be noted that it is significantly divergent from the original card 
format of the standard Stroop procedure and must therefore be subjected to psychometric 
evaluation. A study by Kindt, Bierman, and Brosschot (1996) sought to establish test-retest 
reliability and convergent validity of the card format and single-trial format of the standard and 
emotional Stroop procedures. For color-naming response times, the authors reported highly 
significant convergence between the card and single-trial format (r = 0.35 – 0.57) and test-retest 
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reliability for both the card (r = 0.64 – 0.75) and single-trial (r = 0.66 – 0.84) formats. In regard 
to interference indices, however, the authors found no convergent validity for the card format 
and single-trial format for both the standard and emotional Stroop procedures, which they 
attributed to unique mechanisms measured by both tasks. Furthermore, the authors noted a lack 
of test-retest reliability on the emotional Stroop interference in a single-trial format (r = 0.25); 
however, one should note that, when the authors included only participants who were fearful of 
spiders according to scores on the Spider Phobia Questionnaire, there was a significant increase 
in the test-retest reliability of the emotional Stroop interference on the single trial format (r = 
0.54).  
A later study by Eide, Kemp, Silberstein, Nathan, and Stough (2002) also found 
unacceptably low test-retest reliability when interference indices were calculated (r = 0.24, -0.11, 
depending on word category) but high test-retest reliability when response time was examined (r 
= 0.77-0.80, depending on word category). Eide et al (2002) concluded that, while the reliability 
of interference effects remains uncertain but likely given the reliability of response time, 
response times derived from different emotional conditions remains reliable. Strauss, Allen, 
Jorgensen, and Cramer (2005), who reported similar results in a study examining color-word and 
picture-word standard and emotional Stroop tasks, noted that the error in measurement from two 
conditions (emotional and neutral, in the case of an emotional Stroop task) combines when these 
are used to calculate an interference index. The combination of the two valenced word conditions 
compounds measurement error and results in reduction of the correlation coefficient for the 
interference indices. Given the findings of these studies, mean response latencies (i.e. reaction 
times) in each condition rather than an interference index obtained from difference scores in 
response latencies in emotional and neutral stimuli were used to report test performance on threat 
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and neutral words (support of this method was also reported by Dresler et al., 2012). In addition 
to issues with test-retest reliability of the Stroop task, there are other limitations to this task. As 
noted in MacLeod (2005b), the limitations of the Stroop preclude definitive judgments regarding 
the existence of selective processing; alternative explanations for longer response latencies to 
threat-relevant words could be due to word frequency, emotional reactivity to word content, or 
diversion of attention away from the word entirely. Inclusion of this task, however, was preferred 
given the need for comparison of the results of this study with the body of literature that has 
established selective processing through the emotional Stroop task.  
             Identification of selective processing bias: Exogenous cueing task.  
 
Thirty pictorial cue stimuli for the exogenous cueing task were selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and, in the case 
of the threat-relevant pictures for creation of a spider exogenous cueing task, from public domain 
pictures using the internet. Three spider pictures were selected from the public domain due to 
limited availability of spider pictures on the IAPS. Twenty threat cues were selected, ten of 
which were pictures of snakes and ten of which were pictures of spiders. Using previously 
collected data on valence and arousal induction of each picture for both male and female subjects 
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), the mean valence for the ten snake pictures was 4.00 (SD = 
.08) and the mean arousal was 5.95 (SD = .10). The mean valence for the seven rated spider 
pictures was 3.75 (SD = .12) and the mean arousal was 5.64 (SD = .21).  Neutral pictorial cues 
were composed of household items, people, and environmental stimuli. The mean valence for the 
neutral pictures was 4.93 (SD = .03) and the mean arousal was 2.56 (SD = .09). Subject ratings 
from the Lang et al. data (2008) were based on a 9-point Likert scale (range of 1 to 9) with 
higher scores indicating high rating on each dimension (i.e., high pleasure, high arousal). A one-
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way ANOVA with Tukey comparison revealed significant between group differences on both 
valence and arousal for neutral compared to threat-relevant words. Neutral words were rated 
higher in valence, F (2, 26) = 64.18, p < .01, indicating greater participant pleasure upon viewing 
the picture, and lower arousal, F (2, 26) = 221.04, p < .01, compared to both snake and spider 
pictures. Snake and spider pictures did not significantly differ on valence or arousal, although 
data were not available on three spider pictures given that they were selected from the public 
domain. 
The exogenous cueing task was programmed using SuperLab for its millisecond response 
time measuring capability. The task was presented on a Dell desktop computer with color 
monitor. Participants were first instructed to sit in front of the computer. Instructions appeared on 
the screen and were presented verbally to each participant. The participants were told that they 
would see a cross in the middle of the computer screen flanked by two white rectangles on either 
side of the cross and that they should focus their attention on the cross. After a short time, a 
picture would appear to the right or left of the cross in one of the rectangles followed by a black 
square in one of the rectangles; participants were informed that the picture that appears was not 
predictive of where the target square would appear. Participants were instructed to indicate the 
location of the black target square as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy, and they 
were asked to use two keys on the keyboard that indicated left or right target spatial location to 
perform this task. Following instruction, there were twelve trials of practice in which threat or 
neutral cues were not used; rather, a rectangle simply filled with the solid color green. After 
completion of the practice trials, the test phase began and consisted of 240 trials. These 240 trials 
were proportionally divided into valid, invalid, and uncued trials as modeled in Amir, Elias, 
Klumpp, and Przeworski (2003) and described in Posner (1988). Specifically, two thirds (2/3) of 
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the total trials were validly cued (10 pictures x 2 picture valences x 2 picture positions x 4 
repetitions = 160), one sixth (1/6) of the total trials were invalidly cued (10 pictures x 2 picture 
valences x 2 picture positions = 40) , and one sixth (1/6) of the total trials were uncued (10 
pictures x 2 picture valences x 2 picture positions = 40), meaning that there was no picture 
stimulus preceding the target. Trials were randomized by assessment point, but software 
limitations precluded randomization by participant.  
All stimuli were presented against a black background. On every trial, a white fixation 
cross appeared in the center of the screen and this cross was flanked by two white rectangles; the 
fixation cross and white rectangles appeared for 500ms. A threat or neutral pictorial cue then 
appeared in one of the two rectangles for a period of 200ms and completely filled the area of the 
rectangle. The target, which was a black square, appeared immediately following cue offset and 
was located in the center of one of the white rectangles. The target remained on the screen until 
the participant entered a response using the keyboard and, after a response had been made, a new 
trial immediately began. Latency between target onset and participant response was the primary 
dependent measure. Outliers, which were defined as reaction times of less than 150ms or greater 
than 750ms based on previous studies (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema 
2006) and commented on by Ratcliff (1993), were rejected from data analysis. Participant errors, 
which constituted incorrectly indicating the location of the target, were tracked, although error 
rate was not included as a dependent variable in any primary analysis. 
            Measure of intellectual ability. 
In order to evaluate and control the potential confound of intellectual ability on tests of 
memory, the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (SILS; Shipley, 1940; Zachary, 1991), a brief 
measure used for testing intelligence and detecting mild degrees of intellectual impairment, was 
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administered to each participant. The SILS is divided into two main subscales, namely a 40-item 
Vocabulary Test and a 20-item Abstract Thinking Test, and yields six summary scores: the 
vocabulary score (based on the raw score of the 40 vocabulary items), abstraction score (based 
on the raw score of the 20 Abstract Thinking items), total score, conceptual quotient, abstraction 
quotient, and estimated full scale Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale or Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-Revised IQ scores. The Vocabulary subscale measures general verbal abilities 
such as knowledge, reading ability, and verbal comprehension, while the Abstract Thinking 
subscale measures cognitive and reasoning ability; significant discrepancy between scores on the 
two subscales indicates possible cognitive impairment that may warrant further testing. Subscale 
items are scored by number of correct answers out of the total possible, although one should note 
that there are further calculations described in the SILS manual that are needed to produce the 
subscale scores and certain circumstances (i.e. participant omission of a response) warrant 
modification of the calculation. The total raw scores on each of the two subscales range from 0 to 
40 and it should be noted that the raw score on the Abstract Thinking subscale is multiplied by 
two to achieve a range equivalent to that of the Vocabulary subscale. The SILS manual is used to 
transform raw scores into the summary scores. Higher scores on a subscale indicate greater 
ability in that respective area.  
Each subscale has a ten-minute time limit which was adhered to in this study. The 
Vocabulary subscale was administered immediately following the exogenous cueing task to 
avoid potential confounding due to presentation of this linguistic task after explicit word list 
presentation. The Abstract Thinking subscale was administered after the explicit word list 
presentation, during which time it also served as an interpolated activity to reduce recency 
effects on tests of explicit memory. Martin, Blair, Stokes, and Lester (1977) found acceptable 
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test-retest reliability (r = .80) after a 45-day interval in a normative college sample. These same 
authors also found that the SILS was moderately correlated (initial testing r = .46, second testing 
r = .54) with the Slosson Intelligence Test, another brief measure of IQ, thus providing support 
for the measure’s convergent validity. Factor structure or discriminant validity data on the SILS 
is unavailable to the knowledge of the author. 
            Explicit memory evaluation. 
In order to evaluate theorized explicit memory avoidance and the impact of treatment on 
such avoidance, several tests of explicit memory were administered following an encoding phase 
of threat and neutral linguistic stimuli. In a recent meta-analysis of the literature on anxiety-
induced memory bias, Mitte (2008) noted that 67% of a total 165 studies included in the analysis 
used a recall task and 38% of that total used a recognition task; to facilitate comparison among 
studies in this literature and in keeping with the linguistic stimuli presented in the Stroop 
attention task, this study used similar methods to evaluate explicit memory, despite the lowered 
ecological validity of such a methodological selection. Following several tasks (i.e. STAI, 
emotional Stroop task, exogenous cueing task, SILS Vocabulary subscale) in the Cognitive 
Assessment Sequence, explicit word list presentation began. One of two word lists, one for 
snake-fearful participants and one for spider-fearful participants, were employed, depending on 
the participant’s fear. All participants were seated at a Dell personal computer and shown a 
Microsoft PowerPoint presentation of a total of 20 words, half of which were threat-relevant (i.e. 
spider) and the other half of which were neutral (i.e. pencil). It was attempted that all words 
differed in the first two letters with which they began, which was important for the word-stem 
cued recall test that occurred during explicit memory evaluation; this did not happen in practice 
due to the challenge in selecting threat and neutral words and matching them on relevant 
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characteristics. Participants were instructed that, during the encoding phase, they were to pay 
close attention to each word as it appeared on the screen because their memory for the words 
would be tested at a later point in the experiment. Words appeared individually in the center of 
the computer screen for a total of five seconds, after which time the word disappeared, leaving a 
blank screen that remained for three seconds. Another word then appeared for five seconds. All 
words were presented in lower case black ink in Times New Roman 72-point font. Explicit 
memory word lists for both snake and spider participants are presented in Appendix G. 
Following the interpolated task of the SILS Abstract Thinking subscale, memory for the 
words was evaluated via free recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition tasks, which were 
not counterbalanced across participants or time of assessment due to the progressive recall cues 
inherent in each test. The dependent variable on each test was the number of threat-relevant 
words recalled compared to the number of neutral words recalled. All tests had a time limit of 10 
minutes, although participants were permitted to finish the task before 10 minutes and continue 
on to the next task. Once a participant completed one test and began the next, however, he/she 
was not permitted to return to the previous test at any time during the experiment. During the 
free recall test, the primary investigator/research assistant provided the participant with a sheet of 
paper with instructions written on the top, which were also provided verbally. The primary 
investigator/research assistant indicated that the participant should write down all the words that 
he/she could recall that were presented during the encoding phase of the experiment. Participants 
were informed of the 10-minute time limit. The word-stem cued recall test was administered 
following the free recall test. The primary investigator/research assistant provided the participant 
with a paper that contained 40 word stems for the 20 words presented during the encoding phase 
(primed words) as well as 20 words not presented during the encoding phase (unprimed words); 
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word stems consisted of the first two letters of the word followed by a line (e.g., sp______). 
Participants were instructed to read the first two letters of the word and attempt to recall the word 
that was presented during the encoding phase that began with those letters. They should then 
print that word on the line following the first two letters. Again, participants were informed of 
the 10-minute time limit. Finally, a recognition task was conducted. Participants were provided 
with a sheet that contained forty words, half of which were presented during the encoding phase 
and the other half of which were new words. The primary investigator/research assistant then 
informed the participant that he/she had 10 minutes to review the list of words and circle any 
word that he/she recalled as having been presented during the encoding phase of the experiment. 
Given that these tests of recall are created specifically for this experiment, no psychometric 
properties of the explicit memory tests were available. The free recall, word-stem cued recall, 
and recognition tests for snake and spider participants are available in Appendices H through J; 
note, however, that each of these tests changed for each assessment period due to different words 
being presented at each assessment point. Additionally, the tests differed by the feared stimulus 
being employed for each participant. Thus, the tests provided in Appendices H through J were 
used in the pre-test assessment only and were specifically given to snake-fearful participants. 
             Distress when presented with the feared stimulus.  
A Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) was used to assess each participant’s ability to 
approach the snake or spider stimulus and also served to hypothetically elicit greater amounts of 
state anxiety prior to the testing for selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. As 
described in Koch, Spates, and Himle (2004), participants were instructed to approach the 
arachnid/snake stimulus as much as he/she was able; unlike Koch et al. (2004), however, 
participants were instructed to avoid physical contact with the animal or its container in an effort 
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to standardize exposure to the stimulus for all participants and to minimize distraction from 
handling the animal. Distance from the door to the animal was measured with the aid of a 
laminated ruler that was secured to the floor of the room and distance was recorded on the 
Participant BAT Record (see Appendix K). Participants approached the stimulus until a 
subjectively determined intolerable level of fear was reached. At the participant’s initial stopping 
point, the primary investigator/research assistant examined the ruler and recorded the distance 
traveled from the door as well as any overt signs of anxiety that the participant was displaying, 
such as shaking or crying. Subjective Units of Distress scale (SUDS; see description below) 
ratings were taken. The primary investigator/research assistant then asked the participant if 
he/she could approach the stimulus any further; if further approach was rejected, SUDs ratings 
were taken and the BAT ceased. If the participant indicated that further approach was possible, 
he/she was permitted to approach further. When the participant reached a point at which he/she 
could go no further (i.e. the final stopping point), SUDS ratings were again taken and the BAT 
ceased. This procedure allowed for quantifiable assessment of level of fear toward the stimulus 
through approach; greater fear should result in less approach. As mentioned above, the SUDs 
was used in the BAT procedure to further quantify each participant’s distress by requiring 
him/her to assign a numeric value to the anxiety experienced at the initial and final stopping 
points in the BAT procedure. Participants were instructed to assign a score of 100 to the worst 
possible anxiety that they have or can imagine experiencing and a score of 0 to complete 
calmness. Thus, the primary dependent variables from this procedure were both distance traveled 
by the participant from the door and SUDs ratings. 
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Design 
 
 This study used a quasi-experimental longitudinal design with three participant groups; 
the purpose of this design was to permit the comparison of fearful individuals who received 
treatment, fearful individuals who do not receive treatment, and non-fearful individuals on 
measures of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance (see Appendix L for a 
diagram of study procedures). The design promoted not only the detection of selective 
processing bias and explicit memory avoidance, but also the identification of immediate and 
enduring treatment effects. The first group, which was to consist of 20 randomly assigned snake- 
or spider-fearful participants, received one-session in vivo exposure treatment with either the 
snake or the spider, depending on the individual’s primary fear. This treatment group was 
included in an effort to address the question of whether exposure treatment produced an initial 
and durable effect on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance, if indeed these 
processes did occur in the sample. The second group, which was to consist of 20 randomly 
assigned snake- or spider-fearful participants, did not receive any treatment for snake or spider 
fear during the course of the experiment. The purpose of this no-treatment group was to evaluate 
the presence of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance in fearful participants 
who did not receive treatment and, theoretically, experienced no abatement of anxiety during the 
experiment. This group was used to determine if indeed selective processing bias and explicit 
memory avoidance was exhibited in the participant sample and to understand the stability of 
these processes across time. Additionally, this group was used to control for treatment effects 
observed in the treatment group that may be induced by the passage of time alone; it further 
controlled for participant history effects, maturation, testing and instrumentation effects, possible 
regression to the mean, selection, mortality, and the interaction between selection and mortality 
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(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Fearful individuals were selected for inclusion in the 
Experimental Phase of the experiment based on their responses to the Screening Phase online 
assessments. They were randomly assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment group. 
The control group, which consisted of 20 non-fearful participants, was included to 
determine if selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance of highly emotional 
information is unique to snake- or spider-fearful individuals; perhaps salient information, such as 
linguistic stimuli related to snakes or spiders, could enjoy preferential encoding due to its novelty 
rather than its level of threat. This group was also included to allow for comparison of formerly 
fearful individuals (i.e. the treatment group) and presently fearful individuals (i.e. the no-
treatment group) to a group of non-fearful individuals to determine the presence of these 
cognitive processes at various points in the experiment; thus, the control group controlled for the 
variable of anxiety level. These individuals were randomly selected through identification of a 
subset of participants who qualified for the control group based on Screening Phase responses 
and random selection of 20 individuals to compose the control group. It should be noted that 
University Human Subjects Review Committee/Internal Review Board policies and procedures 
were closely adhered to in an effort ensure ethical treatment of all participants (see Appendix M 
for UHSRC approval letters). 
The procedure of the experiment also allowed for additional controls of potential 
confounding variables that could have been problematic if left unaddressed. The inclusion of 
three participant groups, two of which could be regarded as functional control groups (i.e. the no-
treatment and control groups), allowed for greater support of results given that more numerous 
comparisons could be made. Each of the two functional control groups (i.e. the control group and 
no-treatment group) reduced the likelihood of confounds, as described above. The pre-test and 
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post-test assessments of all participant groups, although particularly the treatment group, 
permitted the determination of the effects of treatment. The DASS-21 was included as a 
necessary screening measure to reduce the potentially confounding effects of comorbid 
depression, which was particularly important given that research seems to indicate that the 
presence of depression introduces its own cognitive biases (i.e. evidence for both mood-
congruent attentional bias as well as attentional avoidance; see Dalgleish & Watts, 1990, for a 
review). The DASS-21 was used only as a screening measure and not as a covariate in primary 
data analysis. The SILS was used to assess not only the variable of IQ, which could impact 
memory, but also to reduce recency effects for explicit memory testing as well as provide an 
intervening activity between implicit and explicit memory evaluations. If between-group 
differences were found on IQ scores, IQ could be used as a covariate in subsequent analyses, 
thereby requiring analyses of covariance rather than analyses of variance. If IQ was found to be 
comparable across groups, analyses of variance were to be used as IQ would not be considered a 
covariate. Thus, the effects of several important but often uncontrolled variables were reduced in 
this study, suggesting greater clarity in the obtained results.  
Procedures 
Screening Phase Procedures 
The Screening Phase was conducted online. Participants who engaged in the Screening 
Phase were able to use any computer at any time to access the study’s specific web address at 
SurveyMonkey.com, a website that allows online surveys to be created and used in a secure, 
password-protected format. Upon accessing the study’s web address, participants first reviewed 
the Screening Phase Informed Consent Agreement (see Appendix A) before any assessment 
commenced. Contact information for the primary investigator was provided so that questions 
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regarding information contained within the Screening Phase Informed Consent Agreement could 
be addressed. Upon agreeing to the terms of the online phase of the study detailed in the 
Screening Phase Informed Consent Agreement, all the online assessments, including the FSQ, 
FSnQ, DASS-21, and the background questionnaire, were administered. The sequence of these 
assessments was chosen based on order of the same assessments used in the author’s thesis study 
(Stanley-Kime, 2008). Scores on the FSQ, FSnQ, and the DASS-21 were used to determine 
eligibility for the Experimental Phase of the study. Those individuals who obtained a score equal 
to or greater than 70 on the FSQ or FSnQ (one standard deviation below the mean based on 
Muris and Merckelbach, 1996 for consideration for the treatment group or no-treatment group) 
or equal to or lesser than 10 on the FSQ or FSnQ (for consideration for the non-fearful control 
group) were considered for the Experimental Phase of the study. These cutoff scores were 
chosen based on the mean and standard deviation of spider phobic and non-phobic individuals on 
the FSQ, as reported by Muris and Merckelbach (1996). In the instance that an individual 
obtained scores above the cutoff on both the FSQ and the FSnQ, the primary investigator 
selected the highest score and the participant received the most feared stimulus in the 
Experimental Phase. 
In addition to obtaining a cutoff score of 70 or more or a 10 or less on either the FSQ or 
the FSnQ, participants were also required to meet inclusion criteria based on the DASS-21 to be 
considered for the Experimental Phase. Those who scored below the clinically significant range 
(< 6; Henry & Crawford, 2005) on the Depression subscale of the DASS-21 were considered for 
participation in the Experimental Phase. Finally, the background questionnaire was used to 
ascertain the presence of exclusionary criteria. Those individuals who self-reported health 
conditions (i.e. asthma, heart conditions, hypertension, lung disease, migraines, neurological 
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problems, pregnancy, recurring chest pain, seizer, stroke, and ulcers), traumatic brain injury, 
epilepsy, dementia, learning disabilities, allergies to snakes or spiders, a compromised immune 
system, and color blindness were excluded from further participation. All Screening Phase 
participants must have indicated on the background questionnaire that he/she was interested in 
being contacted by the primary investigator for further participation opportunities. He/she had to 
also provide at least one valid method of contact in order to be considered for the Experimental 
Phase. Participants could provide additional identifying information if they desired so that their 
participation in the Screening Phase of the study can be reported to one instructor of their 
choosing for the purpose of possibly obtaining extra credit. 
 Screening Phase participant demographics. 
 A total of 1,185 students fully completed the online Screening Phase assessments but did 
not participate in the Experimental Phase for a variety of reasons (i.e. participant voluntarily 
decided against further participation, participant did not meet Experimental Phase criteria, 
participant did not provide valid contact information, etc.). Mean age for these participants was 
22.84 and, like the Experimental Phase sample, this sample was also 76% female. 
White/Caucasian was the most frequently endorsed race, constituting 62% of the Screening 
Phase sample, with Black/African American being the second most frequently endorsed race, 
constituting 22% of the sample. Ninety-nine percent of respondents were current university 
students and sixty-five percent of participants were employed in addition to their student status. 
Distribution of the participant sample was skewed slightly toward upperclassman undergraduates 
(16% freshman, 23% sophomore, 30% junior, and 28% senior) and only three participants 
identified as a graduate student, seven as a graduate of a two-year college, and seven as a 
graduate of a four-year college. The Screening Phase sample did not statistically significantly 
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differ from the Experimental Phase sample on any of the above mentioned demographic 
characteristics.  
The Screening Phase sample, which was not classified into fearful participants or non-
fearful participants based on FSQ/FSnQ criteria, had a mean on the FSQ of 41.88 (SD = 36.51) 
and a mean on the FSnQ of 58.62 (SD = 39.24), and the Screening Phase sample did not 
significantly differ from the Experimental Phase sample on these measures. The DASS-21 
yielded the following means and standard deviations for the Screening Phase sample: M = 4.43 
(SD = 4.60) for the Depression subscale, M = 4.09 (SD = 4.46) for the Anxiety subscale, M = 
6.92 (SD = 5) for the Stress subscale, and M = 15.44 (SD = 12.65) for the DASS-21 total score. 
Screening Phase participants significantly differed from the Experimental Phase sample on the 
following measures: DASS-21 Depression subscale, t (92.89) = 7.13, p < .001, DASS-21 
Anxiety subscale, t (69.87) = 2.42, p < .05, DASS-21 Stress subscale, t (69.76) = 2.00, p < .05, 
and DASS-21 total score, t (76.66) = 4.04, p < .001. Thus, the Screening Phase sample scored 
higher on all DASS-21 subscale scores and total score compared to the scores of Experimental 
Phase participants. 
Initial Experimental Phase Procedures for All Participants 
Based on FSQ and FSnQ scores obtained during the Screening Phase, all participants 
who met criteria for Experimental Phase participation were invited to participate. Although 
random selection from the group of qualified individuals was planned in an effort to maximize 
external validity (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), the dearth of individuals who qualified for 
and desired to participate in the Experimental Phase was a practicality that prohibited random 
selection. Fearful participants were randomly assigned to either the treatment group or the no-
treatment group prior to meeting with the primary investigator/research assistant; non-fearful 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  65 
participants were selected from the sample that completed the Screening Phase questionnaires 
and immediately assigned to the non-fearful control group. Random assignment of fearful 
individuals was achieved through a random number generation process. After determining that a 
Screening Phase participant met criteria for Experimental Phase participation, a random group 
assignment number that corresponded with either the treatment group (i.e. even numbers) or the 
no-treatment group (i.e. odd numbers) was generated by a computer, thus determining the group 
to which that participant belonged. One should note that all participant data collected in this 
study, including group membership and dates of participation, were carefully tracked by the 
primary investigator using Microsoft Excel, the contents of which were later exported into a 
statistical software package that was capable of greater data analysis. 
All participants who meet criteria for Experimental Phase participation were then 
contacted by the preferred contact method indicated in the Screening Phase background 
questionnaire. Of the 302 who met criteria for Experimental Phase participation, 227 were 
actually invited to participate; some individuals who met criteria for Experimental Phase 
participation were not invited to participate due to the group that he/she met criteria for being 
already completed (i.e. the control group) or the participant’s contact information being invalid. 
Group membership was not initially revealed to participants; rather, all groups were briefly 
described and participants were told that group membership would be revealed upon meeting 
with the primary investigator/research assistant for the Experimental Phase. Individuals were told 
of the general time commitment required (i.e. anywhere between 1 hour and 4 hours, depending 
on group membership and assessment period) and that, within the context of treatment, he/she 
could be asked to physically contact a live snake or spider. Emphasis was placed on the 
voluntary nature of such contact and the role of the primary investigator/research assistant in 
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helping the individual become comfortable with such contact before it was initiated so that it 
could be done safely. Those participants who were interested in further participation were 
scheduled based on the mutual availability of the participant and the primary investigator or 
research assistant. Of the 227 participants who were successfully contacted for possible 
Experimental Phase participation, 73 indicated definite interest in being scheduled to participate 
in the Experimental Phase. Eight individuals declined to participate while one hundred forty-two 
did not respond to the primary investigator’s attempts to contact them. Several individuals 
indicated that he/she might be interested in participating at a later date, although none of these 
individuals followed through with participation. Those who failed to return the initial contacts of 
the primary investigator were recontacted one additional time via their preferred contact method, 
although this method was met with very limited success in terms of Experimental Phase 
participant recruitment. Those who indicated no interest in further study participation on the 
Screening Phase background questionnaire were administered an opt-out questionnaire (see 
Appendix N), which provided information on the characteristics of individuals who opted out of 
further participation so that those characteristics could be compared to the characteristics of 
those who opted in. Those who were interested in further participation were asked to arrive at a 
designated office space to meet with the primary investigator/research assistant at an appointed 
time. Upon meeting with the primary investigator/research assistant and prior to the initiation of 
any additional experimental procedures, all potential Experimental Phase participants were given 
a copy of the Experimental Phase Informed Consent Agreement (see Appendix B) and received a 
verbal explanation of the agreement as well as an opportunity to read the form in its entirety and 
ask questions. Following obtainment of informed consent, the full STAI was administered to all 
participants regardless of group membership.  
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            Treatment group procedures. 
Members of the treatment group were then given the pre-test Cognitive Assessment 
Sequence, which included the emotional Stroop task, exogenous cueing task, SILS, explicit 
memory list presentation and testing, and the BAT with SUDS ratings. Following this, one-
session in vivo exposure treatment followed by post-test assessment was scheduled for another 
day based on the mutual availability of the primary investigator/research assistant and the 
participant; all efforts were made to schedule the participant within the same week but this was 
often precluded by schedule considerations of both the primary investigator/research assistants 
and participant. Typically, the primary investigator/research assistant who conducted the 
participant’s pre-test appointment did not also conduct the participant’s post-test appointment, 
although there were several instances in which the same experimenter conducted two or more of 
a treatment group participant’s appointments. Upon returning on the scheduled day, a member of 
the treatment group was informed that he/she would be exposed to the feared stimulus, although 
the exposure would involve one-session in vivo exposure treatment in an attempt to reduce fear 
of that stimulus. The feared stimulus was either a corn snake of approximately two feet in length 
or a rose hair tarantula. Participants were given a brief and scripted description of treatment as 
well as a treatment rationale, and then the treatment commenced according to the procedures 
outlined in the Treatment Procedures section of this manuscript. The description of treatment 
included a general report of the hierarchy of steps that were to be used in treatment, although 
exact details of the steps were not provided. The description of treatment also included an 
explanation of the primary investigator/research assistant modeling of each step, the assistance a 
participant could request, and the means through which a participant could request a brief break 
from treatment procedures. The treatment rationale included a discussion of the side effect of 
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heightened anxiety that would likely be produced by the treatment and an abridged description of 
the hypothesized mechanisms of action of the treatment (i.e. maintenance of current avoidance 
response through negative reinforcement, the concepts of extinction and habituation, etc.). 
Treatment success was quantitatively defined as participant report of a SUDS level of 19 or less 
on every step in the treatment hierarchy, but one should note that participants were not made 
privy to this information.  
Following exposure treatment of three hours maximum duration, the participant and the 
primary investigator/research assistant exited the treatment room and returned to the original 
office space for the reminder of the Experimental Phase procedures. Upon returning to the office 
space, participants were informed that they would next be given the same cognitive measures 
that they had previously received at the pre-test appointment. They were also informed that, after 
completion of all the measures, they would be recontacting the snake or spider stimulus but that 
physical touch would not be permitted in this instance. The cognitive measures that followed 
composed the post-test Cognitive Assessment Sequence, which included the State subscale of the 
STAI, emotional Stroop task, exogenous cueing task, SILS, explicit memory list presentation and 
testing, and the BAT with SUDS ratings; this precise sequence was administered again at the two 
remaining follow-up appointments (see Experimental Phase – One-Week and One-Month 
Follow-Up Procedures section of this manuscript). 
During the pre-test and post-test Cognitive Assessment Sequences, participants received 
either the full STAI in the case of pre-test assessment or the State subscale only of the STAI in 
the case of post-test assessment. Participants were asked to sit at a Dell personal computer to 
complete the emotional Stroop task, which was conducted in accordance with the procedural 
outline presented in the Measures section. Again, selection of the threat-relevant and neutral 
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words were dependent on the individual participant’s fear and separate emotional Stroop tasks 
were administered to snake- and spider-fearful participants. Following completion of the 
emotional Stroop task, participants completed the exogenous cueing task, the details of which are 
outlined in the Measure section. Participants were then given the Vocabulary subscale of the 
SILS, which had a 10-minute time limit. If participants finished before the 10-minute time limit 
was announced, they were instructed to review their responses until the time limit had expired. 
The purpose of the SILS was not only to provide an estimation of IQ in the participant sample, 
but also to provide an intervening distraction activity between implicit and explicit memory 
assessment procedures, thus making the time limit particularly important.  
Following the SILS Vocabulary subscale, participants were again seated in front of a Dell 
personal computer to view the Microsoft PowerPoint presentation of the explicit memory word 
list presentation. They were instructed to closely attend to each word as memory for all words 
would be tested later in the experiment. Included in the presentation were 20 words, half of 
which were threat-relevant and the other half of which were neutral, as described in the Measures 
section. Following completion of the presentation, the Abstract Thinking subscale of the SILS 
was administered with a 10-minute time limit. Again, participants were instructed to review their 
responses until the time limit had expired if they finished the subscale early. In addition to IQ 
estimation, this activity also served to reduce recency effects on tests of explicit memory recall. 
The three tests of explicit memory (i.e. the free recall test, word-stem cued recall test, the 
recognition test, respectively) were then administered, each of which having a 10-minute time 
limit. Participants who finished one explicit memory test before the time limit could progress to 
the next explicit memory test. Finally, after completion of the explicit memory tests, the 
participant was escorted back to the treatment room to complete the BAT with SUDs ratings. 
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The same snake or spider stimulus used for treatment was used for the BAT with SUDs rating 
procedure. The participant was then thanked for his/her participation and a one-week or one-
month follow-up appointment was ideally scheduled prior to the participant leaving the 
appointment. 
            No-treatment and control group procedures.  
The no-treatment and control group procedures were identical to the treatment group 
procedures with the exception of treatment procedures. These groups still received the four 
assessment periods as the treatment group: pre-test assessment, post-test assessment, one-week 
follow-up assessment, and one-month follow-up assessment. Following obtainment of 
Experimental Phase informed consent and after the administration of the full STAI, individuals 
in the no-treatment group and the control group were administered the pre-test Cognitive 
Assessment Sequence. These participants were informed that they would complete several 
cognitive measures. They were also informed that, after completion of all the measures, they 
would be contacting the snake or spider stimulus. This contact was to occur exclusively during 
the BAT with SUDs ratings procedure and they received either a snake or spider stimulus. As 
was described above for the treatment group and illustrated in the study diagram (see Appendix 
L), the sequence began with the emotional Stroop task and exogenous cueing task, which was 
then followed by the Vocabulary subscale of the SILS. This was followed by explicit memory 
word list presentation, the Abstract Thinking subscale of the SILS, the three tests of explicit 
memory, and the BAT with SUDs ratings. All procedures described above for administration of 
the Cognitive Assessment Sequence to the treatment group were adhered to for the no-treatment 
and control groups. Following completion of the pre-test Cognitive Assessment Sequence, each 
participant was thanked for his/her participation and asked to schedule a time, preferably within 
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the same week, to return to complete the post-test Cognitive Assessment Sequence. Subsequent 
to the post-test assessment, he/she was asked to return a third and fourth time for one-week and 
one-month follow-ups. One should note that all the procedures described here were approved by 
the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board of Eastern Michigan University, and all animal 
care and use for the snakes in this study were approved by Eastern Michigan University’s 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (see Appendix O). 
One-Week and One-Month Follow-Up Procedures 
 Approximately seven days from the date that a participant completed the post-test 
assessment described above, the participant was recontacted and asked to meet with the primary 
investigator/research assistant a second time to complete the one-week follow-up procedures, 
which consisted of readministration of the Cognitive Assessment Sequence. Often times, 
recontact was not necessary as the primary investigator/research assistant who conducted the 
post-test was able to schedule the one-week follow-up appointment prior to the participant 
leaving the post-test appointment. This did not always occur, however, due to the availability of 
the primary investigator or research assistant; in the case that a research assistant could not 
accommodate the participant’s preferred time for any of the follow-up appointments, that 
research assistant referred the participant to the primary investigator of the study, who 
collaborated with the participant to ensure that scheduling of all appointments occurred based on 
the participant’s preferences. The participant was also recontacted approximately thirty days 
from the date he/she completed the post-test assessment procedures to meet for a final time with 
the primary investigator/research assistant to complete the one-month follow-up procedures. 
Note that the date the participant completed the post-test Cognitive Assessment Sequence was 
used to determine the dates of the one-week and one-month follow-up procedures. Participants 
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were contacted in advance to schedule follow-up appointments as close to seven days for the 
one-week follow-up and thirty days for the one-month follow-up as possible, although mutual 
availability of the primary investigator/research assistant and the participant precluded exact 
timing of follow-up for most participants. All participants regardless of group membership 
received equivalent follow-up procedures at both one-week and one-month appointments.  
Upon meeting with the primary investigator/research assistant, participants were 
informed that they would complete several cognitive measures that were equivalent to the 
measures received at the preceding two appointments. They were also informed that, after 
completion of all the measures, they would be contacting, although not physically contacting, the 
snake or spider stimulus. The State subscale of the STAI was administered first. The emotional 
Stroop task followed the State subscale of the STAI, and this task was followed by the 
exogenous cueing task and then the Vocabulary subscale of the SILS. In the follow-up 
procedures, the SILS primarily served as an intervening activity to reduce possible effects of the 
measures of selective processing bias on explicit memory word list presentation as well as 
recency effects from explicit memory word list presentation and recall. Thus, SILS data were 
collected at one-week and one-month follow-up, but analysis of the data was not planned given 
its limited utility due to potential practice effects. Explicit memory word list presentation 
occurred, followed by the Abstract Thinking portion of the SILS. Again, the SILS time limit of 
10 minutes per subscale was enforced. The three explicit memory tests, namely the free recall, 
word-stem cued recall, and recognition tests, were administered. Finally, the BAT with SUDs 
ratings procedure completed the follow-up appointments. All participants could have 
demonstrated practice effects on dependent variable measures, but the primary investigator 
attempted to control such effects by varying stimuli (i.e. words or pictures) as much as possible 
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and randomizing the order in which stimuli that composed each test were presented. Complete 
alternate forms of tests of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance were not 
used, however, due to the limited selection of the threat-relevant stimuli. 
One-Session In vivo Exposure Treatment Procedures 
One-session in vivo exposure therapy with no overt cognitive component was provided 
by the primary investigator or a research assistant to those individuals assigned to the treatment 
group. While no overt cognitive component was incorporated into treatment, one should 
appreciate the implied ability of one-session in vivo exposure treatment to indirectly modify 
cognitions (e.g. de Jong, Vorage, & van den Hout, 2000). Treatment was provided in a small 
classroom or conference space in a university classroom building. All extraneous material was 
moved in the room so as to leave a clear path between the participant and the feared stimulus, 
which remained in a secure container on a table. A brief description of treatment procedures and 
treatment rationale was provided to each participant in a separate meeting room before treatment 
began and any questions regarding treatment were addressed by the primary 
investigator/research assistant. Following the description and rationale, the primary 
investigator/research assistant escorted the participant to the treatment room. The participant was 
asked to begin at the doorway of the treatment room and approach the feared stimulus as close as 
he/she was able. As outlined by Öst (1997) and used in several studies examining similar issues 
(Koch et al., 2004; Lavy & Van den Hout, 1993; Lavy, Van den Hout, Arntz, 1993; Thorpe & 
Salkovskis, 1997a), exposure treatment steps, which are enumerated below, began with the 
verbal presentation of one treatment step to the participant; successive steps in the predetermined 
treatment step hierarchy were individually presented after completion of the previous step. 
Following verbal description of the treatment step, the primary investigator/research assistant 
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modeled the necessary components to full completion of that step, allowing the participant to 
carefully observe. The participant was then asked to complete each successive component either 
with initial physical assistance from the primary investigator/research assistant, which was 
gradually faded out, or independently, if possible. If anxiety became elevated to a level at which 
the participant did not feel that he/she could continue with the treatment step, he/she was 
instructed to say, “pause,” which signaled to the primary investigator/research assistant to cease 
further treatment progression for approximately one minute. After the passage of approximately 
one minute, the primary investigator/research assistant resumed treatment. If the participant said 
“pause” a second time during one treatment step, that step was terminated and the previous step 
was undertaken again. SUDs levels were obtained during each treatment step at the time of 
completion of the final components of the step; for example, if a treatment step involved 
touching the stimulus’ container for 60 seconds, SUDs levels were gathered during the last few 
seconds of contact with the container. One-session in vivo exposure treatment continued until all 
treatment steps were completed with little to no subjective anxiety, as indicated by SUDs ratings 
of less than 20 on each treatment step, or when the maximum time limit of three hours was 
reached. Thus, treatment success was quantitatively defined as achieving all steps in the 
treatment step hierarchy with a SUDs rating of 19 or less. If one or more of the treatment steps 
were completed with a SUDs level of 20 or more, each treatment step was repeated until all 
treatment steps were completed with a SUDs rating of 19 or less. Thus, one participant may have 
engaged in two or more treatment cycles, or additional repetitions of all of the treatment steps.  
Similar treatment steps (Koch et al., 2004; Lavy & van den Hout, 1993; Lavy, van den 
Hout, Arntz, 1993; Öst, 1997; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997a) were used for both the spider and 
the snake, although there were several notable differences based on Koch et al.’s (2004) 
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procedure. Initial treatment steps for both the spider and the snake were (1) progressing from the 
participant’s initial BAT location to the outside of the container, (2) touching the container for 10 
seconds while looking at the spider/snake, (3) putting his/her fingertips inside the cage for 10 
seconds while looking at the spider/snake, and (4) touching the inside of the container with the 
hand on the bottom of the cage for 10 seconds while looking at the spider/snake. The spider 
treatment steps were then (5) using an index card to guide the spider into a clear plastic cup three 
times, (6) directing the spider around the cage with two fingers, (7) touching the spider with two 
fingers for 3 seconds, (8) touching the spider with at least two fingers for up to 60 seconds, (9) 
directing the spider across one hand with two fingers, (10) independently lifting the spider and 
allowing it to remain/crawl on the hand for up to 60 seconds, and (11) independently lifting the 
spider and allowing it to remain/crawl on the hand for more than 60 seconds but not in excess of 
3 minutes. 
Following steps 1 – 4 described above, the snake treatment steps (Koch et al., 2004) were 
(5) touching the snake with two fingers for 3 seconds, (6) touching the snake with two fingers for 
up to 60 seconds, (7) touching the snake from underneath, or cupping, for up to 60 seconds, (8) 
touching the snake with two fingers while the primary investigator/research assistant held the 
animal above the cage for up to 60 seconds, (9) touching the snake with one full hand while the 
primary investigator/research assistant held the animal above the cage for up to 60 seconds, (10) 
touching the snake with both hands while the primary investigator/research assistant held the 
animal above the cage for up to 60 seconds, (11) independently lifting the snake directly above 
the cage with both hands for up to 60 seconds, and, finally, (12) independently lifting the snake 
with both hands for more than 60 seconds but not in excess of 3 minutes. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  76 
Research Assistant Training Procedures 
 Because numerous research assistants aided in the data collection of the current study, 
training procedures were warranted. These procedures ensured within- and between-group 
equivalence of the procedures described above. Research assistants were provided with access to 
a manual that described the protocol for all groups as well as a manual that described and 
outlined the steps in administering one-session in vivo exposure treatment. Only research 
assistants in the university graduate program in clinical psychology were, however, permitted to 
administer one-session in vivo exposure treatment to treatment group participants. All research 
assistants were required to meet with the primary investigator for an exposure treatment 
workshop, which included a description, demonstration, and practice of proper protocol for one-
session in vivo exposure treatment. During this workshop, a live snake or spider was used. After 
reading the manual and completion of the exposure treatment workshop, research assistants met 
with the primary investigator to conduct a practice trial with the primary investigator serving as 
the mock participant. Upon successful completion of the training period described above, 
research assistants were permitted to conduct one-session in vivo exposure treatment with 
participants. Additional training was provided to research assistants upon request. No protocol 
adherence monitoring occurred during the course of the experiment.   
Ethical Treatment of Participants and Animals 
 Because the procedure of exposing a participant to a feared stimulus was anticipated to be 
aversive, procedures were outlined to assure that all those involved in the experiment were 
treated with the utmost care. In order to maintain the comfort and well-being of all participants, 
an explanation of the experimental procedure was provided verbally and in writing on the 
informed consent form, which was signed before participation of any kind commenced. Each 
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participant was told that his/her participation was strictly voluntary and that he/she could choose 
to terminate participation at any time for any reason.    
 Prior to choosing to participate in the study, each participant was told that he/she would 
be exposed to the feared stimulus and that he/she could choose to end that exposure at any time. 
All participants were informed that the animal would remain in its container throughout the study 
unless the participant chose to handle the animal during treatment, and any contact with the 
animal would be completely initiated and controlled by the participant. The participant could 
choose to advance toward the animal to any point where he/she felt comfortable, and at no time 
would the primary investigator/research assistant force contact or approach as part of treatment. 
In addition, all fearful participants who are interested in receiving treatment for his/her snake or 
spider fear were offered one-session in vivo exposure treatment after completion of their 
participation in the study if they did not already receive such treatment. At the conclusion of the 
experimental procedures, an informal assessment was conducted with each participant to 
determine if, as a result of participation in the study, the participant could benefit from assistance 
relaxing before leaving the research laboratory. All data collected in this study was coded to 
protect confidentiality; that is, participants were assigned a unique identification number and all 
data were kept in a locked file cabinet. Following cessation of data collection, the code sheet that 
contained the participant’s unique identification number and their name was destroyed, thus 
ensuring confidentiality. 
 The animals used in this study - the rose-haired tarantula and the corn snake - were 
treated with care under the supervision of the primary investigator. Proper handling, feeding, and 
sanitation procedures were used and the animals were not exposed to harmful or aversive stimuli. 
All participants were informed before attempting to handle the animal that any handling must be 
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done gently and, if the participant became fearful during handling, that he/she should 
immediately notify the primary investigator/research assistant standing beside them so that the 
animal could be released quickly and safely. Both the snake and the tarantula were lifted from 
their container during the course of treatment, but they remained in close proximity to the 
container and the primary investigator/research assistant at all times. 
Results 
Description of Primary Statistical Analyses 
 Question group 1: Presence of selective processing bias and explicit memory 
 avoidance. 
As previously described in the Research Questions and Hypotheses section, the first 
group of research question sought to establish the existence of selective processing bias and 
subsequent explicit memory avoidance. An a priori hypothesis stated that the pre-test results 
from the treatment group and the no-treatment group would display data patterns indicative of 
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance; that is, the pre-test assessment of the 
treatment group and the no-treatment group was anticipated to reveal significant response 
differences to threat-relevant stimuli on measures of selective processing bias and explicit 
memory avoidance compared to neutral stimuli on the same measures and compared to control 
group responses to the same stimuli. Three analyses of variance, one for each dependent variable 
of emotional Stroop task response latencies, exogenous cueing task response latencies, and 
explicit recall, were planned to determine whether selective processing bias and explicit memory 
avoidance were indeed evident in fearful individuals. This was accomplished by comparing the 
emotional Stroop task and exogenous cueing task response latencies and explicit recall of threat-
relevant stimuli of those in the treatment and no-treatment groups at pre-test to these 
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participants’ response to neutral stimuli on these measures. The pre-test results of the treatment 
and no-treatment groups were also compared to the pre-test results of the control group.  
Additionally, the temporal stability of the cognitive patterns of interest were to be 
assessed through a mixed analysis of variance with group assignment as the between condition 
and time of assessment as the within condition. Missing data prohibited the use of the planned 
mixed analysis of variance in this circumstance, however. At the conclusion of data collection, 
five participants, three of which were in the no-treatment group and two of which were in the 
treatment group, presented missing data due to the participant’s discontinuation of participation 
at some point after completion of post-test. Reason(s) for attrition were not collected in this 
study. When the demographic information for the individuals who discontinued participation 
were compared to the demographic information for the Experimental Phase sample, these two 
groups of individuals were closely matched demographically. No significant differences existed 
between these two groups on Screening Phase fear assessment. Limited missing data also existed 
elsewhere in the Experimental Phase participant sample due to technical failure or participant 
non-response. Notably, technical failure interfered with recording of data for half of the post-test 
emotional Stroop task for one control group participant and all of the pre-test emotional Stroop 
task data for another control group participant. In the case of item-level missing data (e.g. 
participant non-response to one item of the State subscale of the STAI), mean substitution was 
used. 
For the five participants whose discontinued participation generated substantial missing 
data (i.e. one or more assessment points), the generalized linear model was employed to analyze 
the data such that an F value was obtained via comparison of the sum of squares and the mean 
square of each dependent variable of interest. A procedural mixed model, specifically a restricted 
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maximum likelihood (REML) estimation method with unstructured covariance structure and 
between-within degrees of freedom, was used to estimate missing values based on the available 
data points of each participant with missing data. Maximum likelihood estimation “maximizes 
the likelihood of observing the sample data that were actually observed” based on a likelihood 
function, or the value(s) of one or many parameters that make the occurrence of the actual 
observed data most likely (Long, 1997, pp. 26-27; see also Eliason, 1993). Clarke (2008) 
described the substantial agreement between the ANOVA method and REML in the case of 
assumed normality, balanced designs, and nonnegative estimates of variance parameters, 
although he championed the application of REML even in cases of unbalanced data.  
 Question group 2: Impact of treatment on anxiety-induced cognitive processes. 
The second group of research questions involved understanding the immediate and 
prolonged impact of one-session in vivo exposure treatment on selective processing bias and 
explicit memory avoidance. It was hypothesized that one-session in vivo exposure treatment 
would immediately eliminate selective processing bias and reduce inhibition of threat-relevant 
information characteristic of explicit memory avoidance; these effects, however, were not 
anticipated to remain stable over time in the absence of treatment maintenance procedures. To 
address this question, a 2 (word/cue valence) x 3 (group assignment) x 3 (time of assessment) 
repeated measures analysis of variance for the emotional Stroop task, exogenous cueing task, and 
all explicit memory tests was to be used to determine the effect of treatment on the selective 
processing bias and explicit memory avoidance that may have been indicated in the analyses of 
variance conducted on pre-test assessment data. Treatment effects were also to be evaluated 
immediately following treatment and at one-week and one-month follow-up assessments. As was 
the case for questions in the previous question group, however, the same general linear mixed 
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model incorporating a maximum likelihood method of missing value estimation was used to 
predict the limited amount of missing data present for five treatment and no-treatment group 
participants as well as the missing data present due to technical error. 
           Question group 3: Impact of state and trait anxiety on selective processing bias and                  
explicit memory avoidance. 
The final group of research questions addressed the impact of state and trait anxiety on 
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. It was hypothesized that state and trait 
anxiety variables would interact such that those participants who demonstrated high levels of 
both these variables would display the greatest levels of selective processing bias and explicit 
memory avoidance. In order to address this question, participants were recatergorized into one of 
four anxiety groups. Participants’ scores on the STAI were grouped according to cutoff scores 
implemented in studies that evaluated the effects of trait anxiety on implicit memory (i.e. 
Harrison & Turpin, 2003; Schwerdtfeger, 2006). Participants were assigned to one of the 
following mutually exclusive groups: high in both state and trait anxiety, low in both state and 
trait anxiety, high in state anxiety and low in trait anxiety, and high in trait anxiety and low in 
state anxiety. In accordance with Harrison and Turpin (2003) and Schwerdtfeger (2006), a high 
score on either scale was defined by a score of 40 or above while a low score on either scale was 
defined by a score of 39 or below. A 2 (word valence) x 4 (anxiety group) analysis of variance 
was to be conducted to compare the response latencies on the emotional Stroop task and 
exogenous cueing task and recall on each test of explicit memory. Again, the same general linear 
mixed model incorporating a maximum likelihood method of missing value estimation was used 
to address this group of questions as well.  
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In recognition of the necessity to conduct multiple planned comparisons to examine 
several of the research questions/hypothesis, a Bonferroni multiple comparison procedure was 
used to control for potential alpha inflation; this method permits pairwise comparison based on a 
priori hypotheses regardless of equality of sample size and has narrow confidence intervals 
(Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996). Additionally, the assumptions of the general 
linear model, namely sample normality, equality of variance, and randomness/independence of 
factor-level responses (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996), were presumed to have 
been met. As was congruent with the results of the primary investigator’s thesis study (Stanley-
Kime, 2008), the Experimental Phase sample was not dramatically skewed on demographic 
variables, and similar population variances appeared to result from the random assignment of 
fearful individuals to either the treatment or no-treatment groups. One should note that all groups 
possessed approximately equal numbers of participants, thereby offsetting inaccuracies that 
could have arose resultant of elevated between-group variance. Based on statistical screening, the 
Experimental Phase sample appeared to achieve normality with no significantly skewed 
variables. However, limited extreme score outliers existed on the following variables: age (one 
significantly older participant in the treatment group and in the control group, respectively) and 
the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (one control group participant scored significantly higher than 
other control group participants on this measure). Potential confounds such as estimated IQ, age, 
or sex that may have impacted results were identified using a chi-square or analysis of variance 
procedure and are described in detail below. 
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Sample Characteristics 
 Demographics. 
  A total of 1,403 students from a Midwestern university participated in whole or part in 
the online Screening Phase of the study from November 2009 to December 2011; of those 1,403 
participants, 1,245 participants fully completed the Screening Phase, and a majority of those 
individuals (N = 908) indicated interest in participation in the Experimental Phase of the study. A 
total 302 met all screening criteria for the Experimental Phase and were eligible to be invited to 
participate in that phase of the study; of this 302, 227 individuals were actually invited to 
participate in the Experimental Phase. Some participants who met Experimental Phase criteria 
were not invited for further participation as they met criteria for a participant group that was 
already completed at the time (i.e. the control group) or they did not provide valid contact 
information. Sixty individuals participated in the Experimental Phase of the study; of this sixty, 
55 fully completed all four assessment periods while 5 voluntarily discontinued participation. 
Four of the five withdrew participation after completing post-test assessments while one 
withdrew participation after completing one-week follow-up assessment. Two of the study non-
completers were members of the treatment group while the remaining three participants were 
members of the no-treatment group. The treatment group was composed of 19 individuals, 12 of 
whom contacted a snake and 7 of whom contacted a spider during participation, and the no-
treatment group was composed of 21 individuals, 11 of whom contacted a snake and 10 of whom 
contacted a spider during participation. The control group was composed of 20 individuals, 10 of 
whom contacted a snake and 10 of whom contacted a spider during participation. Mean age for 
all participants  in both study phases was 22.38 with a range of 18 to 56 years and no significant 
between group differences were found on this variable. The majority of the participant sample 
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identified as female (76%) and White/Caucasian was the race most often endorsed (75%). 
Significantly more female participants composed the treatment group compared to the control 
group (p < .05). Race/ethnicity was not significantly different by group. Sixty percent of 
participants were employed in addition to their student status. Most participants identified as a 
freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior and only two participants identified as being a second 
bachelors student. Mean estimated IQ based on administration of the SILS was 107 with a range 
of 88 to 118, and this variable was not significant by group. Table 1 illustrates the between-group 
similarity found on demographic variables. . 
Table 1. Demographic Variables by Participant Group and Total Sample 
 Treatment No-Treatment Control Total Sample  
Mean Age (Range) 21 (18-37) 21 (18-33) 24 (19-56) 22 (18-56) 
Sex*     
Female 17 18 11 46 (76%) 
Male 2 3 9 14 (24%) 
Ethnicity     
African American 1 3 1 5 (8%) 
Asian 0 0 1 1 (2%) 
Caucasian  16 13 16 45 (75%) 
Hispanic 0 1 0 1 (2%) 
Middle Eastern 0 0 1 1 (2%) 
Multi-Ethnic 1 3 1 5 (8%) 
Other/Decline 1 1 0 2 (3%) 
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Employment     
Employed 15 9 12 36 (60%) 
Unemployed 4 12 8 24 (40%) 
Student Standing     
Freshman 7 6 2 15 (25%) 
Sophomore 4 5 8 17 (28%) 
Junior 5 5 5 15 (25%) 
Senior 3 4 4 11 (18%) 
Second Bachelors 0 1 1 2 (3%) 
Mean IQ (Range) 107 (98-116) 104 (89-118) 108 (88-118) 107 (88-118) 
* Significant at the .05 level 
 Performance on screening phase assessments. 
 The Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) and the Fear of Snakes Questionnaire (FSnQ) 
was administered electronically to all participants as described in the Procedure section. Of the 
fearful participants assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment groups, 23 interacted with a 
snake during the Experimental Phase and 17 interacted with a spider. Mean score on the FSQ for 
fearful participants who interacted with the spider was 91.41 with a standard deviation of 14.50 
while mean score on the FSnQ for fearful participants who interacted with the snake was 90.70 
with a standard deviation of 16.34. Mean score on the FSQ for fearful participants who did not 
interact with the spider (i.e. rather, these participants interacted with the snake due to greater fear 
of the snake) was 46.93 with a standard deviation of 34.25 while mean score on the FSnQ for 
fearful participants who did not interact with the snake (i.e. rather, these participants interacted 
with the spider due to greater fear of the spider) was 35.82 with a standard deviation of 34.10. Of 
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the control group participants, the mean score on the FSQ for those who interacted with the 
spider was 3.80 with a standard deviation of 3.58 while mean score on the FSnQ for those who 
interacted with the snake was 2.10 with a standard deviation of 1.97.  Mean score on the FSQ for 
control participants who did not interact with the spider (i.e. rather, these participants interacted 
with the snake due to less fear of the snake) was 9.90 with a standard deviation of 17.19 while 
mean score on the FSnQ for control participants who did not interact with the snake (i.e. rather, 
these participants interacted with the spider due to less fear of the spider) was 22.00 with a 
standard deviation of 18.65. For those who interacted with the snake, the difference between 
fearful participants assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment groups and non-fearful 
participants (i.e. the control group) on the FSnQ was significant, t (23.43) = 25.58, p < .001, and 
this was also true on the FSQ for those who interacted with the spider, t (19.13) = 23.73, p < 
.01). When the three participant groups were compared, the treatment and no-treatment 
participants significantly differed only from the control group for both snake-fearful participants, 
F (2, 30) = 140.80, p < .001, and spider-fearful participants, F (2, 24) = 170.89, p < .001. 
 The 21-item version of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS-21) was also 
administered electronically to all participants during the Screening Phase. The mean for the 
depression subscale across all participants was 2.32 (SD = 2.05) while the means for the anxiety 
and stress subscales were 2.98 (SD = 3.38) and 5.88 (SD = 3.81), respectively. The mean total 
score for the DASS-21 was 11.18 (SD = 7.61). These means are within non-clinical limits for all 
subscales and for the total scale (Sinclair, Siefert, Slavin-Mulford, Stein, Renna, & Blais, 2011). 
Significant between-group differences existed on the anxiety subscale, F (2, 57) = 3.24, p < .05, 
on which the no-treatment group scored significantly higher than the control group. 
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 Performance on experimental phase assessments. 
 The latency between Experimental Phase appointments was planned to occur as follows 
for all participants: one to six days between pre-test and post-test, seven days between post-test 
and one-week follow-up, and thirty days between post-test and one-month follow-up. Mean 
number of days between pre-test and post-test was 4.48 (SD = 3.75, range 1-19). Mean number 
of days between post-test and one-week follow-up was 10.48 (SD = 6.47, range 4-34). Mean 
number of days between post-test and one-month follow-up was 31.75 (SD = 8.63, range 14-55). 
No significant differences by group were found on any of the three appointment latencies 
mentioned above. 
 The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) was administered at the beginning of each 
appointment the participant attended; both the State and Trait Anxiety subscales were given at 
pre-test appointments while only the State Anxiety subscale was given at subsequent 
appointments. The mean score on the Trait Anxiety subscale at pre-test assessment of those 
participants who were fearful (i.e. assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment groups) was 
significantly different from the mean score of non-fearful participants on this subscale (M = 
37.15, SD = 10.51 for fearful participants, M = 30.70, SD = 6.43 for non-fearful participants; t 
(55.46) = 2.93, p < .01), and the groups were also statistically significantly different on the State 
Anxiety subscale as well (M = 34.75, SD = 9.83 for fearful participants, M = 27.50, SD = 5.61 
for non-fearful participants; t (56.87) = 3.63, p = .001). When only the fearful participants were 
compared in an independent samples t-test, the treatment and no-treatment groups did not 
significantly differ from one another on either the State or Trait Anxiety subscales at pre-test. A 
one-way ANOVA with participant group membership as the independent variable and State and 
Trait anxiety score as the dependent variable revealed significant differences on both the Trait 
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Anxiety subscale, F (2, 57) = 5.19, p < .01, and the State Anxiety subscale, F (2, 57) = 5.04, p = 
.01, at pre-test; on both subscales, the treatment group differed significantly from the control 
group with the treatment group earning higher scores on each subscale. No significant between-
group differences on the State Anxiety subscale of the STAI were found at post-test, one-week 
follow-up, or one-month follow-up, although one-month follow-up approached significance, F 
(2, 52) = 2.99, p < .06. A repeated measures ANOVA with scores on the State Anxiety subscale 
as the dependent variable suggested significant differences by assessment point only, F (3, 50) = 
5.93, p < .01, indicating that all total scores regardless of participant group membership changed 
over time on this measure. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the change in STAI – State Anxiety 
subscale scores over time by group. 
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Figure 1. STAI- State subscale scores across assessment points by participant group. 
 The Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) was used as a behavioral measure of participant 
fear toward the snake or spider. Several BAT variables were coded for analysis, including (1) the 
participant’s Subjective Units of Distress (SUDs) ratings prior to entering the room with the 
animal, (2) the participant’s distance traveled in feet from the door of the room in which the BAT 
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was conducted to the participant’s initial stopping point, (3) the participant SUDs rating at the 
initial stopping point, (4) the participant’s distance traveled in feet from the door of the room in 
which the BAT was conducted to the participant’s final stopping point, and (5) the participant’s 
SUDs rating at the final stopping point. None of these five BAT measures significantly differed 
by animal used in the Experimental Phase, thereby permitting analysis without animal as a 
covariate. At pre-test assessment, all BAT variables were significant at the .01 alpha level or less 
with the exception of the participant’s distance traveled in feet from the door of the room in 
which the BAT was conducted to the participant’s final stopping point, which approached 
significance; significant differences existed between the treatment and control groups in several 
instances and between the fearful groups (i.e. treatment and no-treatment groups) and the control 
group. In all instances of statistical significance, fearful groups exhibited more fear on the BAT 
variables at pre-test assessment (i.e. higher SUDS ratings, less willingness to approach the 
animal). At post-test, one-week, and one-month follow-up assessments, all BAT variables 
continued to be significant by group at the .05 alpha level or lower with the no-treatment group 
demonstrating significantly more fear on all variables than both the treatment and control groups. 
Means and standard deviations for all BAT variables are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for SUDS Ratings and Distance Traveled by Participants During the BAT at All Assessment 
Points 
 Pre-approach 
SUDS 
(0-100) 
Distance (ft) to 
Initial Stopping 
Point 
SUDS (0-100) at 
Initial Stopping 
Point 
Distance (ft) to 
Final Stopping 
Point 
SUDS (0-100) at 
Final Stopping 
Point 
 
T
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t
 
 
Pre-test 22.32 (28.47) 11.03 (3.74) 41.42 (33.29) 12.17 (3.85) 43.47 (35.87) 
Post-test .68 (1.60) 14 (0) 3.63 (8.30) 14 (0) 3.63 (8.30) 
One-week 2.28 (5.19) 13.94 (.24) 3.44 (4.44) 14 (0) 3.44 (4.44) 
One-month 2.88 (6.59) 14 (0) 3.47 (6.19) 14 (0) 3.47 (6.19) 
 
 
N
o
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t
 
 
Pre-test 14.76 (21.68) 10.95 (3.92) 32.24 (30.75) 12.15 (3.23) 38.81 (35.37) 
Post-test 16.38 (24.73) 12.19 (2.56) 33.29 (33.96) 13 (2.03) 36.10 (37.16) 
One-week 14.61 (23.03) 12.89 (2.17) 32.11 (33.35) 13.36 (1.47) 32.39 (35.03) 
One-month 11.39 (18.54) 12.61 (2.77) 29.56 (35.79) 13.03 (2.02) 31.50 (39.01) 
 
 
C
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l
 
 
Pre-test 0.16 (.50) 14 (0) 3.21 (11.44) 14 (0) 3.21 (11.44) 
Post-test .25 (.72) 13.32 (2.98) 2.74 (10.28) 14 (0) 2.60 (10.02) 
One-week .50 (1.28) 14 (0) .74(2.35) 14 (0) .74 (2.35) 
One-month .60 (2.26) 14 (0) .60 (2.26) 14 (0) .60 (2.26) 
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 Treatment statistics. 
 Of the nineteen participants in the treatment group, all but one successfully met criteria 
for treatment cessation by reaching a SUDs level equivalent to or below 19 on all steps in the 
treatment hierarchy. The single treatment participant who did not meet this criterion voluntarily 
chose to discontinue treatment prior to the end of the three hour maximum time limit. This 
participant did continue to complete the reminder of the post-test and all follow-up appointments. 
Several treatment group participants said “pause” one or more times during treatment, but the 
exact frequency of requested pauses is unknown as these data were not reliably collected. One 
treatment group participant required brief relaxation before leaving the post-test appointment; 
note that this individual successfully completed treatment. Many participants completed 
treatment with a single exposure to treatment steps but some participants required additional 
treatment cycles, or instances in which the treatment steps had to be sequentially repeated due to 
unsatisfactorily high SUDs levels. Mean SUDs levels for the treatment cycles were as follows: 
49.21 (SD = 24.65, range 0-85) for cycle one for which the total number of participants was 19, 
13.76 (SD = 18.08, range 0-54) for cycle two for which the total number of participants was 17, 
14.20 (SD = 12.11, range 1-34) for cycle three for which the total number of participants was 5, 9 
(SD = 8.54, range 0-17) for cycle four for which the total number of participants was 3, and 4 
(SD = 0) for cycle five for which there was one participant. Mean treatment time was 67.26 
minutes (SD = 30.04 minutes, range 26-180 minutes). Mean treatment time did not differ by type 
of animal (e.g. snake versus spider) used in the Experimental Phase. Mean SUDs rating for each 
treatment cycle also did not differ by animal. 
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Primary Statistical Analyses 
 Question group 1: Presence of selective processing bias and explicit memory 
 avoidance. 
 The first group of research questions sought to establish the presence of selective 
processing bias and explicit memory avoidance in the fearful individuals in the present 
participant sample. The emotional Stroop task, frequently used to demonstrate the existence of 
attentional bias across anxiety disorders, was used to connect the study’s methodology with the 
broader empirical literature through utilization of equivalent methods. The first research question 
was (1) will there be selective processing bias found in the emotional Stroop task?  It was 
hypothesized that selective processing bias would be found in the treatment and no-treatment 
groups at pre-test assessment, as would be evidenced by longer response times on the emotional 
Stroop task for threat words than neutral words and than the response times of control group 
participants for threat words. Statistical comparison of the mean response times for threat and 
neutral words on the pre-test emotional Stroop task for each of the three groups yielded 
acceptance of the null hypothesis; that is, no significant differences were found between 
participant groups for threat- or neutrally-valenced words on the pre-test emotional Stroop task. 
Contrary to the literature cited above in which selective processing bias was detected on the 
emotional Stroop task, no selective processing bias was detected in this sample at pre-test. 
 The exogenous cueing task, a relatively novel methodological application in this 
empirical literature, was employed to further clarify the presence of selective processing bias in 
fearful participants by differentiating between facilitated responding, a unique detection 
capability exclusive to this task, and attentional capture, as would have also been revealed by the 
emotional Stroop task. The second research question in question group one was (2) will there be 
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selective processing bias on the exogenous cueing task?  It was hypothesized that selective 
processing bias would be found in the exogenous cueing task in the treatment and no-treatment 
groups at pre-test, which would be evidenced by facilitated responding (i.e. faster responding 
such that millisecond response times would be lesser) to targets presented with threat cues 
compared to targets presented with neutral cues on valid trials. This specifically would suggest 
that there would be smaller mean response latencies to threat valid trials than neutral valid trials 
and uncued trials in treatment and no-treatment groups as compared to mean response latencies 
to threat valid trials in the control group. Comparison of the treatment and no-treatment groups to 
the control group on mean response times to targets presented with valid threat cues to mean 
response times to targets presented with valid neutral cues revealed no significant differences 
between groups on threat valid trials or neutral valid trials on the pre-test exogenous cueing task. 
The third research question was (3) will there be attentional capture on the exogenous cuing 
task?  It was hypothesized that the treatment and no-treatment groups would exhibit attentional 
capture on the exogenous cuing task at pre-test assessment when threat invalid trials were 
compared to neutral invalid trials. That is, longer response times to threat invalid trials than 
neutral invalid trials and uncued trials in the treatment and no-treatment groups as compared to 
response latencies on the same trials in the control group would be observed. No significant 
differences, however, were found between groups on threat invalid trials or neutral invalid trials 
on the pre-test exogenous cueing task. Additionally, no between-group differences existed in 
millisecond reaction time for uncued trials on the pre-test exogenous cueing task.  
 Along with attentional processes, explicit memory was also a focus of this study with the 
dependent variables being performance on three tests of recall (i.e. free recall, word-stem cued 
recall, and recognition) of a previously presented valenced word list, each test of recall offering 
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the participant progressively more recall cues. The final research question in question group one 
was (4) will there be explicit memory avoidance on the tests of free recall, word-stem cued 
recall, and recognition?  It was hypothesized that explicit memory avoidance would be found in 
the treatment and no-treatment groups at pre-test, which would be evidenced by decreased 
explicit recall of threat-relevant words compared to recall of neutral words. Thus, the dependent 
variable for explicit memory evaluation was mean number of threat-valenced words correctly 
recalled/endorsed compared to mean number of neutrally-valenced words correctly 
recalled/endorsed across groups. On the free recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition tests, 
no significant differences were found between groups on recall/recognition for threat-valenced 
words or neutrally-valenced words on the pre-test explicit memory measures. 
 Question group 2: Impact of treatment on anxiety-induced cognitive processes. 
In light of the uniformly null results for all questions in question group one, questions in the 
second grouping could not be addressed as anticipated given that they presupposed the initial 
existence of selective processing bias and/or explicit memory avoidance in this participant 
sample. The two research questions in this grouping were (1) will one-session in vivo exposure 
treatment immediately eliminate selective processing bias and reduce potential inhibitory 
processes operating to suppress explicit recall of threat-relevant information? and (2) will 
hypothesized treatment gains exhibited in the treatment group remain stable at one-week and 
one-month follow-up?  It was hypothesized that the treatment group would not significantly 
differ from the control group on all dependent variables at post-test. Also, the immediate 
treatment gains exhibited by the treatment group was predicated to gradually decrease over time, 
although the results of the treatment group were not anticipated to eventually equate with those 
of the no-treatment group due to this decrease. Because neither selective processing bias nor 
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explicit memory avoidance was found in fearful participants at pre-test assessment, 
determination of immediate and prolonged impact of treatment on the absent processes is 
unwarranted in this sample.  
 The temporal stability of patterns of cognitive processing among anxious and non-
anxious individuals was, however, an ancillary focus presented in question group one, the intent 
of which was to determine if hypothetically present selective processing bias and explicit 
memory avoidance found at pre-test assessment remained stable in the no-treatment group across 
all assessment points. It was hypothesized that response patterns indicative of selective 
processing bias and explicit memory avoidance would be temporally stable in the no-treatment 
group. As previously mentioned, no patterns of responding suggestive of selective processing 
bias or explicit memory avoidance were found in any group at pre-test, thereby negating the 
necessity to determine temporal stability of these constructs in the no-treatment group. 
Longitudinal participant performance by group on all dependent variables was, however, 
examined in an effort to detect any changes in performance due to the receipt of treatment or the 
effects of an unknown, unmeasured variable.  
 Measures of selective processing bias, namely the emotional Stroop task and the 
exogenous cueing task, were initially analyzed to ascertain longitudinal participant performance. 
For the emotional Stroop task, the fixed effect of assessment point did not yield significant 
results, suggesting that the mean response times for both threat and neutral words did not change 
across time regardless of group membership. The interaction between group and assessment 
point was also not significant for either threat or neutral words. Thus, all participants performed 
approximately equivalently on the emotional Stroop task regardless of word valence, and 
performance did substantially not change over time. Again, this sample demonstrated no 
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selective processing bias on the emotional Stroop task, and response patterns remained stable 
across assessment points. On the exogenous cueing task, the fixed effect of assessment point was 
significant for threat valid trials, F (3, 57) = 44.69, p < .0001, threat invalid trials, F (3, 57) = 
4.62, p < .01, uncued trials, F (3, 57) = 17.98, p < .0001, neutral valid trials, F (3, 57) = 40.73, p 
< .001, and neutral invalid trials, F (3, 57) = 11.16, p < .0001 (see Figure 2). For threat valid and 
neutral valid trials, all participants became faster in their response times when assessment points 
were compared with the exception of the comparison between the one-week follow-up and the 
one-month follow-up, for which there existed no significant differences. For the threat invalid 
and neutral invalid trials as well as uncued trials, only the pre-test assessment point significantly 
differed from all other assessment points. This suggests that, regardless of group membership, all 
participants became significantly faster in responding over time to all trial types presented on the 
exogenous cueing task; this increasingly rapid responding, however, did dissipate between one-
week and one-month follow-ups for valid trials and between post-test and one-week follow-up 
for both invalid and uncued trials.  The interaction between group and assessment point was not 
significant for any trial type on the exogenous cueing task, indicating that changes in response 
time to all trials on the exogenous cueing task were not a product of group membership. 
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Figure 2. Response times in milliseconds for all participants on all trials of the exogenous cueing 
task. 
 Tests of explicit memory avoidance were also analyzed for temporal change. On the free 
recall test, the fixed effect of assessment point was significant for recall of both neutral words, F 
= (3, 57) 7.01, p < .001, and threat words, F (3, 57) = 2.83, p < .05, (see Figure 3). For neutral 
words, all assessment points differed significantly from the one-week follow-up, when 
participants recalled significantly more neutral words than recalled at the other assessment 
points. For threat words, recall at pre-test and one-month follow-up significantly differed from 
recall at post-test, which evidenced the greatest recall for threat words across participants. The 
interaction between group and assessment point was not significant for either word valence on 
the free recall test. On the word-stem cued recall test, the fixed effect of assessment point was 
significant for recall of both neutral words, F (3, 57) = 16.25, p < .0001, and threat words, F (3, 
57) = 9.09, p < .0001, (see Figure 4). For neutral words, recall was greater at post-test, one-week, 
and one-month follow-up, all of which did not significantly differ from one another, than recall 
at pre-test. For threat words, recall was significantly greater at post-test than all other assessment 
points, which did not differ from one another. The interaction between group and assessment 
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point was not significant for either word valence on the word-stem cued recall test. Finally, on 
the recognition test, the fixed effect of assessment point was not significant for recognition of 
neutral words but was significant for recognition of threat words, F (3, 57) = 6.40, p < .001, (see 
Figure 5 for recall of threat words across all participants). Significant differences were found in 
the comparison between pre-test and one-month follow-up (i.e. more threat words recognized at 
pre-test) and between post-test and one-week and one-month follow-ups (i.e. more threat words 
recognized at post-test in than one-week and one-month follow-up, respectively). As was evident 
for the free and word-stem cued recall tests, the interaction between group and assessment point 
was not significant for either word valence on the recognition test.  
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Figure 3. Number of threat and neutral words correctly recalled by all participants on the free 
recall test. 
 Each assessment point was analyzed to detect main effects on dependent variables. At 
post-test, no significant differences between groups were noted on any dependent variable. 
Notably, however, several dependent variables approached significance, including response time 
to threat invalid words on the exogenous cueing task, F (2, 55) = 2.14, p < .13.  At post-test 
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assessment, the treatment and control group almost exactly equated in response time to threat 
invalid trials (mean response times of 390 and 389, respectively) while the no-treatment group 
responded faster with a mean response time of 365 milliseconds, perhaps suggesting attentional 
diversion from threat. Also approaching significance at post-test assessment was recognition of 
threat words on the recognition test, F (2, 57) = 2.32, p < .11. On the recognition test, the no-
treatment group recalled more threat words than the treatment and control groups. At one-week 
follow-up, the mean difference between recall of threat and neutral words on the free recall test 
was significant, F (2, 53) = 3.24, p < .05. Specifically, the no-treatment group exhibited a 
significantly smaller mean difference in recall between threat and neutral words than the mean 
difference in recall in the control group. This same trend was observed on the cued recall test, 
although this result failed to reach significance, F (2, 53) = 2.14, p < .13. Near significant 
differences were also present on the recognition test, specifically for recognition of neutral 
words, F (2, 53) = 2.37, p < .11. The mean difference between recognition of threat and neutral 
words on the recognition test was significant, F (2, 53) = 3.48, p < .05. The control group 
displayed the largest mean difference between recognition of threat words and neutral words. 
Finally, at one-month follow-up, response times to uncued trials of the exogenous cueing task 
almost reached significance, F (2, 51) = 2.20, p < .13; the no-treatment group responded faster 
than both the treatment and control groups to these trials. Number of neutral words recalled on 
the free recall test almost reached significance, F (2, 52) = 2.13, p < .13; the treatment group 
recalled more neutral words than the no-treatment group. Once again, the mean difference 
between recall of threat and neutral words on the free recall test almost reached significance, F 
(2, 52) = 2.00, p < .15, with the treatment group exhibiting the smallest mean difference (M = 
0.88), followed by the control group (M = 1.95) and the no-treatment group (M = 2.22).   As 
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reported in one-week follow-up, the mean difference between recognition of threat and neutral 
words on the recognition test was significant, F (2, 52) = 3.73, p < .05 with the control group 
demonstrating the largest mean difference between recognition of threat words and recognition 
of neutral words. 
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Figure 4. Number of threat and neutral words correctly produced by all participants on the word-
stem cued recall test.  
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Figure 5. Number of threat words correctly recognized by all participants on the recognition test.
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Question group 3: Impact of state and trait anxiety on selective processing bias and 
explicit memory avoidance. 
 The final group of research questions involved the recategorization the participant sample 
based on levels of state and trait anxiety in order to assess their impact on the measures of 
cognitive processing. Thus, participants were categorized as follows based on pre-test responses 
on the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI): high on both state and trait anxiety (i.e. STAI 
scores greater than 40 on each subscale; N = 6), low on trait anxiety (i.e. STAI-Trait subscale 
score of 39 or less) and high on state anxiety (i.e. STAI-State subscale score of 40 or greater; N = 
3), high on trait anxiety (i.e. STAI-Trait subscale score of 40 or greater) and low on state anxiety 
(i.e. STAI-State subscale score of 39 or less; N = 11), and low on both state and trait anxiety (i.e. 
STAI scores of 39 or less on both subscales; N = 39). The research questions in this group were 
(1) will selective processing bias and explicit recall differences arise as a result of high or low 
state or trait anxiety in participants? and (2) will possible increases in state anxiety, as may be 
seen in the one-week and one-month assessments, in the treatment group result in greater 
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance?  For question one, an interactive effect 
between state and trait anxiety was hypothesized such that those participants who were high in 
both types of anxiety at pre-test would display the greatest selective processing bias and produce 
more explicit recall avoidance of threat-relevant stimuli. For question two, it was hypothesized 
that, if state anxiety increased in the treatment group at one-week and one-month follow-up 
assessments, greater selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance would be found. 
 At pre-test assessment, no significant differences were found among any of the anxiety 
groupings on the emotional Stroop task, the exogenous cueing task, or the three tests of memory, 
thereby negating question one of this question group. Question two requires initial establishment 
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of elevations in state anxiety in the treatment group at one-week and one-month follow-up 
assessments. Therefore, a repeated measures ANOVA with the independent variable as 
participant group assignment and the dependent variable as STAI – State subscale score revealed 
that scores on the State subscale were significantly different across time, F (3, 50) = 5.39, p < 
.01, and the effect of group assignment on STAI – State scores across time almost reached 
significance, F (3, 50) = 2.18, p < .06. Specifically, the mean difference over time in the State 
subscale scores of the control group compared to those of the no-treatment group almost reached 
significance (p < .06) in that the no-treatment group exhibited higher State subscale scores than 
the control group. As noted previously, Figure 1 illustrates that no significant increase in state 
anxiety as measured by the STAI State subscale occurred in the treatment group at one-week and 
one-month follow-up. Thus, evidence of increase in magnitude of selective processing bias and 
explicit memory avoidance based on the presumption of increased state anxiety in the treatment 
group cannot be made as no such increase in anxiety existed in this sample. In fact, the marked 
decrease in STAI – State scores from pre-test to post-test in the treatment group appears to be 
maintained across one-week and one-month follow-up, perhaps a testament to the effectiveness 
of treatment. 
 The prolonged impact of both state and trait anxiety on selective processing bias and 
explicit memory avoidance was examined in spite of the lack of evidence at pre-test assessment 
that this variable impacts the constructs of interest given that the absence of these constructs in 
this sample. Again, no significant differences were found on any dependent variable measure at 
pre-test when participants were categorized according to levels of state and trait anxiety. 
Differences at post-test were observed, mostly on the tests of explicit recall but one of which 
occurred on the emotional Stroop task. On the post-test emotional Stroop task, significant 
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differences were found for neutral words only, F (3, 56) = 2.80, p < .05; those who had low trait 
and high state anxiety took significantly more time to name the color in which neutral words 
were printed compared to participants who were classified as high in both types of anxiety. On 
the post-test free recall test, the mean difference between recall of neutral and threat words by 
anxiety grouping almost reached significance, F (3, 56) = 2.66, p < .06. Greater mean disparity 
in recall for threat words versus neutral words on the post-test free recall test occurred in those 
who were high in trait and state anxiety and those who were low in trait and high in state anxiety 
with threat words enjoying preferential recall over neutral words by these groups. Finally, on the 
post-test cued recall test the mean difference between recall of neutral and threat words by 
anxiety grouping also almost reached significance, F (3, 56) = 2.63, p < .06. Greater mean 
disparity in recall for threat versus neutral words on the post-test cued recall test was suggested 
in participants who were high in both state and trait anxiety only with threat words being 
preferentially recalled by this group. No group differences were observed at one-week follow-up. 
At one-month follow-up, recall of threat words on the free recall test approached significance, F 
(3, 51) = 2.47, p < .08, with those with low trait and high state anxiety recalling the fewest threat 
words than the other three anxiety groups.  
 Numerous differences on the dependent variables were observed across time irrespective 
of anxiety grouping; in fact, almost all dependent measures with the exception of threat invalid 
trials on the exogenous cueing task and recognition of neutral words on the recognition test were 
significant across time when participants were grouped according to anxiety. Even results of the 
emotional Stroop task were significant across time with anxiety grouping as the independent 
variable, a finding that was not indicated when participant grouping was assigned as the 
independent variable; specifically, the latency for color-naming on threat trials at post-test was 
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greater for all participants at post-test than all other assessment points, F (3, 56) = 2.81, p < .05). 
One result was significant by anxiety grouping and time – response time to neutral words on the 
emotional Stroop task, F (9, 56) = 2.62, p < .02, with the group classified as high in both state 
and trait anxiety responding more rapidly to such words. 
Secondary Statistical Analyses 
 Description of Screening Phase participants who opted out of further participation. 
During the Screening Phase assessments, participants who indicated that they did not 
wish to be considered or contacted for further participation were directed to a brief “opt-out” 
survey (see Appendix N) inquiring about the reason(s) for their decision. Demographically, the 
group of participants who opted out of Experimental Phase participation did not significantly 
differ from the Experimental Phase participants on any measured demographic variable based on 
Pearson’s chi-squared tests, nor did the two groups differ on totals for the FSQ, FSnQ, DASS-21 
and any DASS-21 subscale. The brief opt-out questionnaire was fully completed by all but one 
participant. One multiple choice question inquired as to the reason the participant wished not to 
be considered for the Experimental Phase of the study. Options to this question were as follows: 
I do not have the time to participate further, I have no interest in this project, I am too frightened 
or nervous to participate in the next phase of the experiment, I am not comfortable providing my 
contact information to the experimenter of this study, I do not understand what further 
participation would involve, I do not feel like continued participation in this project could benefit 
me, I disagree with the purposes of this research project, I do not participate in research projects 
in general, and an “other” option in which participants could supply a personal response. Three 
hundred thirty five participants completed the opt-out survey, and two hundred eighty-eight 
(86%) of those participants opted out of Experimental Phase participation for a reason that was 
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not fear-related (e.g. I do not have the time to participate further). Six specific statements 
regarding level of fear toward the experimental procedures (e.g. I am much too scared of snakes 
and/or spiders to be a part of this study) were requested to be rated on a four point Likert scale 
with 0 indicating Completely False and 3 indicating Completely True. Participants who indicated 
that his/her reason for opting out of further participation was indeed fear-related scored 
significantly higher than those who opted out for non-fear-related reasons on all opt out survey 
questions as well as the total of all opt out survey questions at the .0001 alpha level. Of those 
whose reason for opting out was fear-related, the statement that had the highest mean (M = 2.59, 
SD = .78) was, “I am afraid that I would be forced to touch a snake or spider if I participated in 
this experiment.”  Those participants who opted out of further participation for a fear-related 
reason scored significantly higher on both the FSQ (M  = 68.20, SD = 32.96) and FSnQ (M  = 
86.52, SD = 33.82) compared to those who opted out of further participation for non-fear-related 
reasons (FSQ: M  = 37.93, SD = 30.77, FSnQ: M  = 62.13, SD = 36.44), t (332) = -6.13, p < .000 
for the FSQ, t (332) = -4.26, p < .000 for the FSnQ. 
Discussion 
Summary of Results 
 
            One goal of the present study was to investigate the presence of selective processing bias  
and explicit memory avoidance in fearful participants versus non-fearful participants at pre-test. 
Selective processing bias was assessed via the emotional Stroop task as well as the exogenous 
cueing task while explicit memory avoidance was examined via three tests of recall (i.e. free 
recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition) for a previously presented valenced word list. No 
significant differences on any dependent variable were found, thus failing to establish the 
existence of the constructs of interest in this sample. Absence of these constructs prohibited the 
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primary investigator’s ability to fully address the second goal of the study, which was to examine 
the impact of one-session in vivo exposure treatment on the constructs.  The temporal stability of 
the constructs was, however, examined as data were collected at four assessment points (pre-test, 
post-test, one-week follow-up, and one-month follow-up). The effect of time on each group’s 
performance on the measures of selective processing bias was again mostly insignificant with the 
exception of the exogenous cueing task, to which all participants became increasingly rapid in 
respond times to all trial types. Several significant differences were found on tests of explicit 
recall avoidance when examined longitudinally, none of which were significant by the 
intersection of time and group. Interestingly, measures of explicit memory consistently revealed 
significant differences by assessment point with more threat words being recalled across the 
three memory measures at the post-test assessment period (although a significant increase in 
recall of neutral words began at post-test and maintained until one-month follow-up as well); 
again, this finding is irrespective of participant group. When each assessment point was analyzed 
independently, several results approached significance at one-week and one-month follow-up, 
such as the results of the exogenous cueing task, and mean differences between recalled words 
on tests of explicit memory became significant in several instances. Based on these results, the 
impact of anxiety treatment on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance is 
uncertain as the data cannot address the question. Finally, the third goal of the study was to 
examine the respective impacts of both state and trait anxiety on the dependent variables by re-
analyzing data based on participants’ high or low levels of each type of anxiety. While some 
between group differences on explicit recall approached significance, most intriguing in these 
results was that the previously impotent emotional Stroop task displayed significant and 
perplexing results; those participants who were low in trait anxiety and high in state anxiety were 
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delayed in response to neutral words at post-test while those participants who had elevated trait 
and state anxiety demonstrated more rapid responding to neutral words across assessment points. 
Based on these results, the impact of state and trait anxiety on the constructs of interest is 
unknown. In summary, the questions for which this study was designed to clarify cannot be 
clarified by the obtained results, which may in fact pose additional questions or challenges. 
Implications of Results 
 Lack of selective processing bias and/or explicit memory avoidance at pre-test. 
 One of the most notable findings in the current study is the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis in regard to the presence of both selective processing bias and explicit memory 
avoidance at pre-test assessment, resulting in an inability to examine several primary research 
questions that were dependent on the presence of these constructs in the experimental sample. 
While the elusiveness and instability of these constructs has been previously discussed, the 
absence of significant result on any measure of these constructs was unanticipated, particularly 
the lack of selective processing bias detected on the emotional Stroop task, and suggestive of 
further inquiry into possible causes of the null results. Perhaps the most apparent component of 
the study that may have impacted the results is the representativeness of the participant sample. 
Participants were college students who did not necessarily meet diagnostic criteria for any 
particular anxiety disorder; rather, they were screened for fear level toward a particular stimulus, 
namely a spider or a snake, using the FSQ and FSnQ, thereby diagnostically approximating 
individuals with a diagnosis of specific phobia. Williams, Mathews, and Macleod (1996) noted 
that researchers who have used the emotional Stroop task to capture attentional bias have most 
often successfully done so by including only clinically diagnosed individuals. One should recall 
that most participants (N = 39) were categorized as low on both state and trait anxiety at pre-test 
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assessment despite their fear-indicative responses to the FSQ or FSnQ. Thus, the level of anxiety 
experienced by the participants in this study may have been insufficient to elicit the cognitive 
constructs of interest. Additionally, the small number of participants in this study, while 
appropriate to detect medium to large effect sizes, was not appropriate to detect small effect 
sizes. Examination of Table 3 in which the means and standard deviations of each participant 
group on all dependent variables reveals no trend in the expected directions on any of the 
dependent variables; the absence of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance is 
evident at pre-test assessment, and there is no clearly discernible hypothesized response patterns 
across assessment points when examining group performance. When inspecting tests of explicit 
recall, in fact, one may note that all participant groups displayed somewhat enhanced recall for 
threat words on each of the three explicit memory tests, the opposite of results that would be 
expected given the theory of explicit memory avoidance. Given the lack of pattern in the data, 
the role of power issues in contributing to the null results of the study is doubtful. Additionally, 
this participant sample was drawn from the same population as the participant sample used in the 
primary investigator’s thesis project (Stanley, 2008), a related study in which significant results 
were found.  
 Inclusion of the feared animal in the experiment may have also impeded detection of 
selective processing bias, as was reported in a series of experiments by Mathews and Sebastian 
(1993), by altering the cognitive processing priorities of participants. Williams, Mathews, and 
Macleod (1996) hypothesized that this lack of detection of selective processing bias may be due 
to an increase in response effort required to perform the emotional Stroop task under conditions 
in which cognitive resources are devoted to the presence or anticipated presence of the live 
feared animal. This increase in response effort is thought to abolish the emotional Stroop 
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interference effect. Related theories of the interference suppression effect include a prioritization 
of attention to only the most potent threat and additional narrowing of attentional focus such that 
cues previously regarded as threat-relevant (e.g. threat-relevant linguistic or pictorial stimuli) 
become peripheral in nature (Constans, McCloskey, Vasterling, Brailey, & Mathews, 2004). 
Amir and colleagues (1996), who found an interference suppression effect in an experiment 
involving participants with social phobia, suggested that perhaps the ability to suppress the 
interference effect for threat-relevant words is indicative of the enhanced ability of clinically 
anxious individuals to avoid threat-relevant stimuli.  
 While the sample-specific or methodological limitations of the study likely contributed to 
the encompassing inability to reject the null hypothesis, one must also consider the measures 
used to assess the dependent variables, namely the emotional Stroop task and the exogenous 
cueing task to measure selective processing bias and the three tests of recall to examine explicit 
memory avoidance. The empirical and clinical utility of the emotional Stroop task in detection of 
selective processing bias has been questioned previously by Thorpe and Salkovskis (1997b), who 
reference the “real and unanswered questions about precisely what tasks such as the Stroop are 
actually measuring,” (p 142). The exogenous cueing task, despite its conceptual similarity to the 
dot probe paradigm, is not frequently used in this literature but is capable of detecting anxiety-
induced attentional bias and is arguably preferable to other more common measures as discussed 
above based on the exogenous cueing task’s strengths. The only main effect that was significant 
for the exogenous cueing task in this experiment was time, suggesting possible practice effects 
that existed across participants on this task, and no evidence of attentional bias at pre-test 
assessment was found. Practice effects on the exogenous cueing task could be indicative of 
habituation to the task in spite of the randomization of trial type and the increasing latency in 
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days between assessment points. In a series of experiments that specifically tested practice 
effects on inhibition of return, a phenomenon detected by the exogenous cueing task, Weaver, 
Lupiáñez, and Watson (1998) found a decline in inhibition of return across a relatively small 
number of trials (i.e. 150 unvalenced test trials), but did not conclude that this decline was due to 
habituation as there was no evidence of spontaneous recovery of the habituated response across 
days of testing. Lupiáñez, Weaver, Tipper, and Madrid (2001) reported similar results and 
posited a habituation-to-the-cue hypothesis, which stated that participants quickly learn to 
habituate to a non-predictive threat cue such that the cue becomes peripheral in nature. Thus, it 
would appear possible participants may “learn” the task of the exogenous cueing task over time, 
although the exact nature of such learning is not understood. 
 In addition to the macro-level methodological and measure characteristics described 
above, micro-level nuances of the measures may have contributed to the lack of significant 
findings. A major limitation of the traditional emotional Stroop task is that threat and neutral 
stimuli are restricted to words; the number of threat words related to the feared stimulus in 
specific phobia is somewhat limited and one might question the ability of linguistic stimuli alone 
to elicit attentional bias in a sample whose fear may or may not be clinically significant. 
Duration of valenced cue presentation may have also impacted results, particularly on the 
exogenous cueing task. Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Vanvolsem, and De Houwer (2007) 
employed the exogenous cueing task to examine the time-course of attentional processing of 
threat information. In these experiments, threat cue duration was varied (28, 100, 200, and 500 
ms) as was threat level of the cue (neutral, moderate, and high threat); results suggested 
facilitated attention to high threat cues at 100ms but reduced attentional cueing of high threat 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  111 
cues at 200ms and 500ms. Cue presentation in the present study occurred for 200ms, thereby 
potentially leading to lack of facilitation of attention toward threat cues.  
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations by Participant Groups on All Dependent Variables at 
Each Assessment Point 
 Pre-Test Post-Test One-Week One-Month 
Stroop Neutral     
Treatment 720 (103) 747 (118) 725 (110) 695 (106) 
No-Treatment 758 (106) 721 (109) 741 (96) 727 (101) 
Control 708 (120) 715 (138) 681 (212) 710 (146) 
Stroop Threat     
Treatment 734 (100) 755 (112) 716 (111) 710 (112) 
No-Treatment 761 (110) 736 (115) 748 (98) 735 (109) 
Control 724 (120) 731 (135) 688 (215) 726 (128) 
ECT Neutral Valid    
Treatment 381 (65) 348 (40) 328 (34) 330 (43) 
No-Treatment 391 (50)  341 (28) 331 (50) 319 (35) 
Control 396 (52) 350 (53) 340 (43) 333 (47) 
ECT Threat Valid    
Treatment 382 (68) 342 (39) 324 (33) 327 (44) 
No-Treatment 393 (50)  331 (28) 327 (46) 312 (36) 
Control 394 (53) 347 (51) 335 (47) 336 (48) 
ECT Neutral Invalid    
Treatment 406 (76) 381 (39) 378 (38) 369 (37) 
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No-Treatment 397 (56) 364 (28) 374 (49) 353 (35) 
Control 410 (59) 372 (45) 373 (43) 372 (40) 
ECT Threat Invalid    
Treatment 399 (80) 390 (38) 381 (45) 379 (33) 
No-Treatment 398 (53) 365 (30) 370 (41) 364 (32) 
Control 400 (59) 389 (55) 387 (46) 382 (39) 
ECT Uncued     
Treatment 402 (63) 380 (40) 376 (37) 378 (44) 
No-Treatment 404 (45) 371 (31) 369 (34) 357 (31) 
Control 420 (53) 388 (49) 383 (48) 382 (39) 
Free Recall Neutral    
Treatment 3.11 (1.91) 3.95 (1.93) 5.00 (2.22) 4.35 (2.87) 
No-Treatment 3.71 (2.05) 3.90 (1.97) 5.00 (2.03) 2.83 (1.54) 
Control 3.40 (1.43) 3.85 (2.16) 4.15 (2.16) 3.95 (2.26) 
Free Recall Threat    
Treatment 5.32 (1.42) 5.95 (1.78) 6.00 (1.71) 5.24 (2.31) 
No-Treatment 5.43 (1.33) 5.86 (1.42) 5.22 (1.21) 5.06 (1.76) 
Control 5.20 (1.67) 6.05 (1.88) 5.90 (1.68) 5.90 (2.22) 
Cued Neutral     
Treatment 3.32 (1.92) 5.00 (1.94) 5.33 (2.03) 4.76 (2.36) 
No-Treatment 3.62 (1.72) 5.33 (1.85) 5.17 (1.47) 3.78 (2.10) 
Control 3.35 (1.69) 4.60 (2.21) 4.25 (2.20) 4.50 (2.24) 
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Cued Threat 
Treatment 5.21 (1.69) 7.31 (1.77) 6.28 (1.71) 5.65 (2.00) 
No-Treatment 5.76 (2.02) 7.00 (1.92) 5.72 (1.90) 6.00 (1.85) 
Control 5.25 (1.74) 6.20 (2.02) 6.05 (1.88) 6.10 (2.05) 
Recognition Neutral    
Treatment 8.00 (1.67) 7.89 (1.73) 8.44 (1.50) 8.11 (2.03) 
No-Treatment 8.00 (1.70) 8.57 (1.25) 8.17 (1.54) 7.67 (2.25) 
Control 7.30 (1.38) 7.90 (1.65) 7.15 (2.52) 7.50 (2.26) 
Recognition Threat    
Treatment 9.32 (1.00) 9.16 (1.07) 8.72 (1.32) 7.88 (2.23) 
No-Treatment 9.24 (1.45) 9.57 (0.75 8.50 (1.10) 8.50 (1.65) 
Control 8.90 (0.97) 8.95 (1.00) 8.75 (1.45) 8.75 (1.55) 
Note. Standard deviations noted in parentheses. Stroop and ECT data are reported in millisecond 
response times while explicit recall data are reported in number of words correctly recalled. 
 Evaluation of success of one-session in vivo exposure treatment. 
 Although this study provided no evidence of the ability of one-session in vivo exposure 
therapy to reduce or eliminate the constructs of interests, one would be remiss to neglect the 
success of this treatment in significantly reducing anxiety in treatment group participants. All but 
one treatment group participant successfully completed all treatment steps, including the last 
treatment step in which the participant was asked to independently hold the feared animal for a 
period of time between one to three minutes. Quantitatively, the STAI – State subscale scores for 
the treatment group significantly decreased from pre-test assessment with a mean of 36 to post-
test assessment with a mean of 27 and remained stable from post-test assessment to one-week 
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and one-month follow-up with a mean of 29 at both assessments. The no-treatment group also 
demonstrated a significant decrease in STAI – State subscale scores such that they equated with 
the treatment group at one-week follow-up with a mean of 29 on this measure; these group 
members returned to pre-test levels at one-month follow-up as both assessment point means were 
34, demonstrating unstable levels of anxiety that may have impacted results that were dependent 
on stability of anxiety in no-treatment group participants. Notably, scores on the STAI – State 
and Trait subscales were generally low for all groups regardless of assessment point, and other 
researchers conducting empirical studies on specific phobia have even found lack of significant 
difference between phobic participants and non-anxious controls on the STAI (see, for example, 
Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2007). Nevertheless, STAI scores did decline in fearful individuals, but 
whether this result is attributable to treatment is uncertain due to the pre-to post- to one-week 
decline in the no-treatment group scores. Stability of STAI-State subscale scores was achieved in 
the treatment group. 
In addition to the STAI – State subscale scores, evidence of the success of exposure 
treatment can be readily observed in the BAT as the results of the BAT across time reveal 
notable differences between the treatment and no-treatment group. Examination of SUDs levels, 
three data points of which are presented in Table 2, reveals marked similarity between the 
treatment and no-treatment groups on all reported SUDs levels at pre-test assessment, although 
this is not the case at any other assessment point subsequent to the treatment group’s receipt of 
exposure treatment. Distance traveled in feet from the initial stopping point and the final 
stopping point also reveals differences apparent in the treatment group only after post-test such 
that members of this group traveled farther toward the feared animal than members of the no-
treatment group. One will note, however, that differences in distances and SUDs levels, while 
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apparent, are quite small. At post-test and thereafter, for example, all treatment group 
participants traveled the full 14 feet toward the feared stimulus in the cage for the final stopping 
point, thus equating with control group participants on this measure. The differences in feet 
traveled to the final stopping point between the treatment group and no-treatment group from 
post-test assessment to one-month assessment was an average of a single foot or slightly less. 
This may be evidence that, in spite of quantifiable differences in fear level between treatment 
and no-treatment group participants following exposure treatment for those in the treatment 
group, these differences may not have been so pronounced as to create a measurable effect on the 
dependent variable assessments. Indeed, even at their most fearful point when the participants 
had traveled as close as possible to the feared stimulus, mean SUDs levels, which were taken on 
a 0 to 100 scale, were 43.47 for treatment group participants and 38.81 for no-treatment group 
participants at pre-test assessment. A ceiling effect appeared to have been encountered in this 
methodology that may have been overcome if participants were permitted to physically contact 
the animal/arachnid’s container and/or the animal/arachnid itself during BAT procedures. 
 Effect of time on participant’s performance. 
 The temporal stability of anxiety-induced cognitive processes such as those examined in 
the present study is, of course, of critical importance, particularly in treatment outcome research 
that is dependent on the sustained presence of a construct of interest barring intervention. 
Unfortunately, the impact of time on the cognitive performance of this sample cannot be 
adequately addressed due to the failure to reject the null hypothesis at pre-test. One may have 
noted, however, the numerous sporadic significant or near-significant results, particularly on 
tests of explicit memory that are mentioned in the Results section under the second question 
group heading. Like the results of the exogenous cueing task, the fixed effect of time appeared to 
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be the only significant effect, although there were some significant effects for group when each 
assessment point was separately analyzed. The most striking element of these data is the lack of 
clear pattern or consistency across time and, quite often, with the theories of selective processing 
bias and explicit memory avoidance. The results found in this study are unfortunately reflective 
in the empirical literature, particularly the literature examining anxiety-induced explicit memory 
bias or avoidance, in that result consistency is not typical. One would be advised to consider this 
lack of temporally consistent significant findings, most frequently those relevant to explicit 
memory, in light of the preponderance of empirically studies that report significant findings 
based only on a single assessment point. 
 In addition to the uncertain temporal stability of attention and memory processes in 
fearful individuals, to which the present study offers no insight, one must also consider the 
reliability of the measures of attentional bias and explicit memory avoidance, particularly given 
that failure to replicate is quite common in these literatures. LeBel and Paunonen (2011), for 
example, used a Monte Carlo simulation to ascertain the impact of random measurement error on 
replicability of between-group mean difference effects obtained through use of implicit measures 
of mental constructs, the emotional Stroop task and dot probe task included in this category. 
Enumeration of the psychometric shortcomings, including unacceptably low levels of reliability, 
of implicit measures was provided by these researchers, and they unsurprisingly reported low 
probability of replication of an experimental effect as random measurement error/lack of 
reliability affects the dependent variable. The researchers also mention the possibility of context-
dependent factors (e.g. participant memories, present mood state, physical ailments) that may 
contaminate mental processes assessed by implicit measures. Dishon-Berkovits and Algom 
(2000) experimentally demonstrated the malleability of the Stroop interference effect with 
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undergraduate participants through several contextual variances of traditional Stroop task-
inclusive experiments. Consideration of the reliability of the measures in addition to the 
numerous factors that may impact participant performance on these measures would be a useful 
practice. 
 Relative contribution of state and trait anxiety to constructs of interest. 
 While the goal of this study was to distinguish the respective and combined impacts of 
both state and trait anxiety on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance, 
accomplishing or even approaching that goal with the present sample is remarkably difficult give 
the dramatic disproportionateness of anxiety group size. The vast majority of all participants 
were grouped in the low trait and low state anxiety category at pre-test. Lack of significance in 
most results with anxiety grouping as the independent variable may be a product of true absence 
of impact of these variables on the constructs of interests. The more likely cause based on the 
literature that has reported significant findings is that this study’s findings were absent due to 
inadequate sampling. Nonetheless, perhaps most interesting in these findings is that, when state 
and trait anxiety at pre-test was employed as the grouping variable, significant results were found 
on the emotional Stroop task, which was non-significant at each assessment point and across 
time when participants were grouped according to receipt of treatment or control. Results that 
did achieve significance, while tenuous due to sampling issues, may be of evidentiary value to 
the hypothesis that state and trait anxiety as well as their interplay may indeed impact differential 
attention and memory processes. Thus, while the results of this study are certainly insufficient to 
inform conclusions, one may derive that further investigation is warranted, particularly 
investigation that focuses on attentional bias as the dependent variable. Another interesting area 
of exploration based on the data is the impact of fluctuations in state anxiety over time in 
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untreated anxious individuals; no-treatment participants in this study showed an unexpected 
spontaneous drop in STAI – State subscale score at one-week follow-up followed by an almost 
equivalent return to pre-test state anxiety levels. Using level of state anxiety at each assessment 
point as the independent variable with a more heterogeneous sample may better explicate its 
contribution to the constructs of interest over time, a task that this study was ill equipped to 
complete.  
Limitations of the Study 
 Several limitations of the current study may have impacted results and should be 
acknowledged to prevent erroneous conclusions. Notably, a participant sample of this size has 
the capability to detect only medium to large effect sizes, which may be insufficient to evaluate 
the presence of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance and their reaction to 
treatment, particularly if the fearful sample randomized to the treatment or no-treatment may 
have best been characterized as moderately fearful based on numerous anxiety measures (e.g. 
STAI, BAT). One should note, however, that self-reported fear toward either a snake or spider in 
participants assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment groups was high as reported on the 
screening instruments FSQ and FSnQ. Thus, the limited sample size united with largely 
uncertain but seemingly moderate fear levels may have influenced the ability of the measures 
and the subsequent statistical analyses to demonstrate between-group mean differences. 
Incorporate into these sampling issues the impact of participant attrition and confidence in the 
results of this study diminishes further. While missing data due to attrition and technical failure 
was addressed through appropriate statistical methods, these methods, which essentially 
projected the likely missing data points based on a participant’s gathered data, were clearly not 
preferred to actual participant data. Estimation methods are also not immune to the impact of 
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small sample size. Along with limited sample size, the assistance of numerous research assistants 
was both advantageous in that it reduced the likelihood of experimenter bias from a single 
experimenter and disadvantageous in that it introduced potential protocol non-adherence. 
 In the spirit of the assertion that “confession should not have the goal of disarming 
criticism” (Wilkinson, 1999, p. 602), the recognized limitations in the study discussed above 
could be addressed in future studies.  The obvious response to a small sample size would be to 
increase the participant number in each group, although feasibility of that solution may dissuade 
its implementation as had occurred in this instance. In order to combat the deleterious effects of 
limited sample size and to enhance the ability to detect smaller effect sizes, the dependent 
variable measures could have been altered to include the addition of trials on the emotional 
Stroop task and the exogenous cueing task as well as with the addition of words to be recalled on 
the three test of explicit recall. Participant workload must be considered with such a suggestion 
as the addition of time to an already time-intensive research commitment may increase attrition 
rates. In addition to the solution of expanding the dependent variables, more stringent criteria for 
group admission could be employed such that a clear bimodal sample is created on the variable 
of anxiety toward a snake or spider. Perhaps including only those fearful individuals who met 
criteria for specific phobia would have been useful, as would have been incorporating a 
behavioral measure of anxiety prior to group assignment rather than sole reliance on the self-
report screening data that was gleaned. 
 Along with practical limitations, theoretical limitations may also be useful to consider 
when examining the results. This study failed to account for the possible presence of effortful 
control (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994), a concept that is 
congruent with Posner’s theories of voluntary and involuntary attentional functioning systems 
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that are influenced by emotional states (Posner & Raichle, 1994). In the empirical literature on 
anxiety-induced attentional bias, effortful control, which is conceptually considered a trait of 
temperament, is defined as “the ability to control responses so as to withhold a dominant 
response tendency while making a subdominant response” (Posner, Rothbart, Sheese, & Tang, 
2007, p. 393); in the present context, it refers to the ability to use higher order learned coping 
skills to address anxiety-inducing stimuli in an adaptive manner. While this study incorporated 
the measurement of the more involuntary orientation of attention and used appropriate measures 
to assess this, the ability to regulate attention through executive control could have proven 
influential as this ability, which likely widely differs among participants if indeed linked to 
temperament, may have a moderating effect on attentional bias. Those who are high in effortful 
control may have the capacity to largely forego attentional bias (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; 
Lonigan & Vasey, 2009). The Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002), a 
measurement of one’s general capacity for attentional control, could have been administered in 
Screening Phase assessments. This 20-item scale purports to assess the ability to focus attention, 
to shift attention between tasks, and to flexibly control thought through participant ratings on a 4-
point Likert scale. In addition to the inclusion of a measure of effort control, use of slightly 
different measures of explicit memory may be helpful in future studies. As suggested by 
MacLeod and Mathews (2004), recognition tasks permit researchers to assess memory for 
various types of stimuli not readily conducive to recall tasks. A recognition task for the pictures 
shown during the exogenous cueing task might have produced evidence of memory bias given 
that the threat-material is pictorial (i.e. not conducive to memory techniques such as mnemonic 
devices) and is presented in a manner incompatible with prolonged encoding.  
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 A final theoretical limitation of this study that is reflective of the state of the related 
empirical literature is the perhaps unwarranted separation of spatial selective attention, as 
assessed by the exogenous cueing task, versus informational selective attention, as assessed by 
the emotional Stroop task, the difference being the understanding of selective attention as a 
purely interstimulus spatial “spotlight” in the former (e.g. attending to the location of feared 
stimulus) versus selective attention as a intrastimulus characteristic gathering in the latter (e.g. 
attending to the threatening characteristics of a stimulus; Shalev & Algom, 2000). As discussed 
and empirically demonstrated in an experimental series by Shalev and Algom (2000), spatial and 
dimensional understandings of selective attention are likely complementary but systematically 
and anatomically (Posner & Raichle, 1994) unique forms of attentional processing. While an 
advantage of the current study is its utilization of tests to examine both networks of attention, 
Shalev and Algom (2000) distinctively demonstrated the possibility of assessing both of these 
concurrently in a single task, thus reducing the extent of participant fatigue and streamlining a 
study without omitting data collection opportunities. 
Directions for Future Research 
The results of the current study provide little information on either selective processing 
bias or explicit memory avoidance; in fact, the major contribution of the current study lies within 
its resounding failure. While the methodological limitations of the study likely impacted the 
results, the present study is certainly not an anomaly in this particular empirical literature as 
failures to replicate and null results are quite common, as noted in the literature review presented 
in this manuscript. Thus, one is left to consider the functional utility of a construct that may or 
may not be a reliable predictor or moderator of anxiety and which may or may not impact 
treatment of anxiety. Marked differences in attentional bias have been observed not only across 
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psychological disorders, but also within the diagnostic category of anxiety disorders. Becker, 
Rinck, Margraf, and Roth (1999), for instance, reported differing color-naming response 
latencies on the emotional Stroop task such that those with generalized anxiety disorder 
demonstrated longer response latencies to all words with affective connotations, regardless of the 
valence, and those with social phobia demonstrated longer response times to specific speech-
related words only. While the impact of psychological disorders on cognitive domains such as 
attention and memory is intriguing and noteworthy from a learning perspective, attention and 
memory disruption is not a diagnostic necessity of most anxiety disorders. Such disruption is 
included as a possible symptom of some disorders. 
Thus, one may question whether attention and memory processes in anxiety disorders, if 
unstable and ephemeral as suggested by the empirical literature, are truly a hallmark of anxiety, 
particularly given the changes in attentional bias among anxiety disorders and the difficulty 
reliably detecting such bias in many cases. As mentioned in the literature review in this 
manuscript, MacLeod and Mathews (2004) have doubted the utility of classifying explicit 
memory bias or avoidance as a potential defining characteristic of anxiety, and perhaps 
evaluation of the utility of selective processing bias is warranted as well. If indeed the field of 
psychology collectively agrees upon cognitive disruption inclusive of attention and memory 
processes as a trait of anxiety disorders, it is incumbent upon the field to determine how best to 
use the current understanding of how these processes operate to instigate or maintain anxiety 
symptoms, no small feat given the disagreements in the empirical literature. Researchers must 
strive to distinguish how anxiety-induced cognitive disruption differs from cognitive disruption 
caused by other psychological disorders and from other potential causes 
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Conversely, however, if the instability of such maladaptive cognitive processes is due to 
measurement error, which indeed seems to be at least partially accountable for null results, 
premature dismissal of such potentially useful constructs would be unfortunate. Given the fairly 
broad time range and volume of literature on anxiety-induced cognitive disruption, one may 
mistakenly assume the adequacy and statistical appropriateness of the assessments typically 
used; as was the case with the current study, the temptation to “put the cart before the horse” by 
measuring constructs that are akin to a “moving target” with measures, particularly implicit 
measures, that possess uncertain reliability and validity is ever present. The characteristics of the 
measures used to assess these constructs, including their temporal reliability, is an important 
preliminary direction for future research as confidence in the measures one will use should be a 
prerequisite to measurement. Sensitivity and specificity is of paramount importance in validating 
these measures. In the case of attention and memory measurement in anxiety, much can impact 
results, including a participant’s sleep, caffeine intake, current stress, physical illness, medication 
use, alcohol and drug use, and so forth. The need for psychometrically strong assessments in this 
area of research, while challenging to provide, is clear. 
A final consideration that is suggested by the results of this study is the stability of the 
emotional experience of anxiety and the impact of that stability or lack thereof on assessment 
and treatment of anxiety. Interestingly, participants in the no-treatment group showed an 
unexplainable decline in state anxiety at one-week follow-up such that these participants almost 
equated with the treatment group. This decline was followed by a return to pre-test levels of state 
anxiety in the no-treatment group at one-month follow-up. While participants in this study 
possessed a stimulus-specific fear that may not generalize to anxiety as a larger construct, 
researchers may wish to consider unacknowledged fluctuations in anxiety-level as the 
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assumption that untreated individuals experience stable symptoms may be invalid; indeed, the 
construct of state anxiety as unstable should be expected given the presuppositions of that 
construct. Tracking of symptoms over time with numerous points of assessment may permit a 
more comprehensive picture of the presentation of anxiety disorders and account for how a 
naturally evolving presentation may impact other constructs that are dependent on anxiety level.  
In conclusion, the null results of the present study were likely obtained from the additive 
effects of a variety of issues of diverse magnitudes. Despite the null results of this study and 
other similar studies, there is research to suggest the presence of anxiety-induced cognitive 
disruption, namely selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. This highlights the 
difficulty in measuring these processes. Establishment of the presence of these processes, 
including clarification regarding the conditions under which the constructs exist, is crucial. To 
accomplish this, reliable and valid measures of these constructs must be employed. Longitudinal 
trajectory of the cognitive processes as well as their reaction to treatment are important 
subsequent future directions, but we must have a clear understanding of the processes prior to 
pursuing additional and complex topics. We must also determine the role and utility of these 
processes in the onset and/or maintenance of anxiety disorders to make the processes clinically 
useful.  A sturdy house necessitates a solid foundation; it would behoove researchers in the field 
to solidify the basic understanding of attention and memory issues in anxiety disorders, including 
delineating how such a pursuit is anticipated to improve clinician’s understanding and treatment 
of anxiety disorders. 
 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  125 
References 
 
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(4th ed., revised). Washington, DC: Author.   
Amir, N., Elias, J., Klumpp, H., & Przeworski, A. (2003). Attentional bias to threat in social 
phobia: Facilitated processing of threat or difficulty disengaging attention from threat? 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 1325-1335.   
Amir, N., McNally, R. J., Riemann, B. C., Burns, J., Lorenz, M., & Mullen, J. T. (1996). 
Suppression of the emotional Stroop effect by increased anxiety in patients with social 
phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34(11-12), 945-948.  
Antony, M. M., Bieling, P. J., Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Swinson, R. P. (1998). Psychometric 
properties of the 42-item and 21-item versions of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales in 
clinical groups and in a community sample. Psychological Assessment, 10(2), 176-181.  
Antony, M. M., & Swinson, R. P. (2000). Specific phobia. In M. M. Antony & R. P. Swinson 
(Eds.), Phobic disorders and panic in adults: A guide to assessment and treatment (pp. 
79-104). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.       
Bar-Haim, Y., Holoshitz, Y., Eldar, S., Frenkel, T. I., Muller, D., Charney, D. S., Fox, N.A., 
Wald, I. (2010). Life-threatening danger and suppression of attention bias to threat. The 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 167(6), 694-698. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2009.09070956.   
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & van Ijzendoorn, M. H. 
(2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and non-anxious individuals: A meta-
analytic study. Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 1-24. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  126 
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. Oxford, England; 
International Universities Press.  
Becker, E. S., Rinck, M., Margraf, J., & Roth, W. T. (2001). The emotional Stroop effect in 
anxiety disorders: General emotionality or disorder specificity? Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 15(3), 147-159. 
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36(2), 129-148.  
Bower, G. H. (1992). How might emotions affect learning? In S. Christianson (Ed.), The 
handbook of emotion and memory: Research and theory (pp. 3-31). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  
Broadbent, D., & Broadbent, M. (1988). Anxiety and attentional bias: State and trait. Cognition 
& Emotion Special Issue: Information Processing and the Emotional Disorders, 2(3), 
165-183.  
Buchanan, J. A., & Houlihan, D. (2008). The use of in vivo desensitization for the treatment of a 
specific phobia of earthworms. Clinical Case Studies. 7(1), 12-24. 
Burgess, I. S., Jones, L. N., Robertson, S. A., Radcliffe, W. N., Emerson, E., Lawler, P. & Crow, 
T. J. (1981). The degree of control exerted by phobic and non-phobic verbal stimuli over 
the recognition behaviour of phobic and non-phobic subjects. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 19(3), 233-243.  
Carroll, J. B., Davies, P., & Richman, B. (1971). The American Heritage word frequency book. 
Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
Chemtob, C., Roitblat, H. L., Hamada, R. S., Carlson, J. G., & Twentyman, C. T. (1988). A 
cognitive action theory of post-traumatic stress disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 2, 
253-275. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  127 
Chen, E., Lewin, M. R., & Craske, M. G. (1996). Effects of state anxiety on selective processing 
of threatening information. Cognition & Emotion, 10(3), 225-240.  
Choy, Y., Fyer, A. J., & Lipsitz, J. D. (2007). Treatment of specific phobia in adults. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 27, 266-286. 
Cisler, J. M., Ries, B. J., Widner, Jr., R. L. (2007). Examining information processing biases in 
spider phobia using the rapid serial visual presentation paradigm. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 21, 977-990. 
Clarke, B. R. (2008). Linear models: The theory and application of analysis of variance. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Coles, M. E., & Heimberg, R. G. (2002). Memory biases in the anxiety disorders: Current status. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 22(4), 587-627. 
Constans, J. I., McCloskey, M. S., Vasterling, J. J., Brailey, K., & Mathews, A. (2004). 
Suppression of attentional bias in PTSD. The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113(2), 
315-323. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.113.2.315 
Dalgleish, T., & Watts, F. N. (1990). Biases of attention and memory in disorders of anxiety and 
depression. Clinical Psychology Review, 10, 589-604. 
de Jong, P. J., Vorage, I., van den Hout, M. A. (2000). Counterconditioning in the treatment of 
spider phobia: Effects on disgust, fear and valence. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 
1055-1069. 
Derryberry, D., & Reed, M. A. (2002). Anxiety-related attentional biases and their regulation by 
attentional control. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111(2), 225-236, DOI: 
10.1037//0021-843X.111.2.225. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  128 
Derryberry, D., & Rothbart, M. K. (1997). Reactive and effortful processes in the organization of 
temperament. Development and Psychopathology, 9, 633–652. 
Dishon-Berkovits, M., & Algom, D. (2000). The Stroop effect: It is not the robust phenomenon 
that you have thought it to be. Memory & Cognition, 28(8), 1437-1449. 
Dresler, T., Ehlis, A-C., Attar, C. H., Ernst, L. H., Tupak, S. V., Hahn, T., Warrings, B., 
Markulin, F., Spitzer, C., Lowe, B., Deckert, J., & Fallgatter, A. J. (2012) Reliability of 
the emotional Stroop task: An investigation of patients with panic disorder. Journal of 
Psychiatric Research, in press corrected proof, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2012.06.006, 
Eastern Michigan University. (n.d.). A profile of Eastern Michigan University. Retrieved March 
12, 2009, from http://www.emich.edu/aboutemu/fastfacts/emuprofile.html#students. 
Egloff, B., & Hock, M. (2001). Interactive effects of state anxiety and trait anxiety on emotional 
Stroop interference. Personality and Individual Differences, 31, 875-882. 
Eide, P., Kemp, A., Silberstein, R. B., Nathan, P. J., & Stough, C. (2002). Test-retest reliability 
of the emotional Stroop task: Examining the paradox of measurement change. The 
Journal of Psychology, 136(5), 514-520. 
Eliason, S. R. (1993). Maximum likelihood estimation: Logic and practice. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage. 
Elsesser, K., Heuschen, I., Pundt, I., & Sartory, G. (2006). Attentional bias and evoked heart rate 
response in specific phobia. Cognition and Emotion, 20(8), 1092-1107. 
Foa, E. B., Feske, U., Murdock, T. B., & Kozak, M. J. (1991). Processing of threat-related 
information in rape victims. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100(2), 156-162.  
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  129 
Foa, E.B., & Kozak, M. J. (1986). Emotional processing of fear: Exposure to corrective 
information. Psychological Bulletin, 99(1), 20-35. 
Foa, E. B., & McNally, R. J. (1986). Sensitivity to feared stimuli in obsessive-compulsives: A 
dichotic listening analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10(4), 477-485.  
Foa, E. B., McNally, R., & Murdock, T. B. (1989). Anxious mood and memory. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 27(2), 141-147.  
Francis, W. N., & Kučera, H. (1982). Frequency analysis if English usage: Lexicon and 
grammar. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Friedman, B. H., Thayer, J. F., & Borkovec, T. D. (2000). Explicit memory bias for threat words 
in generalized anxiety disorder. Behavior Therapy, 31(4), 745-756.  
Garcia-Palacios, A., Hoffman, H., Carlin, A., Furness III, T. A., & Botella, C. (2002). Virtual 
reality in the treatment of spider phobia: A controlled study. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 40, 983-993. 
Gerdes, A. B. M., Alpers, G. W., & Pauli, P. (2007). When spiders appear suddenly: Spider-
phobic participants are distracted by task-irrelevant spiders. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 46(2), 174-187. 
Gilroy, L. J., Kirkby, K. C., Daniels, B. A., Menzies, R. G., & Montgomery, I. M. (2003). Long-
term follow-up of computer-aided vicarious exposure versus live graded exposure in the 
treatment of spider phobia. Behavior Therapy, 34, 65-76. 
Golombok, S., Stavrou, A., Bonn, J., Mogg, K., Critchlow, S., & Rust, J. (1991). The effects of 
diazepam on anxiety-related cognition. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 15(6), 459-467. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  130 
Götestam, K. G., & Götestam, B. (1998). Process of change in exposure therapy of phobias. In E. 
Sanavio (Ed.), Behavior and cognitive therapy today: Essays in honor of Hans J. Eysenck 
(pp. 127-132). Oxford, England: Elsevier Science. 
Harrison, L. K., & Turpin, G. (2003). Implicit memory bias and trait anxiety: A 
psychophysiological analysis. Biological Psychology, 62, 97-114. 
Hedberg, A.G. (1972). State-trait anxiety inventory. Professional Psychology, 3(4), 389-390. 
Hellström, K., Fellenius, J., & Öst, L-G. (1996). One versus five sessions of applied tension in 
the treatment of blood phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34(2), 101-112. 
Henry, J. D., & Crawford, J. R. (2005). The short-form version of the Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales (DASS-21): Construct validity and normative data in a large non-clinical sample. 
British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44, 227-239. 
Hermans, D., Dirikx, T., Vansteenwegen, D., Baeyens, F., Van den Bergh, O., & Eelen, P. 
(2005). Reinstatement of fear responses in human aversive conditioning. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 43, 533-551. 
Hope, D. A., Rapee, R. M., Heimberg, R. G., & Dombeck, M. J. (1990). Representations of the 
self in social phobia: Vulnerability to social threat. Cognitive Therapy and Research 
Special Issue: Selfhood Processes and Emotional Disorders, 14(2), 177-189.  
Huijding, J., & de Jong, P. J. (2009). Implicit and explicit attitudes toward spiders: Sensitivity to 
treatment and predictive value for generalization of treatment effects. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 33(2), 211-220. 
Kelly, M. M., & Forsyth, J. P. (2007). Observational fear conditioning in the acquisition and 
extinction of attentional bias for threat: An experimental evaluation. Emotion, 7(2), 324-
335. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  131 
Kessler, R. C. (1994). The national comorbidity survey of the United States. International 
Review of Psychiatry, 6, 365-376. 
Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Merikangas, K. R., & Walters, E. E. (2005). 
Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 593-602. 
Kindt, M., Bierman, D., & Brosschot, J. F. (1996). Stroop versus Stroop: Comparison of a card 
format and a single-trial format of the standard color-word Stroop task and the emotional 
Stroop task. Personality and Individual Differences, 21(5), 653-661. 
Kindt, M., & Brosschot, J. F. (1997). Phobia-related cognitive bias for pictorial and linguistic 
stimuli. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106(4), 644-648.  
Kindt, M., & Brosschot, J. F. (1998). Cognitive avoidance in phobia. Journal of 
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 20(1), 43-55.  
Kindt, M., & Brosschot, J. F. (1999). Cognitive bias in spider-phobic children: Comparison of a 
pictorial and a linguistic spider Stroop. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral 
Assessment, 21(3), 207-220.  
Klieger, D. M. (1987). The Snake Anxiety Questionnaire as a measure of ophidiophobia. 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 47, 449-459. 
Klorman, R., Hastings, J. E., Weerts, T. C., Melamed, B. G., & Lang, P. J. (1974). Psychometric 
description of some specific-fear questionnaires. Behavior Therapy, 5(3), 401-409. 
Koch, E. I., Spates, C. R., & Himle, J. A. (2004). Comparison of behavioral and cognitive-
behavioral one-session exposure treatments for small animal phobias. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 42(12), 1483-1504. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  132 
Koster, E. H. W., Crombez, G., Van Damme, S., Verschuere, B., & De Houwer, J. (2004). Does 
imminent threat capture and hold attention? Emotion, 4(3), 312-317. 
Koster, E. H. W., Crombez, G., Verschuere, B., Van Damme, S., & Wiersema, J. R. (2006). 
Components of attentional bias to threat in high trait anxiety: Facilitated engagement, 
impaired disengagement, and attentional avoidance. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
44, 1757-1771. 
Koster, E. H. W., Crombez, G., Verschuere, B., P., & De Houwer, J. (2004). Selective attention 
to threat in the dot probe paradigm: Differentiating vigilance and difficulty to disengage. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 1183-1192. 
Koster, E. H. W., Crombez, G., Verschuere, B., Vanvolsem, P., & De Houwer, J. (2007). A time-
course analysis of attentional cueing by threat scenes. Experimental Psychology, 54(2), 
161-171. DOI 10.1027/1618-3169.54.2.161. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (2008). International affective picture 
system (IAPS): Affective ratings of pictures and instruction manual. Technical Report A-
8. University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. 
Larsen, R. J., Mercer, K. A., Balota, D. A., & Strube, M. J. (2008). Not all negative words slow 
down lexical decision and naming speed: Importance of word arousal. Emotion, 8(4), 
445-452. 
Lavy, E. H., & Van den Hout, M. (1993). Selective attention evidenced by pictorial and 
linguistic Stroop tasks. Behavior Therapy, 24(4), 645-657.  
Lavy, E. H., Van den Hout, M., & Arntz, A. (1993). Attentional bias and spider phobia: 
Conceptual and clinical issues. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31(1), 17-24.  
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  133 
LeBel, E. P., & Paunonen, S. V. (2011). Sexy by often unreliable: The impact of unreliability on 
the replicability of experimental findings with implicit measures. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 37(4), 570-583, DOI: 10.1177/0146167211400619. 
Levy, E. A., & Mineka, S. (1998). Anxiety and mood-congruent autobiographical memory: A 
conceptual failure to replicate. Cognition & Emotion, 12(5), 625-634.  
Leyman, L., DeRaedt, R., Schacht, R., & Koster, E. H. W. (2006). Attentional biases for angry 
faces in unipolar depression. Psychological Medicine, 37, 393-402. 
Li, X., Wang, M., Poliakoff, E., & Lou, Y.-J. (2007). Attention to threat in high and low trait-
anxious individuals: A study using extremely threatening pictorial cues. Perceptual and 
Motor Skills, 104, 1097-1106. 
Lipp, O. V., & Derakshan, N. (2005). Attentional bias to pictures of fear-relevant animals in a 
dot-probe task. Emotion, 5(3), 365-369. 
LoBue, V., & DeLoache, J. S. (2008). Detecting the snake in the grass: Attention to fear-relevant 
stimuli by adults and young children. Psychological Science, 19(3), 284-289. 
Loftus, E. F., Loftus, G. R., & Messo, J. (1987). Some facts about “weapon focus.” Law and 
Human Behavior, 11(1), 55-62. 
Long, J. S. (1997). Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. 
Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage Publications. 
Lonigan, C. J., & Vasey, M. W. (2009). Negative affectivity, effortful control, and attention to 
threat-relevant stimuli. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 37(3), 387-399, DOI: 
10.1007/s10802-008-9284-y. 
Lovibond, S. H., & Lovibond, P. F. (1995). Manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. 
Sydney: The Psychology Foundation of Australia. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  134 
Lundh, L.-G., & Öst, L-G. (2001). Attentional bias, self-consciousness, and perfectionism in 
social phobia before and after cognitive-behavioral therapy. Scandinavian Journal of 
Behavior Therapy, 30(1), 4-16. 
Lupiáñez, J. Weaver, B., Tipper, S. P., & Madrid, E. (2001). The effects of practice on cueing in 
detection and discrimination tasks. Psicológica, 22, 1-23. 
MacLeod, C. (1990). Mood disorders and cognition. In M. W. Eysenck (Ed.), Cognitive 
psychology: An international review (pp. 9-56). Oxford, England: John Wiley & Sons.  
MacLeod, C. (1991). Clinical anxiety and the selective encoding of threatening information. 
International Review of Psychiatry, 3(2), 279-292.  
MacLeod, C. M. (2005a). The Stroop task in cognitive research. In A. Wenzel & D. C. Rubin 
(Eds.), Cognitive methods and their application to clinical research (pp. 17-40). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
MacLeod, C. (2005b). The Stroop task in clinical research. In A. Wenzel & D. C. Rubin (Eds.), 
Cognitive methods and their application to clinical research (pp. 41-62). Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association. 
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1988). Anxiety and the allocation of attention to threat. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology, 40(4-
A), 653-670.  
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. M. (1991). Cognitive-experimental approaches to the emotional 
disorders. In P. R. Martin (Ed.), Handbook of behavior therapy and psychological 
science: An integrative approach (pp. 116-150). Elmsford, NY, US : Pergamon Press.  
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  135 
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (2004). Selective memory effects in anxiety disorders: An 
overview of research findings and their implications. In D. Reisberg & P. Hertel (Eds.), 
Memory and emotion (pp. 155-185). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional disorders. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 95(1), 15-20.  
MacLeod, C., & McLaughlin, K. (1995). Implicit and explicit memory bias in anxiety: A 
conceptual replication. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(1), 1-14.  
MacLeod, C., & Rutherford, E. M. (1992). Anxiety and the selective processing of emotional 
information: Mediating roles of awareness, trait and state variables, and personal 
relevance of stimulus materials. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30(5), 479-491.  
Martin, J. D., Blair, G. E., Stokes, E. H., & Lester, E. H. (1977). A validity and reliability study 
of the Slosson Intelligence Test and the Shipley Institute of Living Scale. Educational 
and Psychological Measurement, 37, 1107-1110. 
Masia, C. L., McNeil, D. W., Cohn, L. G., & Hope, D. A. (1999). Exposure to social anxiety 
words: Treatment for social phobia based on the Stroop paradigm. Cognitive and 
Behavioral Practice, 6(3), 248-258. 
Mathews, A., & Klug, F. (1993). Emotionality and interference with color-naming in anxiety. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31(1), 57-62.  
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1985). Selective processing of threat cues in anxiety states. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23(5), 563-569.  
Mathews, A., Mogg, K., Kentish, J., & Eysenck, M. (1995). Effect of psychological treatment on 
cognitive bias in generalized anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(3), 
293-303. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  136 
Mathews, A., Mogg, K., May, J., & Eysenck, M. (1989). Implicit and explicit memory bias in 
anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 98(3), 236-240. 
Mathews, A. M., & Sebastian, S. (1993). Suppression of emotional Stroop effects by fear 
arousal. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 517-530.  
Mayer, B., Merckelbach, H., & Muris, P. (2000). Self-reported automaticity and irrationality in 
spider phobia. Psychological Reports, 87, 395-405. 
Mayer, B., Muris, P., Vogel, L., Nojoredjo, I., & Merckelbach, H. (2006). Fear-relevant change 
detection in spider-fearful and non-fearful participants. Anxiety Disorders, 20, 510-519. 
McKay, D. (2005). Studies in cognitive processing during worry. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 29(3), 359-376.  
McNally, R. J., Riemann, B. C., & Kim, E. (1990). Selective processing of threat cues in panic 
disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28(5), 407-412.  
Metzger, R. L. (1976). A reliability and validity study of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32(2), 276-278. 
Mineka, S., Mystkowski, J. L., Hladek, D., & Rodriguez, B. I. (1999). The effects of changing 
contexts on return of fear following exposure therapy for spider fear. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67(4), 599-604. 
Mitte, K. (2008). Memory bias for threatening information in anxiety and anxiety disorders: A 
meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 134(6), 886-911. 
Mobini, S., & Grant, A. (2007). Clinical implications of attentional bias in anxiety disorders: An 
integrative literature review. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 44(4), 
450-462. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  137 
Mogg, K., Baldwin, D. S., Brodrick, P., Bradley, B. P. (2004). Effect of short-term SSRI 
treatment on cognitive bias in generalised anxiety disorder. Psychopharmacology, 176, 
466-470. 
Mogg, B., Bradley, B. P., de Bono, J., & Painter, M. (1997). Time course of attentional bias for 
threat information in non-clinical anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(4), 297-
303. 
Mogg, K., Mathews, A., & Weinman, J. (1987). Memory bias in clinical anxiety. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 96(2), 94-98.  
Muris, P., Mayer, B., & Merckelbach, H. (1998). Trait anxiety as a predictor of behaviour 
therapy outcome in spider phobia. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 26, 87-91. 
Muris, P., & Merckelbach, H. (1996). A comparison of two spider fear questionnaires. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 27(3), 241-244.  
Mystkowski, J. L., Craske, M. G., & Echiverri, A. M. (2002). Treatment context and return of 
fear in spider phobia. Behavior Therapy, 33, 299-416. 
Neter, J., Kutner, M. H., Nachtsheim, C. J., & Wasserman, W. (1996). Applied linear statistical 
models (4th ed.). Chicago: Irwin. 
Öhman, A., & Soares, J. J. F. (1993). On the automatic nature of phobic fear: Conditioned 
electrodermal responses to masked fear-relevant stimuli. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 102(1), 121-132. 
Olatunji, B. O., Sawchuk, C. N., Lee, T. C., Lohr, J. M., & Tolin, D. F. (2008). Information 
processing biases in spider phobia: Application of the Stroop and “white noise” 
paradigm. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 39, 187-200. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  138 
Öst, L-G. (1996). One-session group treatment of specific phobia. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 34(9), 707-715. 
Öst, L-G. (1997). Rapid treatment of specific phobias. In G. C. L. Davey (Ed.). Phobias: A 
handbook of theory, research, and treatment. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Öst, L-G., Alm, T., Brandberg, M., & Breitholtz, E. (2001). One vs. five sessions of exposure 
and five sessions of cognitive therapy in the treatment of claustrophobia. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 39, 167-183. 
Öst, L-G, Brandberg, M., & Alm, T. (1997). One versus five sessions of exposure in the 
treatment of flying phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(11), 987-996. 
Öst, L-G, Ferebee, I., & Furmark, T. (1997). One-session group therapy of spider phobia: Direct 
versus indirect treatments. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(8), 721-732. 
Öst, L-G, Hellström, K., & Kåver, A. (1992). One versus five sessions of exposure in the 
treatment of injection phobia. Behavior Therapy, 23(2), 263-282. 
Pflugshaupt, T., Mosimann, U. P., Schmitt, W. J., von Wartburg, R., Wurtz, P., Lüthi, M., 
Nyffeler, T., Hess, C. W., & Müri, R. M. (2007). To look or not to look at threat? 
Scanpath differences within a group of spider phobics. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21, 
353-366. 
Pflugshaupt, T., Mosimann, U. P., von Wartburg, R., Schmitt, W. J., Nyffeler, T., & Müri, R. M. 
(2005). Hypervigilance-avoidance pattern in spider phobia. Anxiety Disorders, 19, 105-
116. 
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
32(1), 3-25. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  139 
Posner, M. I. (1988). Structures and functions of selective attention. In T. Boll, & B. Bryant 
(Eds.), Clinical neuropsychology and brain function: Research, measurement, and 
practice (pp. 173-202). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. 
Posner, M. I., & Raichle, M. E. (1994). Images of mind. New York: Scientific American Library. 
Posner, M. I, Rothbart, M. K., Sheese, B. E., & Tang, Y. (2007). The anterior cingulate gyrus 
and the mechanism of self-regulation. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 
7(4), 391-395. 
Posner, M. I., Snyder, C. R. R., & Davidson, B. J. (1980). Attention and the detection of signals. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 109(2), 160-174. 
Potter, K. I. (1999). Implicit and explicit memory bias in adolescents who report symptoms of 
anxiety. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, 
60 (4-B).  
Purkis, H. M., & Lipp, O. V. (2007). Automatic attention does not equal automatic fear: 
Preferential attention without implicit valence. Emotion, 7(2), 314-323. 
Ratcliff, R. (1993). Methods for dealing with reaction time outliers. Psychological Bulletin, 
114(3), 510-532. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.114.3.510 
Richards, A., & Millwood, B. (1989). Colour-identification of differentially valenced words in 
anxiety. Cognition & Emotion, 3(2), 171-176.  
Richards, A., & Whittaker, T. M. (1990). Effects of anxiety and mood manipulation in 
autobiographical memory. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 29(2), 145-153.  
Rinck, M., & Becker, E. S. (2006). Spider fearful individuals attend to threat, then quickly avoid 
it: Evidence from eye movements. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(2), 231-238. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  140 
Rothbart, M. K., Ahadi, S. A., & Hershey, K. L. (1994). Temperament and social behavior in 
childhood. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 40, 21–39. 
Schienle, A., Schäfer, A., & Naumann, E. (2008). Event-related brain potentials of spider 
phobics to disorder-relevant, generally-disgust and fear-inducing pictures. Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 22(1), 5-13. 
Schwerdtfeger, A. (2006). Trait anxiety and autonomic indicators of the processing of 
threatening information: A cued S1-S2 paradigm. Biological Psychology, 72, 59-66. 
Sereno, A. B., & Holzman, P. S. (1996). Spatial selective attention in schizophrenic, affective 
disorder, and normal subjects. Schizophrenia Research, 20, 33-50. 
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental 
designs for generalized causal inference. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Shalev, L., & Algom, D. (2000). Stroop and Garner effects in and out of Posner’s beam: 
Reconciling two conceptions of selective attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 26(3), 997-1017. 
Shipley, W. (1940). A self-administering scale for measuring intellectual impairment and 
deterioration. Journal of Psychology, 9, 371-377. 
Sinclair, S. J., Siefert, C. J., Slavin-Mulford, J. M., Stein, M. B., Renna, M., & Blais, M. A. 
(2011). Psychometric evaluation and normative date for the Depression, Anxiety, and 
Stress Scales (DASS-21) in a non-clinical sample in U.S. adults. Evaluation and the 
Health Professions, DOI: 10.1177/0163278711424282. 
Smith-Janik, S. B., & Teachman, B. A. (2008). Impact of priming on explicit memory in spider 
fear. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32, 291-302. 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., and Lushene. R. E. (1970). Manual for the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA; Consulting Psychologists Press 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  141 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). Manual for 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y). Palo Alto, CA; Mind Garden. 
Spielberger, C. D. (1985). Assessment of state and trait anxiety: Conceptual and methodological 
issues. Southern Psychologist, 2(4), 6-16. 
Stanley-Kime, K. L. (2008). The effect of one-session exposure treatment on selective 
processing and explicit memory bias in snake- and spider-fearful participants. 
Unpublished master’s thesis. Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti. 
Steblay, N. M. (1992). A meta-analytic review of the weapon focus effect. Law and Human 
Behavior, 16(4), 413-424. 
Stewart, S. H., Westra, H. A., Thompson, C. E., & Conrad, B. E. (2000). Effects of naturalistic 
benzodiazepine use on selective attention to threat cues among anxiety disorder patients. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24(1), 67-85. 
Straube, T., Mentzel, H.-J., & Miltner, W. H. R. (2006). Neural mechanisms of automatic and 
direct processing of phobogenic stimuli in specific phobia. Biological Psychiatry, 59, 
162-170. 
Strauss, G. P., Allen, D. N., Jorgensen, M. L., & Cramer, S. L. (2005). Test-retest reliability of 
standard and emotional Stroop tasks: An investigation of color-word and picture-word 
versions. Assessment, 12(3), 330-337. 
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 225(6), 643-662. 
Szymanski, J. N., & O'Donohue, W. (1995). Fear of spiders questionnaire. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26(1), 31-34.  
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  142 
Teachman, B. A., & Woody, S. R. (2003). Automatic processing in spider phobia: Implicit fear 
associations over the course of treatment. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112(1), 100-
109. 
Thorpe, S. J., & Salkovskis, P. M. (1997a). The effect of one-session treatment for spider phobia 
on attentional bias and beliefs. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 36(2), 225-241.  
Thorpe, S. J., & Salkovskis, P. M. (1997b). Information processing in spider phobics: The Stroop 
colour naming task may indicate strategic but not automatic bias. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 35(2), 131-144. 
Thorpe, S. J., & Salkovskis, P. M. (2000). Recall and recognition memory for spider 
information. Journal of Anxiety Disorders Special Issue: Current Clinical Challenges in 
the Treatment of Anxiety Disorders, 14(4), 359-375. 
Tolin, D. F., Lohr, J. M., Lee, T. C., & Sawchuk, C. N. (1999). Visual avoidance in specific 
phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 63-70. 
Van den Hout, M., Tenney, N., Huygens, K., & De Jong, P. (1997). Preconcious processing bias 
in specific phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(1), 29-34. 
Vansteenwegen, D., Vervliet, B., Hermans, D., Thewissen, R., & Eelen, P. (2007). Verbal, 
behavioural, and physiological assessment of the generalization of exposure-based fear 
reduction in a spider-anxious population. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 291-300. 
Vrijsen, J. N., Fleurkens, P., Nieuwboer, W., & Rinck, M. (2009). Attentional bias to moving 
spiders in spider fearful individuals. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 541-545. 
Waters, A. J., Sayette, M. A., & Wertz, J. M. (2003). Carry-over effects can modulate emotional 
Stroop effects. Cognition and Emotion, 17(3), 501-509. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  143 
Waters, A. M., Wharton, T. A., Zimmer-Gembeck, M. J., & Craske, M. G. (2008). Threat-based 
cognitive biases in anxious children: Comparison with non-anxious children before and 
after cognitive behavioural treatment. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46, 358-374. 
Watts, F. N. (1986). Cognitive processing in phobias. Behavioural Psychotherapy, 14, 295-301. 
Watts, F. N., & Dalgleish, T. (1991). Memory for phobia-related words in spider phobics. 
Cognition and Emotion, 5(4), 313-329. 
Watts, F. N., & Coyle, K. (1993). Phobics show poor recall of anxiety words. British Journal of 
Medical Psychology, 66, 373-382. 
Watts, F. N., McKenna, F. P., Sharrock, R., & Trezise, L. (1986). Color naming of phobia-
related words. British Journal of Psychology, 77, 97-108. 
Watts, F. N., & Sharrock, R. (1984). Questionnaire dimensions of spider phobia. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 22(5), 575-580.  
Weaver, B., Lupiáñez, J., & Watson, F. L. (1998). The effects of practice on object-based, 
location-based, and static-display inhibition of return. Perception & Psychophysics, 
60(6), 993-1003. 
Wenzel, A., & Holt, C. S. (1999). Dot probe performance in two specific phobias. British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 407-410. 
Wenzel, A., & Holt, C. S. (2002). Memory bias against threat in social phobia. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 41, 73-79. 
Wessel, I., & Merckelbach, H. (1997). The impact of anxiety on memory for details in spider 
phobics. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 11(3), 223-231.  
Wikström, J., Lundh, L.-G., & Westerlund, J., & Högman, L. (2004). Preattentive bias for snake 
words in snake phobia?. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 949-970. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  144 
Wilkinson, L. (1999). Statistical methods in psychology journals: Guidelines and explanations. 
American Psychologist, 54(8), 594-604.  
Williams, J. M. G., Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1996). The emotional Stroop task and 
psychopathology. Psychological Bulletin, 120(1), 3-24. 
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C. & Mathews, A. (1997). Cognitive psychology and 
emotional disorders. (2nd edition). New York: Wiley. 
Wolitzky-Taylor, K. B., Horowitz, J. D., Powers, M. B., & Telch, M. J. (2008). Psychological 
approaches in the treatment of specific phobias: A meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 28, 1021-1037. 
Zachary, R. A. (1991). The manual of the Shipley Institute of Living Scale. Los Angeles, CA: 
Western Psychological Services. 
Zlomke, K., & Davis, T. E. (2008). One-session treatment of specific phobias: A detailed 
description and review of treatment efficacy. Behavior Therapy, 39, 207-223. 
Zoellner, L. A., Echiverri, A., & Craske, M. G. (2000). Processing of phobic stimuli and its 
relationship to outcome. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(9), 921-931.
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  146 
Appendix A 
 
Screening Phase Informed Consent Agreement 
 
The Enduring Impact of One-Session Exposure Treatment on Selective Processing Bias and 
Explicit Memory Avoidance in Snake- and Spider-fearful Participants 
 
Investigators: Karen Stanley-Kime, M.S., and Ellen Koch, Ph.D. 
 
Purpose: The purpose of this research study is to gain a better understanding of the effects of 
anxiety treatment on thinking in those who are and are not fearful of snakes and spiders. 
 
Procedure: This study begins with filling out four online assessment tools, including the Fear of 
Spiders Questionnaire, the Fear of Snakes Questionnaire, the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-
21 item version, and a short background survey. These questionnaires ask for information about 
your fear toward spiders and snakes, general levels of depression and anxiety in your life, and 
some personal information about you. You will also be asked for your contact information so 
that, if you qualify for the study, the experimenter can contact you to invite you to further 
participate in the second phase of the study if you are interested in doing so. The questionnaires 
are brief and will take a maximum of 40 minutes to completely fill out, though you may finish 
significantly sooner than that. Qualification for participating in the second phase of the study is 
based on your responses to each of the surveys and not everyone will be invited to participate in 
the second phase of the experiment. The second phase of the experiment will involve assignment 
to one of three groups: one group of fearful individuals who will receive free one-session 
exposure treatment (treatment group), one group of fearful individuals who will not receive the 
treatment (no-treatment group), or the third group who are not fearful of either the snake or the 
spider and who will not need treatment (control group). If you are assigned to the group of 
fearful individuals who will receive treatment, you will be asked to physically contact a live 
snake or spider if you are able to do so. This is a part of treatment and the experimenter will be 
assisting you to get to the point that you are comfortable contacting the snake or spider. You will 
not be forced to make contact at any time. If you are chosen to further participate, the 
experimenter will contact you to provide further details about the second phase of the experiment 
so you can decide if you would like to continue to the second phase of the experiment, which is 
called the Experimental Phase. There will also be three follow-up phases of the experiment. 
 
Risks: Risks of filling out these online surveys are minimal, though there is a chance that you 
may become upset or anxious by some of the questions that are asked in these questionnaires. In 
the event that you become upset by these surveys, you may seek free mental health assistance 
from Snow Health Center Counseling Services if you are an Eastern Michigan University 
student. Snow Health Center Counseling Services can be contacted at (734) 487-1118. If you are 
not a student of Eastern Michigan University, you may seek therapy from the Eastern Michigan 
University Psychology Clinic, though a fee for therapy sessions will be charged and you will be 
solely responsible for that fee. The Eastern Michigan University Psychology Clinic may be 
contacted at (734) 487-4987. 
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Compensation:  If you are an Eastern Michigan University student, you may receive extra credit 
for your participation in this study only if it is approved by your instructor. If you indicate your 
instructor and provide identifying information at the end of the survey, we will notify your 
instructor of your participation. Your instructor can then assign extra credit points if approved by 
him or her. The experimenters involved in this study can not guarantee or award any extra credit 
points to you themselves. Decisions on extra credit are made completely by the instructor. 
 
Benefits:  There is no direct benefit to participants who complete the Screening Phase of this 
study. If you are invited to further participate in the study, one of the benefits is that, if you are 
fearful of either a spider or a snake, you will receive free one-session treatment for your small 
animal fear during the course of the experiment in the case of membership in the experimental 
treatment group. The treatment involves gradually approaching the live, caged snake or spider 
with the assistance of the experimenter. The ultimate goal is to make you so comfortable that you 
will be able to physically contact the animal without fear or anxiety. This treatment, which has 
been shown to be effective and will take a maximum of 3 hours to be completed in one day, will 
also be offered to you if you are assigned to the no-treatment group; you may request free one-
session exposure treatment for your small animal fear after you have completed your 
participation in the study. Treatment will take place on the fifth floor of Mark Jefferson hall by a 
qualified graduate student in clinical psychology. This benefit does not apply to you if you are 
not fearful of either a spider or a snake. An additional benefit is that your participation will 
increase our knowledge of the effects of anxiety and possibly help us to improve anxiety 
treatment. 
 
Confidentiality: All the information collected from you is strictly confidential and will be 
disclosed only to the experimenters of this study. That means that your name will not appear on 
any papers on which this information is recorded. The forms will all be coded, and the 
investigators will keep a separate master list with the names of participants and the 
corresponding code numbers. Once the data are collected and analyzed, the master list will be 
destroyed. All other forms will be retained for a minimum of five years in a locked file in 505D 
Mark Jefferson. The results of this study will be reported in a dissertation and may be presented 
at professional conferences or in journal articles. All results will be presented using group data 
rather than individual data, and no identifying participant information will be provided in any 
public dissemination of the results of this study.  
 
Withdrawal Without Penalty: Participation in this study is voluntary. You will not be penalized 
for refusing to participate in the study. Further, you are free to withdraw consent and discontinue 
your involvement in the study at any time without penalty. You may stop filling out the surveys 
at any time if you would like to withdraw consent. 
 
Information regarding what to do if you have questions: If you have any questions about your 
participation in this study, please feel free to contact either Karen Stanley-Kime or Dr. Ellen 
Koch.  
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Karen Stanley-Kime (primary student investigator): (734) xxx-xxxx or kstanley2@emich.edu. 
 
Dr. Ellen Koch (primary investigator/faculty advisor): (734) 487-0189 or ellen.koch@emich.edu. 
 
This research protocol and informed consent document has been reviewed and approved by the 
Eastern Michigan University Human Subjects Review Committee for use from August 25, 2009 
to August 25, 2010. If you have questions about the approval process, please contact Dr. Deb de 
Laski-Smith (734.487.0042, Interim Dean of the Graduate School and Administrative Co-chair 
of UHSRC, human.subjects@emich.edu).  
 
By checking the box below, I acknowledge that I have read, understood, and accepted the terms 
outlined above.  
 
 
 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  149 
Appendix B 
 
Experimental Phase Informed Consent Agreement 
 
The Enduring Impact of One-Session Exposure Treatment on Selective Processing Bias and 
Explicit Memory Avoidance in Snake- and Spider-fearful Participants 
 
Investigators: Karen Stanley-Kime, M.S., and Ellen Koch, Ph.D. 
 
Purpose: The purpose of this research study is to gain a better understanding of the effects of 
anxiety treatment on thinking in those who are and are not fearful of snakes and spiders. 
 
Procedure: This is the Experimental Phase of the above-named research study. You have been 
assigned to one of three groups by the experimenter: one group of fearful individuals who will 
receive free one-session treatment (treatment group), one group of fearful individuals who will 
not receive the treatment (no-treatment group), or the third group who are not fearful of either 
the snake or the spider and who will not need treatment (control group). The experiment will 
begin with administration of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
 
After completion of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, those in the treatment group will receive 
several cognitive assessment measures, including an exogenous cueing task and an emotional 
Stroop task, the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, memory evaluation, and a behavioral 
avoidance task. The exogenous cueing task involves you indicating the location of a target on a 
computer screen while the emotional Stroop task involves you looking at words and indicating 
the color of the ink in which they are printed. You will also complete the Shipley Institute of 
Living Scale and three memory measures. During the behavioral avoidance task, you will be 
asked to approach a caged snake or spider stimulus as much as you possibly can. The 
experimenter will then work with treatment group participants to schedule a date and time for 
him/her to come in to undergo treatment for fear of either a snake or a spider. This one session 
in-vivo exposure treatment will be used to reduce fear of snakes/spiders, and will take a 
maximum of 3 hours to complete. This treatment means that, with the help of the experimenter, 
you will be exposed to a live caged snake or spider (depending on your individual fear) and 
asked to perform various tasks related to the snake or spider in an effort to reduce anxiety. This 
will include approaching the snake or spider. The eventual goal is to get you so comfortable that 
you can physically contact the snake or spider. The snake used in exposure treatment will be a 
corn snake; the spider used for exposure treatment will be a Chilean rose hair tarantula. You will 
not be forced to make physical contact during treatment; this is your decision and the 
experimenter will never force you to do anything as part of treatment. Hand sanitizer will be 
available throughout the experiment as a precautionary measure to be used if you desire. 
Following treatment, you will be asked again to complete the same cognitive assessment 
measures as you did before, including an exogenous cueing task and an emotional Stroop task, 
the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, memory evaluation, and a behavioral avoidance task. For 
those individuals who are assigned to the treatment group, initial participation in this study will 
take two separate days. The first day will require a time commitment of up to one hour and the 
second day during which treatment will be provided will require a time commitment of up to 
four hours.  
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If you are a member of the no-treatment group or the control group, you will not receive any 
treatment; instead, you will simply be administered several cognitive measures after you 
complete the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, the first of which will be an exogenous cueing task 
followed by an emotional Stroop task. The exogenous cueing task involves you indicating the 
location of a target on a computer screen while the emotional Stroop task involves you looking at 
words and indicating the color of the ink in which they are printed. You will also complete the 
Shipley Institute of Living Scale and three memory measures. After you have completed these 
tasks, you will be asked to approach a caged snake or spider stimulus as much as you possibly 
can. Those individuals who are in the experimental no-treatment group and the non-fearful group 
can expect up to a one hour time commitment to be completed in one day. You will be asked to 
return to take the same tests of cognition again, preferably within the same week. 
 
For all participants, there are two additional follow-up appointments that are made at one week 
and one month from the date you participated. These follow-up appointments will not involve 
treatment, only cognitive assessment. The follow-up appointments will begin with administration 
of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. After completion of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, you 
will be asked to complete the same cognitive assessment measures as you did in the initial 
Experimental Phase. One of these measures is called an emotional Stroop task and the other is an 
exogenous cueing task. You will also complete the Shipley Institute of Living Scale and three 
memory measures. After you have completed these tasks, you will be asked to approach a caged 
snake or spider stimulus as much as you possibly can. Completion of these procedures requires 
up to a one hour time commitment that is to be completed in one day. 
 
Risks: As in many experimental studies, risks are present. You may experience elevations in 
anxiety during this study. If you begin to feel very uncomfortable, you may take a break or leave 
the situation if desired. You will choose how much you will approach the snake/spider. At no 
time will the experimenter ever force you to approach or make contact with the snake/spider. If 
you choose to make physical contact, you must do so only with the utmost care for the 
animal’s/insect’s safety and your safety. The trained experimenter will monitor the situation to 
make sure that there is no danger to yourself or the snake/spider. If an accidental injury occurs, 
appropriate emergency measures will be taken; however, no compensation or additional 
treatment will be made available. In the unlikely event that you need medical treatment, Snow 
Health Center or the nearest hospital will be used and the experimenter will accompany you to 
the treatment facility if you would like. You will be responsible for the cost of any medical 
treatment you pursue. It is important to note that the snakes/spiders used in this study do have an 
amount of venom that is medically insignificant for most people, but could possibly be harmful if 
you are allergic to it. If you require counseling as a result of this study, it will be provided to you 
free of cost by Eastern Michigan University’s Snow Health Center Counseling Services if you 
are a currently enrolled student. Snow Health Center Counseling Services can be contacted at 
(734) 487-1118. If you are not a student of Eastern Michigan University, you may seek therapy 
from the Eastern Michigan University Psychology Clinic, though a fee for therapy sessions will 
be charged and you will be solely responsible for that fee. The Eastern Michigan University 
Psychology Clinic may be contacted at (734) 487-4987. In addition, other treatments for phobias 
besides in vivo exposure treatment are available for you to pursue at any time.  
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As with turtles, other reptiles, and some birds, there is the possibility of salmonella 
contamination; however, handling precautions and sanitation of all areas that the snake comes 
into contact with will be used to minimize this risk. In addition, hand sanitizer will be made 
available throughout the experiment for participant use.  
 
Compensation:  If you are an Eastern Michigan University student, you may receive extra credit 
for your participation in this study only if it is approved by your instructor. If you indicate that 
you desire your instructor to be notified of your participation, the experimenter will sign a slip 
stating that you participated in the study. Your instructor can then assign extra credit points if 
approved by him or her. The experimenters involved in this study can not guarantee or award 
any extra credit points to you themselves. Decisions on extra credit are made completely by the 
instructor. 
 
Benefits:  If you are assigned to the treatment condition, you will receive the free one-session 
treatment for your snake/spider fear described above. Fearful participants that do not receive 
treatment during participation may choose to receive treatment after participating in the study in 
full or in part. If you are in this group and would like the one-session treatment for snake or 
spider fears, it will be offered to you free of charge once your participation in this study is 
completed and will take place on the fifth floor of Mark Jefferson hall. This is a highly effective 
treatment for quickly reducing fear; thus, there should be a beneficial reduction in the anxiety 
that you feel when you are around or think about a spider or a snake. However, if new 
information is released during the course of this study that negates the effectiveness of this 
treatment, the treatment may be altered and you will be informed and given the opportunity to 
consent to the new treatment. Finally, your participation will increase our knowledge of the 
effects of anxiety and may help us to improve anxiety treatment. 
 
Confidentiality: All information obtained from you will remain confidential. No identifying 
information, such as your name, will be printed on any data form. Instead, a unique participant 
number will be printed on all data forms. Once data is collected, it will be stored in a password 
protected computer file in a locked office. Your name and contact information will not be 
disclosed to any unauthorized individuals. The results of this study will be disseminated in the 
form of a dissertation. Also, this study may be submitted for publication or may be presented at 
various conferences. Your name and identifying information will not be mentioned in any 
written document or verbal presentation regarding this study. You will be given a unique 
participant number to conceal your identity and, once data is completely collected for this study, 
you will be identified only by number and your name/contact information will be destroyed.  
 
Withdrawal Without Penalty: Participation in this study is voluntary. You will not be penalized 
for refusing to participate in the study. Further, you are free to withdraw consent and discontinue 
your involvement in the study at any time without penalty. You are also free to request a brief 
break at any point in the study if necessary. If you are in the no-treatment group and decide to 
withdraw your consent at any time during the experiment, you are still eligible to receive one-
session in vivo exposure treatment if you desire.  
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Information regarding what to do if you have questions: 
If you have any questions about your participation in this study, please feel free to contact either 
Karen Stanley-Kime or Dr. Ellen Koch.  
 
Karen Stanley-Kime (primary student investigator): (734) xxx-xxxx or kstanley2@emich.edu. 
 
Dr. Ellen Koch (primary investigator/faculty advisor): (734) 487-0189 or ellen.koch@emich.edu. 
 
This research protocol and informed consent document has been reviewed and approved by the 
Eastern Michigan University Human Subjects Review Committee for use from August 25, 2009 
to August 25, 2010. If you have questions about the approval process, please contact Dr. Deb de 
Laski-Smith (734.487.0042, Interim Dean of the Graduate School and Administrative Co-chair 
of UHSRC, human.subjects@emich.edu). 
 
By signing this form, I acknowledge that I have read, understood, and accepted the terms 
outlined above and have received a copy of this form.  
 
___________________________________   __________________ 
Participant Signature      Date 
 
___________________________________   __________________ 
Research Assistant Signature     Date 
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Appendix C 
 
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) 
 
For each item, please record a number to indicate how much you agree with the statement. 
Ratings can include any number between 0 (totally disagree) and 7 (totally agree). 
 
Totally Disagree        Totally Agree 
 0 ---------- 1 ---------- 2 ---------- 3 ---------- 4 ---------- 5 ---------- 6 ----------7 
 
____ 1. If I came across a spider now, I would get help from someone else to remove it. 
 
____ 2. Currently, I am sometimes on the look out for spiders. 
 
____ 3. If I saw a spider now, I would think it will harm me. 
 
____ 4. I now think a lot about spiders. 
 
____ 5. I would be somewhat afraid to enter a room now, where I have seen a spider before. 
 
____ 6. I now would do anything to try to avoid a spider. 
 
____ 7. Currently, I sometimes think about getting bit by a spider. 
 
____ 8. If I encountered a spider now, I wouldn’t be able to deal effectively with it. 
 
____ 9. If I encountered a spider now, it would take a long time to get it out of my mind. 
 
____ 10. If I came across a spider now, I would leave the room. 
 
____ 11. If I saw a spider now, I would think it will try to jump on me. 
 
____ 12. If I saw a spider now, I would ask someone else to kill it. 
 
____ 13. If I encountered a spider now, I would have images of it trying to get me. 
 
____ 14. If I saw a spider now, I would be afraid of it. 
 
____ 15. If I saw a spider now, I would feel very panicky. 
 
____ 16. Spiders are one of my worst fears. 
 
____ 17. I would feel very nervous if I saw a spider now. 
 
____ 18. If I saw a spider now, I would probably break out in a sweat and my heart would beat 
faster. 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  154 
Appendix D 
 
Fear of Snakes Questionnaire (FSnQ) 
 
For each item, please record a number to indicate how much you agree with the statement. 
Ratings can include any number between 0 (totally disagree) and 7 (totally agree). 
 
Totally Disagree        Totally Agree 
 0 ---------- 1 ---------- 2 ---------- 3 ---------- 4 ---------- 5 ---------- 6 ----------7 
 
____ 1. If I came across a snake now, I would get help from someone else to get rid of it. 
 
____ 2. Currently, I am sometimes on the look out for snakes. 
 
____ 3. If I saw a snake now, I would think it will harm me. 
 
____ 4. I now think a lot about snakes. 
 
____ 5. I would be somewhat afraid to go to a place where I have seen a snake before. 
 
____ 6. I now would do anything to try to avoid a snake. 
 
____ 7. Currently, I sometimes think about getting bit by a snake. 
 
____ 8. If I encountered a snake now, I wouldn’t be able to deal effectively with it. 
 
____ 9. If I encountered a snake now, it would take a long time to get it out of my mind. 
 
____ 10. If I came across a snake now, I would leave the vicinity of the animal. 
 
____ 11. If I saw a snake now, I would think it will try to attack me. 
 
____ 12. If I saw a snake now, I would ask someone else to get it away from me. 
 
____ 13. If I encountered a snake now, I would have images of it trying to get me. 
 
____ 14. If I saw a snake now, I would be afraid of it. 
 
____ 15. If I saw a snake now, I would feel very panicky. 
 
____ 16. Snakes are one of my worst fears. 
 
____ 17. I would feel very nervous if I saw a snake now. 
 
____ 18. If I saw a snake now, I would probably break out in a sweat and my heart would beat 
faster. 
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Appendix E 
 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21-Item Version (DASS - 21)  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each statement and choose the number which indicates how much 
the statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time on any statement. The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0= Did not apply to me at all 
1= Applied to me to some degree of some of the time 
2= Applied to me a considerable degree, or a good part of the time 
3= Applied to me very much, or most of the time. 
 
1. I found it hard to wind down. 
 
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth. 
 
3. I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feelings at all. 
 
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in the 
absence of physical exertion). 
 
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things. 
 
6. I tended to over-react to situations. 
 
7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands). 
 
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy. 
 
9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself. 
 
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to. 
 
11. I found myself getting agitated. 
 
12. I found it difficult to relax. 
 
13. I felt down-hearted and blue. 
 
14. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was doing. 
 
15. I felt I was close to panic. 
 
16. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything. 
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17. I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person. 
 
18. I felt that I was rather touchy. 
 
19. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion (e.g., sense of 
heart rate increase, heart missing a beat). 
 
20. I felt scared without any good reason. 
 
21. I felt that life wasn’t worthwhile. 
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Appendix F 
 
Screening Phase Background Questionnaire  
 
1. First name ___________ 
 
2. Age ________________ 
 
3. Sex Male Female 
 
4. Race/ethnicity (Choose one) 
 White/Caucasian    
Pacific Islander 
 Black/African American 
Middle Eastern 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 Native American    
 Alaskan Native 
 Asian 
Multi-Racial/Multi-Ethnic (Please indicate: _________) 
Other (Please indicate: _________)  
I choose not to respond to this question. 
   
5. Are you employed?  Yes          No 
 
6. If yes, what is your occupation? 
 
7. Are you a current student of Eastern Michigan University?  Yes          No 
 
8. What is your current college standing  (Choose one)  
Did not attend any college 
Some college, did not graduate and not currently enrolled 
Freshman 
Sophomore 
Junior 
Senior 
Second Bachelors 
Graduate Student (Masters or Doctoral level) 
Graduate of a 2 year college 
Graduate of a 4 year college 
Completed Graduate/Professional School 
 
9. Do you currently have any health conditions that may be worsened if you become 
anxious or fearful, including any of the following?  (Check all that apply)   
None 
Asthma 
Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias  158 
Heart condition of any kind 
Hypertension (high blood pressure) 
Lung disease, including any shortness of breath or trouble breathing  
Migraine 
Neurological problem 
Pregnancy or the possibility of pregnancy 
Recurring chest pain 
Seizure 
Stroke 
Ulcers         
Other (please specify) 
 
10. Have you ever experienced an intensely fearful or traumatic experience involving a 
snake?  Yes No 
If yes, briefly describe the experience in the box provided. 
 
11. Have you ever experienced an intensely fearful or traumatic experience involving a 
spider?  Yes No 
If yes, briefly describe the experience in the box provided. 
 
12. Have you ever experienced any kind of traumatic brain injury? Yes No 
 
13. Do you suffer from epilepsy, dementia, or any other condition that impacts brain 
functioning?  Yes No 
 
14. Have you ever been diagnosed with a learning disability?  Yes No 
 
15. Have you ever been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)?  
Yes  No 
 
16. Are you color-blind or do you have current uncorrected vision problems that interfere 
with sight?  Yes No 
 
17. Do you have any known allergies to either a snake or a spider? Yes No 
 
18. Is your immune system in any way compromised (by a virus such as HIV or by cancer 
treatment, for instance)? Yes  No 
 
19. How did you hear about this study? (Choose all that apply) 
Flyer In-class announcement  Friend/family member  Other (please indicate:________) 
 
20. If you wish to be contacted for further participation in this study, do you prefer to be 
contacted by phone or by email (you may check both)? Phone Email I do not wish 
to be contacted for further participation 
Please provide the best phone number to reach you at and/or your email address. 
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21. If you checked “phone,” what are the best days to reach you by phone?  (Choose all that 
apply) 
Sunday     Monday      Tuesday    Wednesday     Thursday  Friday     Saturday 
 
22. If you checked “phone,” what are the best times to reach you by phone?  (Choose all that 
apply) 
Morning (8am – 12pm)  Afternoon (12pm - 5pm) Evening (5pm – 8pm) 
If necessary, please note any additional calling instructions that the experimenter should 
know. 
23. If you would like your psychology instructor to be informed of your participation in this 
phase of the experiment, please provide the following information. If you are not a 
student of Eastern Michigan University or would not like any instructor to be informed of 
your participation, you may skip this. 
Your first name _________ 
Your last name _________ 
Your email address ___________ 
 
24. If you would like us to inform your instructor of your participation in this phase of the 
experiment, please indicate which instructor you would like us to inform. If you are not a 
student of Eastern Michigan University or would not like any instructor to be informed of 
your participation, you may skip this. Please note that you can only select one instructor 
from the list below. If you have special circumstances in which you need more than one 
instructor notified, you may email the principle investigator at kstanley2@emich.edu. 
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Appendix G 
Words Used in Emotional Stroop Task and Explicit Memory Evaluation 
Snake Threat Words Spider Threat Words Neutral Words 
Filler Words for 
Word-stem Cued, 
Recognition Tests 
pierce pierce divert prey 
deadly deadly excess coil 
kill kill form tighten 
dangerous dangerous conscious crawl 
predator predator nonsense candy 
aggressive aggressive infectious meet 
molt molt pave grocery 
fangs fangs equal shower 
bite bite pile yesterday 
strike strike arrive feminine 
venom venom tenet delight 
snake legs metal audit 
slither scurry cement gate 
viper spider diaper key 
anaconda tarantula explosion leather 
reptile insect prince orchestra 
cobra hairy navel panic 
hiss web lure tangle 
serpent itching quicken tune 
scales cobweb riddle zero 
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Appendix H 
Free Recall Test 
 
Participant Number:  __________  Date:  ____________  Experimenter:  _______________ 
Assessment Period (circle one):  
Pre-test Post-test  One-week follow-up  One-month follow-up 
 
Instructions:  During the Word List Presentation, you saw a number of words on a computer 
screen. Each word was presented individually on the screen. You were asked to pay close 
attention to each word.  
 
On the blanks below, clearly print each word that you can recall from that word list. Use one 
blank for each word. If you are not sure of all the words, you may guess. You will have 10 
minutes to complete this test. If you finish early, tell the experimenter so that you can move on to 
the next test. Once you complete this test and give it to the experimenter, you will not be able to 
return to it later to change your answers. 
 
Example:  __Card__________ 
 
________________________________          ________________________________ 
 
________________________________          ________________________________ 
 
________________________________          ________________________________ 
 
________________________________          ________________________________ 
 
________________________________          ________________________________ 
 
________________________________          ________________________________ 
 
________________________________          ________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
 
________________________________ 
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Appendix I 
 
Word-Stem Cued Recall Test 
 
Participant Number:  __________  Date:  ____________  Experimenter:  _______________ 
Assessment Period: Pre-test  
 
Instructions:  During the Word List Presentation, you saw a number of words on a computer 
screen. Each word was presented individually on the screen. You were asked to pay close 
attention to each word.  
 
The first two letters of a word are printed below; this is called a word-stem. The word-stem is 
followed by a blank. First, notice the word-stem. Then try to recall the word that was presented 
during the Word List Presentation that began with that word-stem. Print the letters that complete 
the word on the blank following the word-stem. No words should be repeated. That is, you 
should have different words for each word-stem. Not all of the word-stems below were shown in 
the Word List Presentation.  If you do not think that the word-stem is for a word you previously 
saw during Word List Presentation, leave it blank and move on. You will have 10 minutes to 
complete this test. If you finish early, tell the experimenter so that you can move on to the next 
test. Once you complete this test and give it to the experimenter, you will not be able to return to 
it later to change your answers. 
 
Example:  ca_rd______ 
 
1. pr_______________________ 
2. fa_______________________ 
3. co_______________________ 
4. qu_______________________ 
5. ti________________________ 
6. vi_______________________ 
7. mo_______________________ 
8. ca_______________________ 
9. me_______________________ 
10. gr_______________________ 
11. me_______________________ 
12. sh_______________________ 
13. ye_______________________ 
14. re_______________________ 
15. ki_______________________ 
16. pi_______________________ 
17. pa_______________________ 
18. fe_______________________ 
19. di_______________________ 
20. eq_______________________ 
21. de_______________________ 
22. au_______________________ 
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23. ga_______________________ 
24. di_______________________ 
25. fo_______________________ 
26. pr_______________________ 
27. pi_______________________ 
28. ke_______________________ 
29. le_______________________ 
30. bi_______________________ 
31. ag_______________________ 
32. or_______________________ 
33. pa_______________________ 
34. se_______________________ 
35. ta_______________________ 
36. in_______________________ 
37. sn_______________________ 
38. tu_______________________ 
39. ze_______________________ 
40. cr_______________________ 
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Appendix J 
Recognition Test 
 
Participant Number:  __________  Date:  ____________  Experimenter:  _______________ 
Assessment Period (circle one): Pre-test  
 
Instructions:  During the Word List Presentation, you saw a number of words on a computer 
screen. Each word was presented individually on the screen. You were asked to pay close 
attention to each word.  
 
Below is a list of words. Some of these words were shown during Word List Presentation. Others 
were not shown during Word List Presentation. Read the word and circle it if you remember 
seeing it during Word List Presentation. If you do not think it was shown during Word List 
Presentation, do nothing with that word; just leave it alone and move on to the next word. You 
will have 10 minutes to complete this test. If you finish early, tell the experimenter so that you 
can move on. Once you complete this test and give it to the experimenter, you will not be able to 
return to it later to change your answers. 
 
Example: Card  
 
  Mark 
 
 
 
Infectious 
Equal 
Delight 
Meet 
Zero 
Bite 
Diaper 
Snake 
Reptile 
Prey 
Coil 
Feminine 
Key 
Audit 
Kill 
Pave 
Orchestra 
Pile 
Metal 
Serpent 
Prince 
Form 
Panic 
Aggressive 
Divert 
Gate 
Shower 
Leather 
Crawl 
Tighten 
Grocery 
Viper 
Molt 
Candy 
Fangs 
Yesterday 
Tangle 
Tune 
Pierce 
Quicken
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Appendix K 
 
Participant BAT Record 
 
Participant Number: _____________ Date: ________________   Experimenter: __________________ 
Type of animal: (Circle)  Rose Hair Tarantula  Corn Snake 
Participant Group (Circle): Control  Exp. Tx   Exp. No Tx 
Assessment Period (Circle): Pre-test  Post-test One-week f.u. One-month f.u. 
 
1. SUDS rating at the door: ________ 
 
2. Initial distance from the door that the participant traveled (record distance by looking at the tip 
of the participants toes in relation to the ruler): ____________ feet 
Note: If the participant is unable to enter the room or does not move past the door, please record 0 
(zero) feet. If the participant travels the maximum 14 foot distance from the door, skip questions 3 
and 4.  
SUDS rating at initial stopping point: ________ 
 
3. Did you prompt the participant to move further than the initial stopping point?  Yes  No 
Note: If you circled “Yes”, continue with the questions 3a and 3b below. If you circled “No”, go on to 
Question 4. 
a. Distance from the door that the participant traveled when prompted by the experimenter 
(record distance by looking at the tip of the participants toes in relation to the ruler)
 :____________ feet 
b. SUDS rating at the prompted stopping point:   __________ 
c. Was the participant able to go any further when again prompted by the experimenter? 
  Yes  No 
Noted: If you circled “Yes”, go on to question 4. If you circled “No”, skip question 4 and 
go on to question 5. 
 
4. Final distance from the door that the participant traveled (record distance by looking at the tip 
of the participants toes in relation to the ruler) : ____________ feet 
Note: If the participant was unable to enter the room or never left the door, please record 0 (zero) feet. 
SUDS rating at final stopping point: ________ 
 
5. Please indicate any physical signs of distress exhibited by the participant: (Circle) 
 
Crying 
 
Shaking 
 
Groaning, whimpering, other verbalizations 
 
Covering eyes 
 
Attempting to look away (wall, floor) or turn back 
 
Other (please describe below)
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Appendix L 
Diagram of Study Procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fearful Participants        Non-fearful Participants 
 
  Random Selection 
 Random 
Assignment
 
Spider-
fearful 
Score 
at/above 70 
on FSQ, 
 
Cognitive Assessment 
Sequence (CAS) 
 
• State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (full for pre-
test, State subscale for all 
other assessments) 
• Emotional Stroop Task 
• Exogenous Cueing Task 
• Shipley Institute of 
Living Scale – 
Vocabulary Subscale 
• Explicit Word List 
Presentation 
• Shipley Institute of 
Living Scale – Abstract 
Thinking Subscale 
• Explicit Memory Tests 
• BAT with SUDs Rating 
Experimental Phase 
Study Introduction 
Informed Consent 
Screening Phase 
Informed Consent, 
FSQ,  
FSnQ, 
DASS-21, background 
questionnaire 
Treatment 
N = 20 
 
No-
treatment 
N = 20 
 
Control 
N = 20 
 
Snake-
fearful 
Score 
at/above 70 
on FSnQ,  
 
Control 
Scores 
at/below 10 
on either FSQ 
or FSnQ 
 
Pre-test CAS 
Exposure 
Treatment, 
Post-test CAS 
 
One-week 
Follow-up CAS 
One-month 
Follow-up CAS 
Pre-test CAS 
 
Pre-test CAS 
 
Post-test CAS Post-test CAS 
 
One-week 
Follow-up CAS 
One-week 
Follow-up CAS 
One-month 
Follow-up CAS 
One-month 
Follow-up CAS 
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Appendix M 
 
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board of Eastern Michigan University Approval Letters 
 
          EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
                                                                  Education First 
 
October 8, 2009 
 
Karen Stanley-Kime 
Psychology 
 
Dear Karen Stanley-Kime: 
 
The Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Eastern Michigan University has 
granted approval to your proposal, “The Enduring Impact of One-Session Exposure Treatment 
on Selective Processing Bias and Explicit Memory Avoidance in Snake- and Spider-fearful 
Participants: An Examination of Treatment Outcome on Maladaptive Cognitive Processing 
Immediately Post-Treatment and at One Week and One Month Follow-up.” 
 
After careful review of your completion application, the IRB determined that the rights and 
welfare of the individual subjects involved in this research are carefully guarded. Additionally, 
the methods used to obtain informed consent are appropriate, and the individuals participating in 
your study are not at risk. 
 
You are reminded of your obligation to advise the IRB of any change in the protocol that might 
alter your research in any manner that differs from that upon which this approval is based. 
Approval of this project applies for one year from the date of this letter. If your data collection 
continues beyond the one-year period, you must apply for a renewal. 
 
On behalf of the Human Subjects Committee, I wish you success in conducting your research. 
 
Sincerely, 
Deb de Laski-Smith, Ph.D. 
Interim Dean 
Graduate School 
Administrative Co-Chair 
University Human Subjects Review Committee 
 
 
Note:  If project continues beyond the length of one year, please submit a continuation request 
form by 8/25/10.               
Reference # 090701 
 
University Human Subjects Review Committee ⋅ Eastern Michigan University ⋅  200 Boone Hall  
Ypsilanti, Michigan 48197 
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Appendix N 
 
Screening Phase Opt-Out Questionnaire 
 
1. What is the main reason that you decided to decline to be contacted for further 
participation in this experiment (choose only your main reason from the list below)? 
 
I do not have the time to participate further. 
I have no interest in this project. 
I am too frightened or nervous to participate in the next phase of the experiment. 
I am not comfortable providing my contact information to the experimenter of this study. 
I do not understand what further participation would involve. 
I do not feel like continued participation in this project could benefit me. 
I disagree with the purposes of this research project. 
I do not participate in research projects in general 
Other (please specify) 
 
2. Please rate how applicable the statements below are to you using the following scale: 
 
1 = Completely False 
2 = Somewhat False 
3 = Somewhat True 
4 = Completely True 
 
I am afraid that I would be forced to see a snake or spider if I participated in this 
experiment. 
 
I am afraid that I would be forced to touch a snake or spider if I participated in this 
experiment. 
 
If I were selected to be in the treatment group, I would not be able to overcome my fear 
even with treatment. 
 
I am much too scared of snakes and/or spiders to be a part of this study. 
 
Something bad would happen to me if I chose to participate further (i.e. have a panic 
attack, bite by a snake or spider). 
 
I am afraid that I might lose control if I become too fearful during the study. 
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Appendix O 
Eastern Michigan University’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee Approval 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
